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                                                                   To my beloved friends, because: 
 
Going in tandem, one perceives before the other. 
 Plato, Protagoras, 348d. 
 
‘Let’s go,’ he said. ‘We’ll think about what to say  
‘as we proceed the two of us along the way.’ 
















Plato’s attitude on Art has always been hardly debated among scholars, and in recent 
times the interest on ancient Aesthetics in general and Plato’s attitude in particular 
has been even increased in the philosophical debate. The problem with Plato’s 
position is twofold. On the one hand he expresses hard criticism against poetry and 
he even banishes the poets from the ideal state he envisages in the Republic. That has 
been usually regarded as an illiberal, totalitarian position. On the other hand, the 
criticisms he makes of poetry seem to present inconsistencies among the Platonic 
corpus and they could prima facie appear to the modern reader odd, paternalistic or 
moralistic.  
Throughout my work I suggest to adopt a new approach, based both on historical and 
theoretical grounds, according to which it will be possible to resolve the problems 
that Plato’s objections to poetry give rise to. The historical and cultural context will 
be the focus of the first chapter. It consists of the following points. On the one hand I 
will first focus on different features that characterize Greek poetry, and on the other I 
will emphasize the pre-literacy of Plato’s contemporaries. I will also highlight how 
the ethical and political role, along with the educational function, made poetry the 
privileged source of information and education, and the ultimate reference for 
everyone in the Athens of the fifth B.C. In the second section of the first chapter I 
will analyze Plato’s teleologism, which I regard to be a fundamental entity in his 
stance on art. Such a notion, although not as much emphasized by scholars, plays a 
pivotal role in Plato’s arguments on poetry, I contend. This is especially evident in 
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the Republic, where Plato’s criticism regards the flaws of poetry in teaching (Resp. II 
and III) first, and secondly as the main source of knowledge (X).  
In the third and last section of chapter one, I will face the complex issue of the 
alleged existence of the concept of beauty in antiquity. In this occasion I argue in 
favour of the existence of such an entity, both among average Greeks and for Plato, 
even though in different ways and degrees of awareness.  
After having provided the historical and theoretical frame of my approach, I will then 
move to textual examination of the Platonis Opera.  In the second and third chapter I 
will analyse the so-called ‘early dialogues’, in order to single out the recurrent 
features of Plato’s stance on poetry. In fact, one of the main goals of my study is to 
retrace an overall, consistent view on art in general and poetry in particular among 
the Platonic corpus. While the second chapter is mainly focused on the Apology and 
the Protagoras, a special emphasis deserves the Ion, which is the object of the third 
chapter. I argue indeed that for the first time in this early dialogue we find a clear 
theoretical expression of a key-concept of Plato’s stance on art. In fact, Plato bases 
his criticism toward the eponymous rhapsode pointing out that the rhapsode on the 
one hand lacks the knowledge of the things he (demands to be able to) talk(s) about. 
On the other hand, the rhapsode lacks the knowledge of what poetry, as well as his 
trade, is. Such a ‘twofold ignorance’, as we will see, it is a recurring pattern in 
Socrates’ pupil.  
While the fourth chapter is mainly devoted to the analysis and comment of the 
Symposium, the fifth, sixth and seventh chapter present the detailed examination of 
the Book II, III and X of the Republic. They are respectively devoted to the analysis 
and criticism of the ‘middle dialogues’, the Republic and the ‘late dialogues’. 
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Because of its capital importance for the purpose of my argument, I will analyze 
Plato’s criticism in the Republic in details and I will face different approaches to the 
subject. Afterwards I will confront them with my own theory in order to show that 
adopting my approach the apparent discrepancies regarding Plato’s aesthetics within 
the Republic itself as well as in others Platonic dialogues disappear. (And, on the 
contrary, this does not happen if the reader accepts the mainstream interpretation on 
the subject at issue). In essence: I propose to take Plato’s criticism of poetry not as an 
aesthetic attitude, but rather as a justified concern about the pursuit of truth through 
poetry, as if it were the main source of teaching, moral value, knowledge and 
information in the ancient Greek society. That is the core of my argument.  
The eighth chapter analyses the ‘late dialogues’, in particular The Laws, given the 
abundant of relevant passages on the matter.  
Finally, the ninth and last chapter faces Popper’s notorious judgment of Plato as 
totalitarian scholar. In this section of the study I will contend that Popper’s notorious 
reading of Plato’s political system is fallacious. Further, I will reveal that Plato and 
Popper’s stance on mass media essentially correspond. It is my understanding that 
such a fundamental passage will give the ultimate proof of the rightness of my 
revolutionary reading of the vexata quaestio of the ancient quarrel between 
philosophy and poetry in Plato. 
Finally, the outcome of my investigations will show that Plato does not banish poetry 
because he is attacking it as a dangerous, free, “fine” Art. On the contrary, I propose 
to take his attack as the only way to release poetry from its educational and political 
context and to baptize it into the realm of Fine Art. 
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As a matter of historical fact, what makes Greek poetry so different from our own is 
the way in which it was practiced. In an oral culture, the forms of poetry played a 
major role in the process of learning and memorization. Based on this fact, in this 
initial section of the work, I will address Greek pre-literacy in the age of Plato, 
giving historical evidence that, for the average Greek, poetry was the main source of 
learning and knowledge during childhood. Moreover, since some recent views reject 
the concept of an ‘oral culture’ in fifth to fourth Athens in the V-IV B. C., I will offer 
a detailed discussion about the weight and importance of the oral performance of 
poetry.  This discussion challenges such views and gives historical evidence to 
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support my theory; namely, that since the oral practice of poetry was a regular 
feature in ancient Greek literature and it had a pivotal role in the process of learning 
and memorization, Plato’s criticism and related censorship aimed to improve such an 
educational process. Therefore, I will demonstrate that Greek culture was mainly an 
oral one and that such an oral culture was primarily based on Homeric and Hesiodic 
epics.  
Some authors, such as W. Jaeger1, E. A Havelock2, A. Nehamas3 and M. Burnyeat4 
among others, stand in this respect. They are emphasised here because, since 
Jaeger’s Paideia and Havelock’s Preface to Plato, they have given birth to a new 
course of study. As we shall see soon in more detail, Jaeger, for one, provided new 
historical and philological evidence showing the huge influence of Greek poetry in 
the everyday life of the Hellenic world. On the same line of reasoning, Havelock 
focused on the relation between poetry and Plato, in order to shed light on the real 
object of Socrates’ pupil attack.  
These pivotal publications from the first half of the twentieth century allow to 
Nehamas’ and Burnyeat’s seminal contributions. The former drew an innovative 
comparison between Greek poetry and tragedy on the one hand and television on the 
other. The salient point showed that Plato’s (alleged) repressive attitude toward the 
main mass media of his time actually fit modern concerns on the (bad) effects of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jaeger W. 1944. Paideia. The idea of Greek Culture, Oxford University Press, New York. 
2 Havelock, E. A., 1963.  Preface to Plato, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
3 Nehamas, A., (1988), ‘Plato and the Mass Media’, Monist 71, pp. 214-34. 
4 Burnyeat, M. F., ‘Culture and Society in Plato’s Republic’, in: Peterson, G. B. (ed.), 
Tanner Lectures on Human Values 20, Salt Lake City, The University of Utah Press, 1999, 
pp. 216-324. 
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television. With his well known Culture and Society in Plato’s Republic,5 Burnyeat 
eventually explicitly ratifies what was at least in part in nuce in the previous studies: 
‘But not because they were poets. He banished them because they produced the 
wrong sort of poetry. To rebut Plato’s critique of poetry, what is needed is not a 
defence of poetry, but a defence of the freedom of poets to write as, and what, they 
wish.’6 
Once I have outlined the main literature and references, I shall now give my reasons 
for pursuit further this line of reasoning. Indeed, one might ask the ratio of a new 
contribution on the matter, especially in the light of the last quote.  
First of all, as the never-ending publication of monographs on the matter plainly 
shows, the vexata quaestio of Plato’s notorious attitude toward poetry is far from 
being resolved. Second of all, by the means of an accurate textual examination and 
by confronting my criticism with different commentators, I will answer how and why 
Plato actually released poetry from its subordinate function and baptized it under the 
auspices of Fine Art. What follows will make analytically clear what I mean.  
 
1.1.0. Historical context: Oral culture and Archaic Greek poetry. 
 
First, let us consider the meaning of ‘reading’ in ancient Greece since it does not 
mean what the modern term has come to express. Rather, as I will show in this part 
of the study, it referred to a completely different practice, in which the main point 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
6 Ibid, p. 255. 
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was regular oral performance. I will also give evidence that the term ‘reading’ 
implied an active participation for the ‘reader’ who engaged in the process of 
learning and memorization. The ancient Greek word for ‘reading’ is 
‘αναγιγνωσκω’, but it does not correspond to the contemporary meaning of the 
English verb ‘read’. Rather, its meaning is closer to ‘reading in a group7’ or to ‘recite 
a poem8’. This is due to the fact that the concept of private or individual reading was 
basically unknown to the ancient Greeks. Burnyeat singles out such an essential 
difference in the following, enlightening passage that I quote here in full:  
Forget about reading T. S. Eliot to yourself in bed. Our subject is the 
words and music you hear at social gatherings, large and small. Think 
pubs and cafés, karaoki, football matches, the last night of the proms. 
Think morning service at the village church, carols from Westminster 
Abbey. Think popular music in general and, when Plato brings in a 
parallel from the visual arts, forget the Tate Gallery and recall the 
advertisements that surround us everywhere. Above all, think about the 
way all this is distributed to us by television, the omnipresent medium at 
work in every home. What Plato is discussing in the Republic, when he 
talks about poetry, is how to control the influences that shape the culture 
in which the young grow up.9  
 
On the same line, Havelock points out:  
It is not just a matter of selected readings given in public or private nor of 
annual festivals in the theatre. On the contrary the fact that the situation of 
the learner on the one hand and of the adult on the other are treated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For instance, in the philosophical schools of ancient Greece this is the verb used to describe 
the usual collective reading. 
8 That is why Socrates as well as the other characters were perfectly capable and even used 
to recall several passages from Homer and Hesiod to mind. 
9 Burnyeat, 1999, 257. 
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without firm distinction implies that the performance of poetry was 
fundamental in adult recreation: that the two situation in Plato’s eyes were 
somehow serving the same end. The class who sat under the harpist and 
the audience who attended either an epic recital or a performance in the 
theatre were patterns in a general and common practice.10  
 
‘The plain conclusion of this is that performance means oral performance.’11 As can 
been seen from the last remarks, the form by means of which poetry was practiced 
constituted an active part in the process of learning in virtue of the regular oral 
performance of Greek epics. This is a very strong assumption to make and Havelock 
investigates deeper the function of the oral practice:  
All memorization of the poetized tradition depends on constant and 
reiterated recitation. […] Hence poetry exists and is effective as an 
educational instrument only as it is performed. […] His living memory 
must at every turn be reinforced by social pressure. This is brought to 
bear in the adult context, when in private performance the poetic tradition 
is repeated at mess table and banquet and family ritual, and in public 
performance in the theatre and market place.12 
 
Thus, the oral performance constituted a regular feature of Greek poetry. Every time 
that it took place, it was in a social context, both in large (i.e. theatre) and in limited 
occasions (i.e. familiar mess table). Therefore, the oral practice of poetry was not just 
a lack of written forms or simply a different way of ‘reading’. It always had social 
implications, both in its forms – recitation rather than plays – and its contents – epics 
and dramas that referred to the classic Greek heritage. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Havelock, (1963), p. 37. 
11 Ibid, p. 37. 
12 Havelock, (1963), p. 44. 
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In his excellent work about ancient Greek culture and society13, Burnyeat explains 
the importance of such social occasions for the education as follows:  
Symposia and feasts are among the most important places where the 
culture is transmitted from one generation to the next. Singing the 
Harmodius song is like singing the Marseillaise with its bloodthirsty 
chorus, “Aux armes, citoyens!” It is at once a celebration and a 
confirmation, each time it is sung, of a foundational civic tradition. […] 
The songs sung there become common currency. […] At the symposium 
you hear stories about the gods and heroes from the near or distant past 
and acquire the group loyalties, values, beliefs, and knowledge which 
constitute, as my dictionary says, the shared bases of social action. And 
the main vehicle for this transmission is poetry, sung and performed after 
the food has been cleared from the tables and the party is reclining 
comfortably on their couches.14 
 
In the above preliminary remarks I have tried to draw an overall account of the 
fundamentals of what the Greeks meant by ‘reading’. I believe those previous points 
were necessary to introduce Plato’s criticism in the right context. Primarily, it is so 
because the Athens of the V-IV B. C. was still a preliterate society. Although Plato 
himself lived in a time of flux, during which the role and the importance of writing 
was growing, I maintain that the condition of such a society was firmly preliterate. In 
that respect, one might recall that writing was already present to some extent but the 
fact that it was present and even that it was gaining momentum in that period does 
not refute the claim that orality had a leading role in such a society.15 For what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Burnyeat, M., 1999. ‘Culture and Society in Plato’s Republic.’ Tranner Lectures on 
Human Values, 20. 
14 Ibid, pp. 48, 50, 235-236. 
15 I will investigate deeper this topic soon. 
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concerns the Homeric Corpus in particular then, (namely the main target of Plato’s 
criticism in the Republic), the reader should bear in mind that it was not a literary 
composition made by a single author but, rather, it was the saga of several ages that 
was transcribed in a later period, subsequent to its initial creation in the Greek Dark 
Age. Although this conception is currently widely shared by scholars, this point in 
general and Havelock’s approach to Greek literature in particular has been objected 
to by some commentators, such as Halverson, in the recent past16. Halverson’s view, 
along with others, tends to refute Havelock’s main theory about Greeks’ oral culture. 
I do not agree with this criticism and in what follows I will present my reasons for 
rejecting such views and presenting my alternative approach. I will, a fortiori, give 
evidence for my view, which is consistent both with Jaeger and with Havelock’s 
theories. I believe, indeed, that it is useful to discuss this point because, on the one 
hand, it will clarify the deep difference between our attitude to literature and the 
Greek and, on the other hand, it will shed light on Plato’s criticism. 
 
1.1.1.   Pre-literacy and regular oral practice of poetry. 
 
Since the concept of the pre-literacy of the Greeks takes a great deal of my own 
analysis of Plato’s attitude toward poetry, I regard this topic worthy of a devoted 
section. Moreover, the only way that a reader might try to understand Plato’s point of 
view is by grasping the concept of a “living poetry”. As I have point out previously 
(in reference to Jaeger and Havelock), poetry was the expression of Greek culture. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Halverson, John, 1992, Havelock on Greek Orality and Literacy, in Journal of History of 
Ideas, Vol. 53, No. 1, (Jan. – Mar., 1992), pp. 148-163, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia, US. 
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Further, by being rooted in the life of the community, Greek epic had much more 
than just aesthetic value.17  This extension beyond aesthetics, toward a ‘living 
poetry’, was due to the fact that its aims were educational, a sort of cultural 
conditioning. Burnyeat points out: “I do not mean high culture, but culture in a more 
anthropological sense - the sense my dictionary defines as “the total of the inherited 
ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, which constitute the shared bases of social 
action […] Culture, or civilization, […] is that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society.”18 
As I have already illustrated, such principles − moral, political and social in general 
− were expressed in the tales and stories that were sung in social occasions. Such 
tales were based in mythology, which drew upon the whole cultural heritage of the 
ancient Greeks. Such a conclusion is consistent with Havelock’s definition of 
culture:  
[…] to understand what we mean by a ‘culture’, the Greek included, we 
have to ask what gives it a structure, what is continuous and so 
identifiable. This question can be answered by borrowing from the 
cultural anthropologists the concept of the storage of information for 
reuse. The information concerned is not merely technological in the 
narrow sense, but also covers that body of directives which regulates the 
behavior patterns of individuals who are members of the culture. In a 
literate culture, it is easy to perceive this kind of knowledge taking shape 
as a body of law and belief, covering religion and morals, political 
authority ("the constitution," as we say), legal procedures of all kinds, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In this respect I use the adjective aesthetic as Jaeger did in the passage quoted in the 
previous section. I shall face deeper this concept later on in the this study.  
18 Burnyeat, 1999, pp. 217-218. 
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especially those governing property, and also rights and responsibilities 
within the family.19 
 
Each of the different forms of poetry is important in that respect. Once it has been 
demonstrated that Greek culture was a primarily oral one and that Greek poetry was 
the means by which it was expressed and preserved, the forms by which poetry was 
experienced are paramount to understanding the process of cultural transference. In 
the recent past, some scholars questioned the claim of the pre-literacy of the Greeks. 
For instance, A. Burns, in his remarkable essay Athenian Literacy in the Fifth 
Century B. C.20, objects to the pre-literacy of the Greeks in general as well as 
Havelock’s approach in particular. He puts forward the theory that: 
[…] from the end of the sixth century B. C. the vast majority of the 
Athenian citizens were literate and that literacy, though not universal, 
played a major role in Athens’s intellectual and cultural development”.21 
In order to prove his claim, he refers to the presence of written words in 
tables (ostraca), book-rolls especially in schools, and vase-paintings in 
general. He then concludes that, “These pictures are clear evidence that 
reading and writing were an integral part of music instruction, i. e. the 
teaching of mousike in the wider Greek sense which includes all forms of 
music, poetry and the other domains of the Muses.’22 
 
Regarding Greek drama, then, he affirms that: “The written tablet has taken the place 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Havelock, E. A., 1971, The Preliteracy of the Greeks, in New Literacy History, Vol. 8, No. 
3, Oral Culture and Oral Performance, pp., 369-391, John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, US, p. 370. 
20 Burns, A., 1981, ‘Athenian Literacy in the Fifth Century B. C.’, in Journal of the History 
of Ideas, No. 41, pp. 371-387. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, US. I would 
confine my self in this occasion to discuss only Burn’s essay, because as far as I know he 
summarize the view that tend to confute the preliteracy of the Greeks. 
21 Ibid, p. 371. 
22 Ibid, p. 376. 
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of Remembrance as the mother of Muses and has become the repository of 
knowledge. Furthermore, the use of writing in daily life is taken for granted by the 
dramatists.”23 On such an approach, Burns concludes that: “Athenian fifth-century 
society functioned by and large as a literate society. Even if popular literacy was to a 
certain degree impeded by the absence of standardized spelling and large-scale book 
production, its pervasive spread had a profound impact on the intellectual life of 
Athens and on the development of abstract thought.”24 
It is worth noticing that Burns himself (rightly) wonders:  
This brings us to the crucial question: How far is Athenian literacy from 
"full literacy"? The answer depends on the definition of full literacy. […] 
Obviously, a different standard must be applied to an ancient society. 
(Even the term "population" needs qualification: in the Athenian context 
it can include only the free-born male citizens.) The level of literacy 
which would constitute functional literacy can only be a matter of 
conjecture. We must try to determine as nearly as possible the most 
important functions the average fifth-century Athenian had to perform. 
Perhaps, if we could have asked him, he would have said that his function 
as a citizen of Athens was the most important. Many reflections of this 
attitude are implicit in such literary works as the Eumenides, Antigone, 
Oedipus at Colonus, Pericles' Funeral Oration, the Apology, etc.25 
 
This is not the place to attempt an ultimate resolution of the problem concerning the 
exact degree of the (pre-)literacy of the Greeks. However, I would stress some 
general interpretative factors in this connection. First, the last Greek dramas 
mentioned by Burns were recited in theatre, and secondly, they took the roots in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid, p. 377. 
24 Ibid, p. 387. 
25 Ibid, p. 384. 
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Greek mythology, a matter that was very well known by the masses.  
 
Tragedy took 115 stories, with few exceptions, from mythology. These 
stories had been treated by the epic poets, Homer and the Cycle and other 
epics now lost; and Aristotle, with a sure instinct, regarded the Homeric 
handling of myth of myth as a prototype of tragedy. But myth had also 
been treated by poets. It seems that, from an early stage, it had been 
characteristic of hymns and other type of choral poetry to contain a 
narrative.26 
 
The same mythological stories were told to the children by nurses, and such tales 
were told, not read from a book as happens nowadays. Also, even if we accept the 
claim that most of the freeborn citizens in Athens were literate—whatever degree we 
assign to this word—it is hard to accept the claim that ‘the written tablet has taken 
the place of Remembrance as the mother of Muses and has become the repository of 
knowledge.’ In fact, the function of the Muses was both to educate and to transmit 
the cultural heritage, and it happened by means of repeated recitations. There is no 
way of knowing how many Athenians read written tablets but per contra we know 
that “(t)ragedy and comedy were performed before a crowd of 14,000 people at the 
Great Dionysia and other civic festivals. We hear of 20,000 people attending a recital 
of Homer. Then there are hymns sung at religious ceremonies and songs at feasts or 
private symposia.”27  In connection with drama, I would also recall one more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Easterling P. E., Knox B. M. W., 1989, The Cambridge History of Classic Literature, Vol. 
I, Part 2, Greek Drama, Cambridge University Press, New York, US, p. 1-2. 
27 Burnyeat 1999, p. 255. 
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reference in order to show how important it was in daily life:  
 
The audience of Attic Drama, as far as we now know, was a “popular” 
audience in the sense that it was a body fully representative of the great 
mass of the Athenian people […] no less than 17,000 people, perhaps 
more […] In particular, and though this may be difficult to image today, 
the drama was considered a realistic representation of the world: we are 
told, for example, that a number of women were frightened into having 
miscarriages or into giving premature birth by the entrance of the Euries 
in Aeschylus’ Eumenides.28 
 
If we now add the fact that “the Athenians had around 120 festival days a year.”29 I 
suppose we are able to say that even if such representations are often referred to as 
literary works, the means by which people experienced them was, undoubtedly, 
orally. From that it follows that the ‘Remembrance as the mother of Muses and the 
repository of knowledge’ was mainly held by the oral practice of poetry. However, 
we can accept the claim according to which literacy ‘had a profound impact on the 
intellectual life of Athens and on the development of abstract thought” because it is 
true that its use was increasing, especially in higher education contexts. However, it 
does not imply that the transmission of knowledge and information was firmly oral. 
For the reasons that I will present throughout this chapter, the forms of poetry as well 
as the contents and its educational aims constituted a whole, and these features made 
Greek literature in general and Homeric and Hesiodic epics in particular so far and 
different from our own. Havelock has shown this salient point in his fundamental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Nehamas, A., 1999, ‘Plato and the Mass Media’ in Virtues of Authenticity. Essays on Plato 
and Socrates. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, pp. 287-288. 
29 Burnyeat, 1999, p. 277. 
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analysis, taking the route started by Jaeger’s original approach:  
 
[…] what we call "poetry" is therefore an invention of immemorial 
antiquity designed for the functional purpose of a continuing record in 
oral cultures. Such cultures normally follow the practice of reinforcing the 
rhythms of verbal meter by wedding them to the rhythms of dance, of 
musical instruments, and of melody. A poem is more memorisable than a 
paragraph of prose; a song is more memorisable than a poem. The Greeks 
identified this complex of oral practices by the craft term mousike, and 
correctly identified the Muse who gave her name to the craft as the 
"daughter of Remembrance." She personified the mnemonic necessity and 
the mnemonic techniques characteristic of an oral culture. […] while the 
act of imprinting, considered psychologically, operates upon individual 
memories, its social function cannot become effective unless these 
memories are shared. Oral poetry therefore required for its existence an 
occasion which could supply a listening audience, large or small, ranging 
from an entire city to the company at a dinner table. Knowledge hoarded 
for reuse required not only rhythm, but constant performance before 
audiences who were invited to participate in its memorization. Truly 
private communication of preservable information becomes possible only 
under conditions of developed literacy.30 
 
This last passage is particularly interesting. Havelock points out in a few lines the 
more important features of Greek poetry and his final remark about the meaning and 
function of the Muses and the related concept of mousike seems relevant in regard to 
Plato’s attitude toward poetry. In fact, in the preamble of the discussion in book II, 
when Socrates introduced the discourse regarding the right education for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Havelock, E. A., 1971, The Preliteracy of the Greeks, in New Literacy History, Vol. 8, No. 
3, Oral Culture and Oral Performance, pp., 369-391, John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, US.  
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guardians, Plato’s master speaks as follows with Adeimantus: 
 
‘Then we shall begin our education with music before gymnastic, shall we 
not?’ 
‘Surely’. 
‘Do you include literature in music, or not?’ I said.’ 
‘I do.’ (376e). 
 
In light of what has been said so far, I shall argue that the last quotation represents 
important evidence in Havelock’s theory of Greek Literature. It is particularly clear 
that Plato’s introduction to censorship fits Havelock’s theory: literature belongs to 
music and music identifies the whole process of remembering. This textual reference 
confirms on the one hand that literature had an educational aim, and on the other 
hand that the educational purpose of literature is aimed to a ‘continuing record’ by 
virtue of its belonging to the realm of the Muses. As well as the gymnastic, it 




1.1.2.   Homer as the ‘Teacher of all Greeks’ and Iliad and the Odyssey as oral 
encyclopaedias. 
 
This section of the study emphasizes faces the following main points. First of all I 
treat Homer, as it was seen in Plato’s time, namely the prime source of learning and 
knowledge for the Greeks (although the these issues are distinct). Secondly, I move 
to the question of orality, combined with the teaching of educational value by the 
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means of poetry. Indeed, I believe that for the sake of the study it is vital to 
emphasize the huge impact and role that Homeric spell had in Ancient Greece. 
Further, the question of orality, as to say the key-element that transformed poetry 
into a never-ending practise, made such a spell even more central and pervasive 
among the Greeks. For this reason, it is essential to stress the way in which Homer 
was perceived among the average Athenians. Such an issue is particular evident in 
the case of educational value. Indeed, I argue throughout this section that the above 
unique features of Greek poetry mad the Homeric (as well as the Hesiodic) Corpus 
intrinsically educational for the Greek masses. For what concerns this last topic, I 
will face it in relation to opposite views on the importance of orality, in order to 
emphasize that is we underestimate the role and importance historical and 
sociological context, we are no longer able to make sense of Plato’s criticism of 
poetry. 
In the dialogue between Socrates and Adeimantus in book III of the Republic we find 
an important clue of the educational dimension of Homeric poetry. In fact, when 
Socrates’ pupil focuses on the forms of poetry, first he notices that all refer to events: 
events in the past, in the present and in the future. (392d-e). That is why they are 
based on narration of facts. This is not a trivial remark as could appear prima facie.  
The point is that in Greek poetry there was no distinction between what we in 
modern terms call ‘fiction’ and reality. In fact, after Plato’s statement, Adeimantus 
intentionally replied in the following way: ‘What else?’ (392d). In my own view, this 
is a seminal line in connection with our present concern, namely the oral culture of 
the Greeks. Adeimantus’ reply shows that there is no room for mythology, epics and 
tales that do not refer to events. Every possible value—for instance moral, historic, 
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or political—was expressed in narrative style, in making reference to events. Every 
piece of information was handed down through tales. Thus, the tales were the 
principal way to express any value.  
What I am suggesting here is that it is a non sequitur to claim that there was no 
educational value or function to such tales31. Rather, the absence of a technical guide 
or manual confirms that the Homeric Corpus was, if not unique, at least the most 
popular source of whatever kind of knowledge, eve practical one. Moreover, as noted 
above, the repeated and common recitation of poems in social occasions made such 
poetry a reference for the listeners. Due to the fact that they were easy to recall, 
thanks to constant and repeated recitation from the very beginning of common 
people’s life, poems composed a sort of oral encyclopaedia.  
To that extent, the reader should bear in mind that oral performance had another 
peculiar feature in ancient Greece: the listener coincided with the speaker. As for 
what concerns the concept of mimesis, the process of learning is made much more 
forcible in virtue of the active participation of the listener in the process of reciting a 
poem. The reference, through performance, is therefore both taught and learned. This 
dynamic between the performance and learning will be discussed again, in more 
detail, further on in this thesis. 
In light of these features, I am inclined to believe that a correct approach to the 
solution of the puzzle regarding ‘Homer the educator’ (so often quoted both by its 
advocates and by its detractors), should be by first taking poetry as a whole, 
comprised of entertainment and educational tales, and setting it into the oral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Halverson, 1992, p. 153: ‘Both Homer and Hesiod suggest that on the contrary the task of the bard 
was to sing the deeds of men and gods, it is the narrative, the story that come first.’ 
 
	   29	  
perspective. This point is made all the clearer when the reader refers to the regular 
oral performance of poetry. It was educative – not because it was expressly designed 
only for educational purposes like propaganda is expressly designed – but, per 
contra, the constant oral practise of it made it educational, in virtue of the repeated 
oral performance of such tales. If we now look back over what has been said in the 
previous sections, then it should be clearer why Plato argued against poetry. Plato’s 
criticism focused firstly on the telos of the tales, and according to that he criticised 
their structure. As we will see soon, his criticism against the forms of poetry is 
consistent with that approach and it follows the same leitmotiv he used against the 
contents of it. In fact, as we will see soon, Plato attacks the forms of poetry that 
undermined the educational process of his fellow citizens. 
Afterwards, Halverson faces two related issues, namely the value of Homer’s works 
as ‘the educator of the Greeks’ and his works as the ‘Oral encyclopaedia’32, two 
points that in part I have already illustrated in Havelock’s approach. Halverson 
assigns just two authorities to Homer in that respect, namely in warfare and historical 
matters33. In everything else, he doubts Homer’s importance. For instance, regarding 
technical issues and practical knowledge, he states: “Havelock would like us to 
believe it was commonly held that Homer was a master of technai – arts, skills 
technology, practical knowledge but not real evidence is offered.”34 In order to assess 
his claim, Halverson takes as an example a passage from the Iliad regarding 
navigation, emphasizing the inaccuracy of that. He concludes:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid, p. 154. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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As a found of practical knowledge the Iliad and the Odyssey must be 
accounted pretty worthless. The technical information in them is either 
too vacuous or too general to be of any real use. Homer’s love for 
concrete detail is unmistakable and a well-known feature of his style. But 
it is more plausible explained as an adjunct of the narrative, which it 
vivifies and enrich, than vice versa.35 
 
In reply I argue that a certain degree of lacking technical knowledge does not, in 
itself, commit the concept of the Homeric works as an oral encyclopaedia for the 
Greeks to the dustbin. Since technical handbooks were not available, Homeric epics 
represented a useful source of information for the Greeks, even on technical 
information. Moreover, I am inclined to think that the common practice of reciting 
epics made his works a source of information, even a technical one. I shall argue in 
fact that one who believes that Homeric epics represent just a matter of myths and 
fantasy fails in grasping the real, dominant value of such an artwork in his own time. 
In order to defend my claim, I offer brief, historical evidence of my defence of the 
value and importance of Homer’s epic.  
My original argument contrasts the view according to which Homer was an author of 
fascinating tales but lacking in real information. Such a view was quite common 
among academics until the end of the nineteenth century. Heinrich Schliemann, a 
businessman without any link with academic world, who discovered Troy and 
Priam’s “treasure” in 1870, soundly debunked such an approach. Due to his 
autobiographical report of the voyage of discovery36, we know that following 
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36 Schliemann, H., Ilios: the city and country of the Trojans. J. Murray, London 1880. 
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Homer’s stories as though they were a war report allowed him to find the ruins of 
Troy. Instead of considering Homer’s epics as just a fantasy mythology like the 
scholars of his day, a contrario, he successfully adopted a faithful approach to 
Homer’s technical information. Reading his memoirs, for instance, we become aware 
that when he arrived at Burnarbashi (the place that some at the time considered to be 
the location of Troy), he rightly discarded it as the potential spot of the mythic city. 
He based this on the fact that Burnarbashi was too far from the sea for the vessels to 
get to the city twice or more in a day, at least according to what Homer told about the 
battles for the conquest of Troy. All the same, when he arrived in Hissarlik, he 
realized that he was in the right place because from the top of that hill it was possible 
to see Mount Ida, as Homer precisely reported in his writing. 
That anecdote indicates that Homer’s artworks might have had a real practical 
value for the Ancients. However, such an account raises the question, what was 
practical knowledge to the Greeks? Even if we take for granted that the technical 
accounts of some crafts was too general in his works to be thought of as some sort of 
manual (but the regular abundance of particulars in his tales could be taken as a 
counterexample), what I am suggesting here is that Homer provided knowledge that 
was useful for his listeners.  
In addition, people who doubt Homer’s value as ‘an oral encyclopaedia’ do not give 
any counterexamples of other common sources of information that the ancient 
Greeks might have used instead of the Iliad and the Odyssey. Now, in this argument, 
it is pertinent to notice that a necessary and sufficient condition for being an 
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encyclopaedia, as a universal source of information for everyone, is to be available 
and shared. Even if we accept, to some degree, the objections regarding the value of 
Homer’s epic as an origin of knowledge, I shall argue that what made such works the 
main source of learning were on the one hand the easy access to it and on the other 
hand the absence of other common sources of learning for most of the people.  
Let me draw a parallel in order to show how important an encyclopaedia is in 
relation to its availability and popularity. In modern society the discussion about the 
value of the information available online resembles the discussion had on the value 
of information in the Homeric Corpus. I find such a comparison attractive to make 
because what makes sources like ‘Wikipedia’ more popular and consequently more 
useful than the ‘Encyclopaedia Britannica’ is not the correctness of the information 
that people find in both, (and surely Encyclopaedia Britannica is much more accurate 
and without mistakes then ‘Wikipedia’), but rather the easy and free access that 
characterizes Wikipedia. The last point surely makes it an encyclopaedia for most of 
the people, even in a literate society like our own. The point of the analogy, then, is 
that the availability of any origin of learning and information constitutes an integral 
part of its value and such a feature of free and common availability was typical of the 
Homeric’s epics.  
In addition, as Halverson himself reports (regarding the Homeric epics as oral 
encyclopaedias): “But this is no a guarantee of authenticity, for a literate poet could 
be easily compose new material in the traditional manner just as some of the authors 
of the Homeric Corpus imitated Homer.”37 Conversely, it is important to note that 
this is one of the main objections raised against the bulk of information available 
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online in general and against ‘Wikipedia’ in particular. In fact, the volume of 
information available online is continually updated and renewed by anyone who has 
access to it but this very fact does not confute the value of Internet and his 
miscellaneous uses, power and common presence in our day’s work. Rather, a 
fortiori it confirms that since it so present and important in our own life, it is 
constantly in the process of being edited and referenced. If it was not useful and a 
niche product for few people, then why should it be so constantly examined and 
critiqued?  
That is why I shall conclude that the rightness and the accuracy of information in the 
past as well as in the present is surely a necessary condition but not a sufficient one 
for being an encyclopaedia, as far as it is not shared and recognized as such from the 
mass to whom it refers. One might recall that Halverson recognized the value in 
Homer’s depiction of historical and warfare matters. Yet, the accuracy of the 
information in the Iliad and in the Odyssey that allowed Schliemann to find the ruins 
of Troy denotes a practical as well as technical value. Above all, what was more 
important than the warfare and history of a people in an oral culture characterized by 
an almost never-ending age of war? In addition, I would emphasize that the term 
‘History’ covers a huge volume of fields and different issues, like traditions, 
common beliefs, and everything what makes culture of that time a culture. This is 
evident when we read any historic book but, a fortiori, this is even clearer in 
Homeric epics, where historic events were told in a narrative manner referring to 
personal, familiar stories. That is why, I would conclude, the transmission of certain 
fundamental principles was implicit in that epic.  
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1.2.0. Philosophical Framework: Plato’s Teleologism. 
 
This section of the study focuses on a key-concept in Plato’s attitude toward poetry – 
that is, teleologism. The adjective ‘teleological’ derives from the Greek noun τελος, 
which expresses the aim or the goal of something. In general terms and even 
nowadays, teleology refers to the study of any object with reference to its purpose or 
goals. 
Although such a concept is a central element of Plato’s thought in general, with 
implications in various directions, for the sake of argument let us analyse Plato’s 
teleologism in relation to art. If my approach has been right so far, then it provides 
the key to fully grasp his attitude toward poetry.  
In order to corroborate this claim, let me quote in full length the following passage 
from the Phaedo. Before (and very briefly after) I shall include W. K. C. Guthrie’s 
illuminating comments, which include the quotation in question: 
 
Now Plato had learned from the Pythagoreans that the essential nature of 
anything lay not on its matter, but in its form. If matter is the essence, 
then there is no real difference between a lump of marble forming part of 
the flank of Mount Pentelikos and a finished statue from the hand of 
Pheidias. Similarly in the natural world, according to an Ionian monist 
philosopher, there can be no essential difference between a thankful of 
water and the delicate organism of a racehorse or a human being. Since 
both are formed of the same ultimate matter, the cause of their difference 
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lies elsewhere, and it is there, said Plato, in the principle of organization 
by which the matter has been differentiated, that the true philosopher will 
look for his explanation. Plato had also learned, especially from Socrates, 
to equate form with function. A horse and a man differ in the 
organization of their matter, and it is important to understand these 
differences of organization from obvious external facts like the difference 
between four legs and two, to the internal arrangements of muscles, 
organs, brain and so forth. These, however, are but the necessary 
preconditions for an even essential difference, namely that horse and man 
can do different things. The horse can run faster and further without 
tiring. The man can reason. Since the physical arrangements are 
necessary to the performance of these typical functions, it seemed right to 
many Greek thinkers as it seems right to many today, to describe them as 
the cause of the functions.  
 
‘As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking 
mind and making no appeal to any other principle of order, but 
having recourse to air, and ether and water, and many other 
eccentricities. I might compare him to a person who began by 
maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of 
Socrates, but who, when he endeavoured to explain the causes 
of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here 
because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the 
bones, as he would says, are hard and have joints which divide 
them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, 
which have also a covering or environment of flash and skin 
which contains them; and as the bones swing in their sockets, 
through the contraction or relaxation of the muscles I am able to 
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bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved 
posture-that is what he would say; and he would have a similar 
explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to 
sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand 
other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true 
causes, which is, that the Athenians have thought it better and 
more right to remain here and undergo my sentence; for I 
strongly suspect that these muscles and bones of mine would 
long ago have been in Megara or Boeotia, borne there by their 
own idea of what was best, if I did not think it more right 
honourable to endure any penalty ordered by the state, instead 
of running away into exile. There is surely a strange confusion 
of causes and conditions in all this.’38 
 
The cause, then, of any object or any natural events it is not to be sought 
in what preceded it but in what lies before it, the end or purpose at which 
it aims.39  
 
Now the reason why such a suggestive passage is so important in relation to poetry is 
tied to Plato’s approach in evaluating it. Although the last quotes from Guthrie and 
from Plato’s Phaedo imply several issues, I shall argue that we can use that reference 
now in order to interpret Plato’s attitude toward poetry. As well as Plato deals with 
poetry in virtue of its function, if we consider poetry as literature just because it is 
made up of lines of verses (usually it was sung and so on), then we totally miss the 
point. Basically, we make the same mistake that one does who considers a man and a 
horse equal in virtue of the fact that both are mammalian and, consequently, that both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Plato, Phaedo, (98 c-e). 
39 Guthrie, W. K. C., 1950, The Greeks and their Gods, Beacon Press, Boston, p. 337.  
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present the same morphologic features. Above all, in this way, we miss Plato’s 
approach.  
Although I do not want to anticipate what has yet to be demonstrated, I shall briefly 
recall two key passages from the Republic where Plato’s teleological approach is 
evident. Such passages will be properly discussed in Chapter Five, entirely devoted 
to the Republic. They play a pivotal role for two reasons. First, they clearly illustrate 
both the starting point of Plato’s approach as well as his goal when dealing with 
poetry. Secondly they show a clear application of the teleological principle stated in 
the Phaedo.  
The passages are the following:  
 
Republic II:  
I answered, Adeimantus, you and I at this juncture are not poets, but founders of 
a city. The founders ought to know the canons in accordance with which the 
poets should tell their stories, and which they are not to be allowed to transgress, 
but they need not themselves compose stories. (378e-379a) 
 
Republic X: 
‘My dear Homer, if, as you say, you are not thrice removed from truth 
concerning virtue, a manufacturer of an image, and what we have called an 
imitator; if you are but twice removed, and can know practices make men better 
individuals and better citizens, can you not mention a city to which you gave a 
better government, such as Lycurgus gave to Lacedaemon, and many other 
persons to many to many cities great and small? Does any city name you a good 
lawgiver and its benefactor? (599a). 
 
In the first extract, Republic II (378e-379a), Plato clearly points out that as rulers, 
they do not have to invent others, different stories alternative to the classic ones. Nor 
the founders of the city have to be poets themselves. Rather, the founders of the city 
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must put forward rules that have to be followed by the poets, too. This passage 
shows, I urge, that Plato acknowledges poetry as specific art, and in this occasion he 
approaches the subject as a matter that have to regulated, among many others, in 
brand new state. Put in another way, the first passage shows that the telos of 
establishing the best regulations guides Plato 
If the former extract highlights Plato’s approach, the latter, Republic X 599a, points 
to the teleological approach the leads Plato’s criticism of Homer in the last book of 
the Republic. Indeed, Plato emphasizes that Homeric poetry fails in educating 
people. In this particular case, the failure regards the art of governing, but his final 
critique, although broader it is grounded on a teleological ground. As we shall see in 
more details in section of the thesis devoted to the analysis of the last book of Plato’s 
masterpiece, Plato’s arguments show that the average Greeks approached Homeric 
poetry as universal source of truth, although it fails as such.  
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1.3.0. The Very Concept of Beauty. 
 
This section of the study faces the tricky question of the ancient conception(s) of 
beauty. I face this problematic subject now before claiming that Plato acknowledges 
poetry in aesthetic terms. In order to make a compelling argument regarding Plato’s 
view of aesthetic, it is necessary to prove the existence and the peculiarity of such a 
notion as aesthetics, in general, in classical Antiquity. 
As a matter of historical fact, scholars have largely questioned even the existence of 
an idea of beauty whatsoever in antiquity. In what follows, I tackle such an issue 
arguing for the existence of a peculiar idea of beauty in the Greek world. Such a 
concept, I submit, was present among the average citizens as well as in Plato’s 
philosophy, but with distinct features that I will outline throughout the section. 
First of all, let me outline the main differences between our own conception(s) of 
beauty and the Greek one. Such a preliminary passage will serve as the right path in 
order to contextualize Plato’s arguments on poetry, given the particular features of 
the ancient Hellenic horizon. Due to these features, I will show a fundamental 
distinction. Indeed, on the one hand, the average Greeks did hold a particular feeling 
of beauty, as most scholars have largely highlighted but on the other hand, against 
the thinking of the majority of Platonic scholarship, the ratio of Plato’s attacks on 
poetry relies on a very different ground. Namely, Plato held a distinct view from his 
contemporaries, reading beauty as an autonomous property. Indeed, I do believe that 
for the average Greek, beauty was just one of the many values at play in the case of 
classic poetry. Conversely, by the means of textual examination, I will provide 
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evidence for arguing that Plato singled out beauty as distinct entity, with a theoretical 
clarity unknown before him.  
To this extent, I will put forward an original argument in order to corroborate the 
claim that Plato did actually have a strictly different view on beauty. The very fact 
that ancient Greeks did have a very different conception of beauty does not imply by 
itself that Plato held the same view. On the contrary, I will conclude my analysis by 
showing that Plato was actually the first scholar to postulate a ground-breaking 
theory of beauty in western thought. Such a view, in a nutshell, saw beauty as an 
independent entity among the heterogeneous values at stake in the case of classical 
poetry. I would also point out since now that the aforementioned stance is quite close 
to our own way of considering beauty, as a self-standing property.   
It is finally worth noting that the advantage of such an approach is to explain the 
reason why Plato, while criticizing poetry, ignores beauty in the texts he deals with. 
However, as I will show by the means of the textual analysis, he is willing to 
emphasize the ‘kalon’ of the extracts he quotes so often and to value without fail the 
great poets we still regard as such.  
 
1. 3. 1. Plato and Beauty. 
 
It is uncontroversial that Plato postulates the existence of the Form of beauty; there is 
evidence of this (e.g. in the Phaedo A beautiful thing is beautiful “for no reason at all 
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First, if the leader" leads aright, he should love one body and beget 
beautiful ideas there; then he should realize that the beauty of anyone 
body is brother to the beauty of any other and that if he is to pursue 
beauty of form he'd be very foolish not to think that the beauty of all 
bodies is one and the same. When he grasps this, he must become a lover 
of all beautiful I bodies, and he must think that this wild gaping after just 
one body is a small thing and despise it. 
 
211a: 
"First, it always is and neither comes to be nor passes away, neither 
waxes nor wanes. Second, it is not beautiful this way and ugly that 
way, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another, nor beautiful in 
relation to one thing and ugly in relation to another; nor is it beautiful 
here but ugly there, as it would be if it were beautiful for some people and 
ugly for others. Nor will the beautiful appear to him in the guise of a face 
or hands or anything else that belongs to the body. It will not appear to 
him as one idea or one kind of knowledge. 
Although the literal meaning of the above passages is clear, their interpretation raises 
difficult challenges, as is often the case with Plato’s writings.  
Certainly, the problematic issue of Plato’s aesthetics in general and his well-known 
attitude toward poetry in particular is involved. If Plato acknowledges the existence 
and value of beauty, why does he criticize Homer as well as many other poets for 
adding beauty to the truth or falsehood of their stories? Put in another way, if Plato 
admits beauty in the realm of Forms, why does he question the aesthetic value of 
literature, which is based on the very idea of beauty?  
On the other hand, there is the issue of the meaning of the Greek word kalon and 
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Plato’s heterogeneous use of it40. To kalon is usually understood to be the noun for 
beauty in ancient Greek; kalon is also very often associated with ‘goodness’. This 
raises the question of whether beauty was intrinsically related with moral goodness 
in antiquity41.  
 
1. 3. 2. What Beauty is for the ancient Greeks and what Beauty is for Plato. 
 
In this section, I want to briefly look at what and how the Greeks thought about 
beauty and encourage the claim that Plato saw it differently from his own 
contemporaries. I will also emphasize the main differences between the Greek 
understanding of it and our own. Finally, I will conclude that the way Plato thinks of 
beauty is actually closer to modern and contemporary aesthetics. To this extent, I 
argue that he is actually closer to us than to his own contemporaries. Firstly, however 
we need to establish whether there is a singular notion of beauty Plato refers to in all 
the relevant dialogues.  I submit we have to distinguish between beauty, which is, I 
argue, something bestowing a particular property, and the much wider kalon. A. 
Kosman puts it this way: “The question surely has to be whether kalon in fact points 
to something different—whether very different or only slightly different—from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Riegel, N. Beauty, To Kalon and its Relation to the Good in the Works of Plato. 2011, PhD 
Thesis, University of Toronto, Department of Philosophy, Canada.  
41 On the problematic relation between Aesthetics and Moral Value, not just in antiquity, I 
suggest the further reading of: Gaut, B., 2007, Art, Emotion, and Ethics Oxford University 
Press, McGinn, C., 1997, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
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beauty”. While Plato’s conception of beauty is characteristic of his philosophy, 
Kalon belongs to Hellenic cultural heritage.42  Kalon, in all its heterogeneous 
occurrences, covers a much wider, and from time to time semantically different, 
range of meanings. In a recent monograph on the Kalon43, Kosman comments on the 
relation between Kalon and beautiful:  
And this concern, which is at the heart of this essay, is related to our 
earlier questions: if beauty is for us associated with what we think of as 
art and nature, why is the kalon so little associated with these matters? 
And if kalon means “beautiful,” why do Aristotle and Plato treat the kalon 
as morally normative?44 
 
My answer to such a central question in the treatment of ancient beauty is the 
following. The very fact that the ancient concept of beauty is different from ours 
does not imply that Plato held a view that, tout court, corresponded to his 
contemporaries. Otherwise, we are left with the paradoxical claim that Greeks had no 
concept of beauty, as Kosman rightly points out.45 My suggestion intends to give a 
compelling answer to Kosman’s concern:  
I’ve tried to suggest broadly what those differences might be. They leave 
me with the urge, an urge that I will of course resist, to say that the 
Greeks had no concept of beauty. But this much is right: the concept of 
beauty is sufficiently different from that of the kalon to make the urge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 However, I am aware that the two distinct concepts can sometimes overlap; I will explain 
that in detail later on in the paragraph. 
43 Classical Philology (On Kalon).Vol. 105, No. 4, October 2010. Special Issue: Beauty, 
Harmony, and the Good. Edited by Elizabeth Asmis. University of Chicago Press. 
44 Ibid. 
45 I agree, it is surely paradoxical to think that the Greeks had no concept of beauty because 
how could we explain otherwise why Plato on the one hand prizes Homer and on the other 
banishes the poets from Callipolis? 
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understandable. We’ve noticed merely these two features of our notion of 
beauty not found in a comparable sense in the notion of the kalon: (1) 
Beauty critically involves the world of Art (2) Beauty critically involves 
the world of nature.46  
In sum, I argue that Plato acknowledges the value of beauty as we know it. What I 
mean by that is evident in Plato’s numerous appreciations of poetry, I mantain. The 
textual examination of the relevant passages will show this in detail. In addition, I 
submit that two distinct notions (although sometimes overlapping) such as kalon and 
beautiful coexisted in ancient aesthetics; as tecné and art did. In his seminal work on 
the matter, W. Tatarkiewicz explains:  
The Greek also gave a wider significance to the term tecné, which we 
translate as ‘art’. For them it meant all skilful productions and included 
the labors of carpenters and weavers as well as architects. They applied 
the term to every craft created by man (as opposed to nature) so long as it 
was productive (and not cognitive) relied on skill (rather than inspiration), 
and was consciously guided by general rules (and not just routine). They 
were convinced that in art, skill mattered most and for that reason held art 
(including the art of carpenter and the weaver) to be a mental activity. 
They laid stress on the knowledge which art entails and valued it 
primarily on account of that knowledge. Such a concept of art included 
the characteristics common not only to architecture, painting and 
sculpture, but also to carpentry and weaving. The Greeks did not possess 
a term to cover exclusively the fine arts, that is, architecture, painting and 
sculpture. Their wide concept of art (which we today perhaps term ‘skill’) 
survived to the end of antiquity and had a long career in European 
languages (which, when stressing the special features of painting or 
architecture, could not call simply arts, but had to qualify them as ‘fine’ 
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arts.47 
In both cases we deal with two ancient broader concepts (Kalon and Tecné). They 
are characteristic of a peculiar historical and cultural scenario, and for this reason, 
they are expressed by distinguished linguistic expressions that the ones we nowadays 
use. Yet, this very fact does not prevent us from identifying within the 
aforementioned notions two narrow concepts and related terms (Beauty and Art). 
The latter two express then, although not necessarily, a remarkably close connection 
with the way usually we think and deal with them. By the same token, I believe we 
are now in a position to state that when Plato talks about beauty in the way I have 
just outlined, he does so in the same way we do when we refer to beauty. In fact, 
Kosman admits:  
Actions, institutions, virtues, and the like were said by them to be kala; 
paintings, musical compositions, sunsets, and the like are said by us to be 
beautiful.48 
In what follows, Kosman allows the possibility of attributing to Plato a view on 
beauty different from his own contemporaries:  
For example, if we come to realize that for Plato, love’s proper object, 
that toward which erôs is per se directed as toward its appropriate end, is 
kalon, or is indeed the kalon itself, we should feel no inclination to infer 
that Plato believes love’s object to be what we would call “beautiful.” We 
will have acquired evidence that for Plato the object of love is cousin-
german to the beautiful, that it is admirable or fine or noble, or indeed that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  Tatarkiewicz, W, 1970, History of Aesthetics I: Ancient Aesthetics, Continuum 
International Publishing Group, London (2005), p. 26. 
48 Ibid, p. 351. 
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it is good. We may in good conscience continue to speak of the argument 
as pointing us in the direction of “the beautiful,” but only if we take pains 
to elaborate a nuanced sense of beauty, a sense that captures the subtleties 
of the kalon.49 
It is not surprising then to read Kosman’s final remark:  
This paper is therefore a prolegomenon; for the really interesting and hard 
work remains to be done. That is the work required when we go beyond 
the facile use of “beautiful” here and “fine” there, or beyond the easy 
acknowledgment that kalon somehow “means both good and beautiful,” 
and ask the question: how so? How are these predicates connected in the 
concept of the kalon?50 
Kosman’s stance traces in his prolegomenon in order to find a coherent picture of 
Plato’s metaphysics of beauty. Rachel Barney (2010), in her Notes on Plato on the 
Kalon and the Good, raises the issue of how Beauty is connected to proportions and 
functionality and whether Beauty is essentially linked with them. The end or purpose 
of something defined as beautiful plays a pivotal role in the functionality of beauty. 
Her point is that something is beautiful if and only if it serves at best the designed 
function.51  But I urge that we cannot simply relegate beauty to the realm of 
functionality, as to say virtue. Barney seems to be sympathetic with the above stance. 
A path related to the study of Kalon in Plato that I do not want to take is the example 
of the spoon52. Such an account of Kalon, stated in Resp. 353c–e and also Republic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid, p. 352. 
50 Ibid.  
51 The Greek term arête would traditionally translate it. 
52 Kosman illustrate the significance of such an example as follows (and I endorse his 
reading): ‘It may be that a wooden spoon is more desirable than a golden spoon if it’s better 
able to perform its spoonly functions. But does it follow that it’s more beautiful? (Pl. Hp. 
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10, (601d) and in the Hippias Major (290c-291d), is not relevant for the purpose of 
the present work, for the reasons I have just outlined. To this extent, it would be at 
any rate interesting to note the relevance of teleology in Plato’s account of Kalon in 
this context.  
For measure and proportion manifest themselves in all areas as beauty 
and virtue. (Phlb. 64e). 
The Timaeus claims that all that is good is beautiful, adding that what is 
beautiful is “not without measure (87c).53 
The Greek term arête, usually translated as virtue, is at the core of such a functional 
account. But this is a very low bar for theories to meet. Indeed, the ambiguities 
associated with the term virtue leave me with the urge to notice that there is no 
theory of this sort in Plato. The only possible conclusion I can draw is that the wide 
range of meanings covered by virtue only indicates that sometimes, an artwork can 
be beautiful as well as virtuous. But the two entities, beauty and virtue, are not in a 
causal relation with each other. 
Let us address another issue, Plato does not necessarily relate beauty with proportion 
and measure. Although there is some textual evidence for such a claim, I do not think 
that a mere mathematical ratio is a sufficient condition for making something 
beautiful. This Pythagorean claim54, it is worth remembering, is the first aesthetic 
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53 Barney, 2010, p. 365. 
54 On Pythagoreanism: L. Zhmud, Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans, Oxford UP 
2012; G. Cornelli, In Search of Pythagoreanism, De Gruyter 2013; G. Cornelli, R. 
McKirahan, C. Macris (eds.), On Pythagoreanism, De Gruyter 2013; P.S. Horky, Plato and 
Pythagoreanism, Oxford UP 2013; C. Huffman (ed.), A History of Pythagoreanism, 
Cambridge UP, forthcoming. 
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theory ever postulated in the history of western thought. Now it is true that Plato’s 
thought resembles in some ways Pythagoreans’ philosophy, but it is equally 
undeniable that Plato’s complex aesthetics is not reducible to it. Pythagoreans held 
the undisputed merit to have elaborated a specific aesthetics, but that was just the 
first step in the study of beauty, I urge. It is true that the Pythagorean ideals of 
aesthetic continued to be quite popular among artists but, once again, it seems clear 
that Plato made a clear departure from them, because he did not relegate beauty to 
the real of mathematical ratio, as Pythagoreans did. Indeed, at the base of 
Pythagorean’s aesthetics we find the claim that the essence and nature of beauty 
relies the mathematical proportion, solely. Although Plato’s aesthetics is quite 
debated among scholars, we can safely assert that Plato never relegate the essence 
and the nature of beauty to the real of mathematical ratio. In this sense, Plato did 
make a departure from Pythagoreans, especially form what concerns aesthetics.  
However, to this extent, a more central point must be highlighted for the sake of the 
argument. The very way that the Pythagoreans used in order to elucidate the nature 
and essence of beauty sheds light on a central matter. Namely, even the Pre-Socratics 
clearly thought of beauty as a distinct property. Further, they theorized of it in what 
we would call nowadays ‘aesthetic terms’.  Such a strong claim is grounded on the 
consideration that they based the search of beauty in proportions and mathematical 
ratio55. Their paradigm was primarily applied to works of art such sculptures and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  For what concerns Pythagoreans, I suggest the reading of L. Zhmud, Pythagoras and 
the Early Pythagoreans, Oxford UP 2012, G. Cornelli, In Search of Pythagoreanism, De 
Gruyter 2013, G. Cornelli, R. McKirahan, C. Macris (eds.), On Pythagoreanism, De 
Gruyter 2013, P.S. Horky, Plato and Pythagoreanism, Oxford UP 2013, C. Huffman (ed.), 
A History of Pythagoreanism, Cambridge UP, 2014.  
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disciplines like music. 56  It is also remarkable to note that the seeking for a 
mathematical theory for beauty presupposes the existence of a ‘form’ of beauty that 
is objective and independent from any other subject or external goal. The paramount 
relevance of this presupposition relies on the objections of scholars that the Greek 
sensibility to the idea of beauty can be set aside with no further hesitation. Indeed, 
the very face that even the presocratics tried to define beauty, shows a conscious, 
perception of that. Regardless of the mathematical nature of the presocratic account, 
what it is important here for the purpose of the argument, it is to stress the object of 
research: beauty.  
 
 
1. 3. 3. The nature of beauty. 
In order to further substantiate the claim that the idea of beauty as an independent 
property was familiar among the Greeks in general and in Plato’s system of thought 
in particular, I will refer now to poetry, with special emphasis on the famous poet 
Sappho. For what concerns the vivid presence of such a fundamental property in the 
Greek culture, I do endorse N. Riegel’s view about how such an entity was perceived 
by the average Greek:  
But, one might still ask, couldn’t it still be true that the Greeks or at least 
some of the Greeks felt τὸ καλόν was something like a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 I am very well aware that what we have already said about the tricky noun and related 
concept of beauty in the ancient world and the contemporary one resembles to same extent 
the case of musique. In particular, the Greek word musique points to a broader umbrella of 
entities and disciplines that the word ‘music’ today refers to.  
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response‐dependent property in a pre‐theoretical, implicit way? Isn’t it 
possible, that is to say, that τὸ καλόν was viewed, at least implicitly, as 
whatever produced a certain reaction, pleasure say, in certain observers, 
perhaps ideal observers?57 
It is interesting to note that Sappho expresses the first instance of such a view. The 
most famous poem usually regarded as putting forward a respond-dependent theory 
or subjectivism, is the so-called fragment 16:  
Ο]ἰ µὲν ἰππήων στρότον οἰ δὲ πέσδων οἰ δὲ νάων φαῖσ᾽ ἐπὶ γᾶν 
µέλαιναν ἔ]µµεναι κάλλιστον ἔγω δὲ κῆν᾽      ὄττω τὶσ ἔπαται.   
πά]γχυ δ᾽ εὔµαρεσ σύνετον πόησαι πά]ντι τ[οῦ]τ᾽. ἀ γὰρ πόλυ 
περσκόπεισα κά]λλοσ ἀνθρώπων Ἐλένα [τὸ]ν ἄνδρα      [κρίννεν 
ἄρ]ιστον,   
ὂσ τὸ πὰν] σέβασ τροΐα[σ ὄ]λεσσ[ε, κωὐδὲ πα]ῖδοσ οὔδε [φίλ]ων 
το[κ]ήων µᾶλλον] ἐµνάσθη, ἀ[λλὰ] παράγαγ᾽ αὔταν      πῆλε φίλει]σαν,  
Ὠροσ. εὔκ]αµπτον γαρ [ἀεὶ τὸ θῆλυ] αἴ κέ] τισ κούφωσ τ[ὸ πάρον 
ν]οήσῃ. οὐ]δὲ νῦν, Ἀνακτορί[α, τ]ὺ µέµναι      δὴ] παρειοῖσασ,   
τᾶ]σ κε βολλοίµαν ἔρατόν τε βᾶµα κ]αµάρυγµα λάµπρον ἴδην προσώπω η 
τὰ λύδων ἄρµατα κἀν ὄπλοισι      πεσδοµ]άχεντασ   
εὶ µεν ἴδ]µεν οὔ δύνατον γένεσθαι λῷστ᾽] ὀν᾽ ἀνθρώποισ, πεδέχην δ᾽ 
ἄραστηαι, [τῶν πέδειχόν ἐστι βρότοισι λῷον]       [ἢ λελάθεσθαι 
Some say thronging cavalry, some say foot soldiers, others call a fleet the 
most beautiful of sights the dark earth offers, but I say it's whatever you 
love best. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Riegel, 2011, p. 40. 
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‘And it's easy to make this understood by everyone, for she who 
surpassed all human kind in beauty, Helen, abandoning her husband that 
best of men went sailing off to the shores of Troy and never spent a 
thought on her child or loving parents: when the goddess seduced her wits 
and left her to wander, she forgot them all, she could not remember 
anything but longing, and lightly straying aside, lost her way. But that 
reminds me now: Anactoria, she's not here, and I'd rather see her lovely 
step, her sparkling glance and her face than gaze on all the troops in Lydia 
in their chariots and glittering armor.’ (my emphasis) 
The above passage is traditionally regarded as the first example of Subjectivism or 
Projectivism.  
It is a reasonable supposition to say that Plato, along with most of the Athenian 
citizens, was quite familiar with Sappho’s lyrics. Secondly, it is widely sustained that 
the ancient Greeks used to admire and highly value Sappho’s mastery. I cannot find 
any other possible ground for such an appreciation but the purely aesthetic one. 
Barney says:  
In traditional Greek usage, kalon and agathon are the two most central 
and powerful terms of approbation, and the overlap between them is 
considerable. But there is one striking contrast between the two. This is 
that while it is common to speak of what is agathon for someone, using 
the dative of interest, the same construction is awkward and rare, if not 
impossible, with kalon.58 
Sappho’s contribution to the question on beauty however, is not confined to the 
subjectivism reading of her lyrics. As a matter of fact, her poetics expresses more 
than any other author who sought beauty. Among her compositions, the Hymn to 
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Aphrodite represents the brightest instance of such process, in my view. 
Another possible path to take in order to investigate beauty in antiquity would be to 
appeal to emotions. This is because there is a strong continuity of reasoning in the 
history of Western culture between art, artworks and the emotions that they raise in 
both the senses and intellect of who listen to a musical piece or who admire a statue 
or a painting. The same pattern, of course, applies to writing and reading, dancing, 
and even to cinema. According to this view, what all of them have in common is to 
appeal to feelings and thoughts art produces in he/she who experiences art. This is 
the way D. Konstan59 tackles the issue: “The ancient Greeks associated human 
beauty with erotic attraction, and most people today would agree that beauty can be a 
stimulus to passion, which is pretty much a synonym for emotion.”60 On the same 
line of reasoning, Nehamas affirms:  “Plato and the ancients were not afraid of the 
risky language of passion because they thought that beauty, even the beauty of lowly 
objects, can gradually inspire a longing for goodness and truth”.61  
Whether a longing for goodness constitutes an emotion is a further question. There is 
no doubt, however, that Plato, at least in one phase of his intellectual development, 
believed that the Forms inspired erôs, that is, the desire to perceive directly the 
transcendent world of ideas, accessible to the mind alone, which is only encumbered 
by mortal flesh.’62 Stendhal magisterially expressed this line of reasoning as: ‘Beauty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 ‘Emotions between Greece and Rome: Beauty.’ By David Konstan, unpublished.  
60 Ibid. 
61 Nehamas, A. Only a Promise of Happiness. The place of Beauty in a World of Art, 
Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 2. 
62 D. Konstan. 
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is nothing more than a promise of Happiness’63.  
Even if the desire of (possession of) beauty from time to time overlaps with beauty 
itself, I regard them as distinguished. The case of Eros in the Symposium provides a 
clear example of that. One thing is the desire (to acquire) something; one thing is a 
disinterested appreciation of an artwork. Stendhal’s famous quote is usually read in a 
twofold way. One is sexual-oriented and it appeals to an individual interpretation of 
the desire of possession. It involves possession as the way to pursue the object of 
appreciation. The second is a broader, more general view and it involves different 
kinds of values. Nevertheless, as in the case of Beauty and Eros, both raises from the 
same ground, but the telos is different. Konstan says:  “If beauty inspires the desire 
to possess and own its object or to use it for some further purpose, especially if it 
involves sex, it might seem reasonable to believe that those who value art for its 
beauty are either philistines or perverts”64 Endorsing last remark, I do not think that 
beauty in antiquity is reducible to emotions. In conclusion, the question about how to 
qualify beauty in antiquity inevitably remains, as in modern times, inevitably open, 
al least to some extent. In this regard, Konstan appears to share the view I would go 
for:  
The question at stake then is not whether the Greeks had a concept of 
Beauty, which I take for granted. Another related assumption I make is 
that such a concept was very different form the modern one. When I say 
modern, of course I refer to the (re)-birth and formulation of the concept 
of ‘Aesthetics’ in the eighteen century. But different does not mean 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Sthendal, M. De l'Amour, ch. 17, footnote (1822) 
64 Nehamas, 2010, p.11. 
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contrary, at least not necessarily. 65 
In conclusion, and endorsing Konstan’s remark, my thought is that the very fact 
that the term kalon covers an heterogeneous and wider range of significata in 
comparison with the modern term Beauty, does not imply by itself that the 
Aesthetic declination of such a term/concept was unknown to the Greeks. A 
contrario, I contend, the aesthetic appreciation of Beauty constituted a 
remarkable part of what is generally designed as Kalon. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Konstan, D. Ibid.  
	   55	  
 
Conclusions.  
In the opening chapter of this study, I have faced some preliminary issues that I do 
regard as vital in order to get a real understanding of Plato’s notorious attitude 
toward art in general and poetry in particular. More precisely, I have first focused on 
the historical context of Greek poetry in the fifth to fourth Athens B.C. The pre-
eminently oral dimension of the practice of poetry shed light on a radically different 
essence of epic poetry.  This subject, along side Plato’s Teleologism, provided the 
reader with the historical and teleological framework on which this study relies on. A 
further, related question concerns the status of beauty in classical antiquity. Such an 
issue has been treated in order to emphasize how Plato’s stance on beauty differed 
from (most of his) contemporaries. All the aforementioned elements have been 
analyzed both in general terms and in connection with Plato’s philosophy. Although 
they could seem prima facie heterogeneous they prepared the path to follow in order 
to make sense of Plato’s attacks to Greek poetry and its masters, I mantain. At the 
beginning of the study, I have intended to substantiate in historical as well as 
philosophical terms, the right perspective in order to solve the dilemma that Plato’s 
censor and banishment of poetry gives rise to. I am confident that once we have 
defined the objects and boundaries of my research in Plato’s philosophy, the reader is 
now able to start with better understating the detailed textual analyses of the platonic 
dialogues in the next chapters.  
 





Plato on poetry 




Plato focuses on poetry on several occasions. It is a constant concern in Plato’s mind, 
from the early dialogues until the very latest ones. Nevertheless, it seems hard to find 
a general account of his attitude toward poetry. This is due to the fact that Plato faces 
poetry from different perspectives, like education (Republic II - III), politics and 
epistemology (Apology, Republic X). He also connects poetry with very different 
issues, like inspiration (Ion, Phaedrus), pedagogical effects (Republic II), and 
imitation (Republic X). He even compares poets to politicians, rhetoricians and 
sophists. With respect to them, he makes the same sort of objections, more precisely 
against their supposed wisdom (Meno, Apology, Sophist)66. It is also true that, in 
reading Platonic dialogues, we find discordant statements about poetry: appreciation, 
hard criticism and even banishment. Indeed, the ‘ancient quarrel’ between 
philosophy and literature Plato speaks about in the tenth book of the Republic and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 For a full treatment of the question I suggest the reading of Amiss, E., 1992. ‘Plato on 
Poetic Creativity’ in Richard Kraut (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 338–364. 
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consequent banishment of imitative poetry represent the climax of the vexata 
quaestio of Plato’s stance toward poetry. 
This first section of the study sets out to explore a connection between a number of 
plausible claims concerning Plato’s attitude toward poetry among the so-called early 
dialogues. More precisely, I will focus with special emphasis on the following 
dialogues: Apology, Protagoras and Ion. With its deep importance regarding the 
issues at stake, the analysis of the Ion will have a chapter devoted to it alone. The 
reason why I highlight these dialogues within the cluster of works called ‘early 
dialogues’ is based on the fact that they present, in my view, a coherent set of claims 
and argument toward poetry. I am confident that the rest of the chapter will illustrate, 
in details, such a line of thought.  
 
 
2.1.0. The Apology: 
‘poets say many fine things,  but they lack knowledge’. 
An ambiguity or a sound argument? 
 
In this section of the work I am going to offer a detailed analysis of Plato’s treatment 
of poetry in the Apology. My claim is that Plato’s criticism in this dialogue does not 
affect the value of poetry qua poetry. Rather, I argue that it mainly regards the very 
particular way poetry was experienced in the ancient Greek society. I will also show 
that Plato’s argument against poets’ (lack of) wisdom is consistent with his 
appreciation of poetry, (qua art of poetry).  
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Plato faces poetry in the first part of the Apology. The relevant passage regards the 
imminent trial in the court. Since he has been charged with impiety, Socrates has to 
face a jury. The matter at stake in the beginning of his speech is wisdom. The 
discussion relies on what wisdom is. Such an investigation quickly turns out to be a 
hard attack against the most important and revered classes of ancient Greek society: 
politicians, rhetorician and poets.  
Plato has Socrates say: 
 
After the politicians, I went to the poets, the writers of tragedies and dithyrambs 
and the others, intending in their case to catch myself being more ignorant than 
they. So I took up those poems with which they seemed to have taken most 
trouble and asked them what they meant, in order that I might at the same time 
learn something from them (a). I am ashamed to tell you the truth, gentlemen, 
but I must. Almost all the bystanders might have explained the poems better than 
their authors could (b). I soon realized that poets do not compose their poems 
with knowledge (c), but by some inborn talent and by inspiration (d), like seers 
and prophets who also say many fine things (e) without any understanding of 
what they say (f). The poets seemed to me to have had a similar experience. At 
the same time I saw that, because of their poetry, they thought themselves very 
wise men in other respects, which they were not (g). (22c). 
 
The passage above introduces several interesting issues. On the one hand, Plato 
recognizes that the “poets say many fine things’ (22e) and on the other hand, he 
points out that the authors have neither knowledge nor understanding of what they 
say (22f). This fact has been interpreted as a harsh critique of poetry as a whole. In a 
recent work67, Halliwell regards as ‘ambivalent attitude to poets’68 the fact that Plato 
both objects to the wisdom and knowledge of the poets and recognizes that they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Halliwell, S., 2002. The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient texts and modern problems, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
68 Ibid, p. 39. 
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say…” they say ‘many fine things’ (22c). Halliwell also notices that we find the 
same seeming contrast in the Ion, which dualism he classifies as the ‘knowledge-
inspiration dichotomy’69. I will return to it in the next chapter, entirely devoted to the 
Ion, but for the time being let me concentrate on the argument Plato presents in the 
Apology. Halliwell interprets it as a dualism and he calls it ‘the contrast between 
knowledge and inspiration’70 . I think such a conclusion is misguided for the 
following reasons.  
The fact that Plato recognizes the poets as capable of saying ‘many fine things’ does 
not imply a dichotomy with respect to his worries about the process of creation of the 
poems. Rather, Plato’s worry is twofold. Firstly, Plato is puzzled by a poet’s creation 
of art, since, he says, poets lack knowledge. He also emphasizes that they lack the 
wisdom they claim to possess – interestingly, this is what worries Plato more. As a 
matter of fact, he refers to poets’ lack of wisdom from the beginning of his treatment 
of poetry (22a) when he explains the reason why he went to the poets. His motivation 
for researching, it is better to bear in mind, was to find the wisest people of Athens. 
After an unfruitful search of wisdom by the politicians, he went to the poets. Now, 
the question becomes: what kind of wisdom Socrates was looking for and, 
consequently, what kind of wisdom, as he stresses, do poets lack? Conversely, what 
kind of wisdom did the general populace expect of poets. The simple answer is that 
two different kinds of wisdom are at stake here in Socrates’ criticism, one is the 
knowledge that poets show in making poetry and the other is that we have (a lack of) 
wisdom regarding the subject matters that poets generally treat in their poems.  
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It is possible to find a clue of such a distinction in the first part of the passage above 
(22a). Plato begins his criticism of poetic wisdom at the source, the poems 
themselves. Indeed, Plato’s criticism relies on the fact that poets are not able to 
explain what they mean (22a-b). That is to say, they are not able to say what the text 
means71. It is also worth noticing, though, that the poems are not worthless according 
to Plato. That implies that they are worth knowing; they are meaningful. According 
to the text, it is possible even for a ‘bystander’ to catch what they meant. Further, 
Plato even says that any bystander is able to explain them better than a poet (b).  
Even though some irony is likely to be present in this sentence, it is anyway worth 
stressing two key notions, which we are going to see again throughout the Platonis 
Opera. The first notion is poets’ inability to explain what a text means. Secondly, 
Plato acknowledges the existence and the value of ‘intention of the text’72, that is to 
say, the meaning or the overall sense that any text expresses. In Plato’s view, a text 
means something, something worth to know. Starting from that, I would argue that 
his reference to the bystander could be read as textual evidence that Plato is very 
well aware of the value of literature. He understands and acknowledges the universal 
strength (see the reference to the bystander) of the written and spoken word. Further, 
I read the aforementioned inference to the universal strength of poetry as a polemic 
statement against the sophoi -- the wise, learned and skilful men are indeed the 
object of Plato’s attacks. Against them, but above all in opposition to the mainstream 
view of that time, according to which priests, poets and rhapsodes had the privilege 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Even if the last point could seem a repetition of what I have just said, let me emphasise it, 
because I do believe this is a central point.  
72 I will return on this concept. Intentio of the text or intentio operis I believe is a central 
concept involved in the discussion.  
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to understand, interpret and let know the truth to common people by divine 
inspiration, Plato contends that the meaning of the text can be captured by anyone, 
with no need for doubtful interpretations by people who have no knowledge of the 
issues in question. 
It is important to highlight this last point by virtue of the fact that most of the 
commentators deny that Plato acknowledged any value of poetry. However, in light 
of what has already been discussed, I contend that in the passage above, there is a 
true positive evaluation of the value of poetry (22e). Plato’s objection relies on the 
poets’ inability to teach what they demand to be expert of. Such criticism is deeper 
than it would prima facie seem. In Plato’s view, such lack is serious because the 
poets, as well as common people, reputed themselves ‘very wise’ in respects in 
which they were not (22g). Moreover, as Plato points out since the beginning of the 
passage, the mass regarded them among the wisest in the whole community (22a).  
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 2.1.1. Why Plato’s attack on the poets does not involve a critique of poetry as a 
whole. 
 
Now that we have established Plato’s evaluation of poetry, let us find the reason for 
Plato’s attacks on the cultural establishment of the Greek society. As he singles out 
at the end of the last extract quoted, common people reputed poets as the wisest, 
‘because of their poetry’ (22g). Now, such statement (22g) could sound ambiguous 
in so far as it is not clear to whom or what it is directed to. One might say that Plato’s 
goal here concerns poets/poetry in general. Yet, this is not necessarily the case. As 
described in the previous section, because of the different kinds of knowledge and 
wisdom at stake, the only way to explain why Plato harshly attacks the poets but still 
appreciates poetry, is to recall that in ancient Greece, poets among politicians, 
rhetoricians and sophists demanded to be (and they were commonly perceived as) the 
wisest persons in the society. What I mean by this is that for Plato the flaw is not 
poetry in itself but it rather relies in its incorrect use or interpretation. Plato explains 
it clearly in the subsequent passage: 
 
Finally I went to the craftsmen, for I was conscious of knowing practically 
nothing, and I knew that I would find that they had knowledge of many fine 
things. In this I was not mistaken; they knew things I did not know, and to that 
extent they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, the good craftsmen seemed to 
me to have the same fault as the poets: each of them, because of his success at 
his craft (h), thought himself very wise in other most important pursuits, and this 
error of theirs overshadowed the wisdom they had, so that I asked myself, on 
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behalf of the oracle, whether I should prefer to be as I am, with neither their 
wisdom (i) nor their ignorance (l), or to have both. (22d-e).  
 
Here, Plato compares craftsmen to poets for two reasons: both have a peculiar art 
(22h) and both gained success by using some characteristic skills (22h). This is 
important because Plato indirectly defines poetry as an art, techne. (22h). It implies 
that not only inspired and inborn talents allow the poet the ability to produce poems 
but also that certain skills and capacities are necessary and sufficient conditions to 
make poetry. This is confirmed by the fact that Plato concludes his criticism stressing 
that poets as well as other craftsmen have both the elements already emphasized: 
wisdom, for what concerns their art (22i) and ignorance for what concerns other 
respects that they do not know (22l), namely, the various subject matters they 
mention in the poems73.  
The breadth of appeal of this interpretation is further indicated by another passage in 
the conclusion of the dialogue. At the end of the Apology, Plato utters the following 
words in praise of Homer and Hesiod: 
 
Again, what would one of you give to keep company with Orpheus and 
Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer? I am willing to die many times if that is true. 
(41a).  
 
Plato here refers to the greatest poets in the antiquity, Homer and Hesiod. He even 
says that it is worth dying just to have the chance to speak with them. Once again, 
one might object that the last passage could be interpreted as an example of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The same pattern applies to Plato’s argument against Ion in the homonymous dialogue.   
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notorious Socratic irony. Yet, I do not think Socratic irony fully explains this 
passage. Rather, I read it as a sheer tribute to the greatest poets in antiquity.  
 
In order to support my view, I would recall one of the most famous passages in the 
Odyssey. When Odysseus meets Achilles at an entrance to the underworld, the latter 
says that ‘he would rather be a slave to the worst of masters than be king of all 
dead’74. W. K. C. Guthrie comments this line saying: 
Old age was a grievous evil no less than death, which in their eyes was 
the separation of the life of man, his psyche, form the body. It was not 
extinction, but meant dragging on an existence deprived of all that made 
life worth living. Hence the Homeric conception of the dead as 
strengthless, miserable wraiths, and hence the outburst to Achilles to 
Odysseus that he would rather be a labourer working for a poor man on 
earth than rule as a king among the dead.75 
 
I believe that what comes to light more clearly from this passage of the Odyssey by 
comparison with Plato’s previous statement is a common element regarding life and 
the underworld. In both the allegories, the hade is taken to be the worst possible 
scenario for any human being. Yet, Socrates states that it is worth dying if it is the 
only way to meet Homer and Hesiod. Hence, I suggest interpreting it as further 
evidence of the great value Plato gives to poetry and to its most authoritative 
representatives. He could not have paid tribute to them in a greater measure. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Odyssey, XI, 489, ff. 
75 Guthrie, W. K. C., 1950, The Greeks and their Gods, Beacon Press, Boston, p. 122. 
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In conclusion, the previous point seems to me an additional proof that the right way 
to see Plato’s ostensibly ambiguous attitude toward poets in the Apology is as a 
coherent argument. On the one hand, we have a sincere appreciation of the value of 
the poems, by means of a suggestive allegory. On the other hand, we find a criticism 
of the poets, as well as to other supposedly wise people, based on the lack of wisdom 
that they pretend to teach, by appealing to a fallacious use and interpretation of 
classic Greek poetry. Finally, it is interesting to notice that the elements I have so far 
emphasized in the Apology foreshadow the issues at the core of the Ion. 
 
 
2. 2. 0. Plato on poetry in the early dialogues: 
A general account. 
Lysis, Euthyphro, Protagoras.  
 
I can now sum up my interpretation of Plato’s attitude toward poetry in the early 
dialogues. If my approach has been right so far, then I am confident I have shown 
that, although Plato expresses hard criticism against heterogeneous key figures 
involved in various degrees and different manners with poetry, it is possible to 
rebuild an overall, positive account of Plato’s on poetry.  
To that extent, a key specification is required at this point. When I talk about Plato’s 
positive attitude toward poetry, I refer to poetry in aesthetic terms. In order to make 
such a strong claim, I highlight, by the means of textual analysis, the recurrent 
(positive) elements in Plato’s positive evaluation of poetry. As we have already seen 
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formerly, they correspond to stylistic analyses of the poems, to the link with the 
concept of beauty, as well as the readers’ pleasure in reciting them. 
As a matter of textual analysis, we have already seen so far that when Plato shows 
positive evaluation of poetic extracts, he emphasizes the beauty of such passages. At 
any rate, we are already able to state that Plato’s positive evaluations of poetry are 
independent, in Plato’s judgments, from any external contention (i.e. Morality). 
Conversely, as the early dialogues highlight, Plato’s harsh criticisms toward the 
poets only regard extra, non-aesthetic entities. More precisely, Plato’s arguments are 
directed toward the following concepts, (in relation to poetry). First of all, Plato 
argues that the poets lack knowledge, (of the topics they talk about); secondly, he 
insists that there is no real ground for attributing to poets any kind of wisdom. And 
his overall criticism contrasts in toto with the common opinion. As a matter of fact, 
Athenian population used to pay a dogmatic respect to the poets as well as to the 
other categories listed in the Apology).  
In brief, since the very beginning, Plato shows his awareness of such entities, that I 
single out as follows: 
1. The status of poetry as vehicle of heterogeneous messages and aims. 
Nevertheless, his positive evaluations demonstrate he is able to distinguish (and 
appreciate) the Aesthetic elements in all its instances.  
2. He is rather concerned about (and his attacks are directed to) the status (quo) of 
poets as the main truth-holders. 
I believe such a claim can be further justified by looking at other early dialogues in 
which Plato refers to some poetic extracts. Although in the works I am going to 
analyze there are no extended treatments of poetry like the ones previously faced, I 
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maintain that we can find important evidence, in full agreement with what we have 









‘Poets are our father in wisdom’. 
 
Discussing with Lysis in the eponymous dialogue, Plato recalls some of the points 
we have already emphasized. The main discussion focuses on friendship. Plato poses 
several conceptual problems to both Lysis and Menexenus, his interlocutors in this 
work. First of all, it is interesting to notice that in the course of the discussion Homer' 
and Hesiod are quoted in abundance. Plato, for instance, pays homage to the 
aforementioned poets with the following statement: 
 
I think we'd better go back to where we turned oft and look for guidance to the 
poets, the ancestral voices of human wisdom. (214a). 
 
What comes to light clearly from this passage is Plato’s plain appreciation of poetry. 
It means not just a sincere, positive evaluation of well-made verses but it is also 
interesting to notice the acknowledgement that they express wisdom. The kind of 
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wisdom Plato mentions is an ancestral one. In this way, he qualifies the time-
honoured poems as the cultural repository of the civil Hellenic heritage. Their 
cogency is strong enough to be explicitly pointed to as a valuable reference, despite 
their antiquity. 
I will now focus on other dialogues, which belong to the early period, in which we 
find other related statements. We will find not just appreciation like in the passage 
just quoted but also criticisms. Nevertheless, I argue that the passages that I am going 
to discuss below do not imply an ultimate devaluation of poetry. Rather, in what 
follows I am going to shed light on the way Plato approaches poems.  
 
2.3.2. Euthyphro: 
Plato objects poets’ tales. 
 
In the Euthyphro Plato seems to disagree with what the poets say:  
 
Indeed, Euthyphro, this is the reason why I am a defendant in the case, because I 
find it hard to accept things like that being said about the gods, and it is likely to 
be the reason why I shall be told I do wrong. (6a). 
 
Plato meets the eponymous character on his way to stand trial. He is charged with 
impiety. Although he denies the charges, in the above passage as well as in the 
following, he doubts the truth of some tales.  
 
For what are we to say, we who agree that we ourselves have no knowledge of 
them? Tell me, by the god of friendship, do you really believe these things are 
true? (6b). 
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Hence, in Plato’s reference to poetry in the Euthyphro there is not any evaluation or 
aesthetic discussion. Nevertheless, it is interesting to underline the central role of 
poetry in that culture and society.76 Plato makes an interesting point -- how is 
possible to know who tells the truth about the gods? So far as it regards tales and 
poems, such a question could sound trivial and odd to the modern reader. But in 
ancient Greece, gods as well as poetry played a pivotal role in people’s every day 
life. As W. K. C. Guthrie points out in his monumental study The Greeks and their 
Gods, ‘So great was the authority of Homer that much in later Greek belief is either 
in fact a development of Homeric teaching or was believed to be so by the Greeks.’77 
In spite of that, Plato’s concern seems to be fully justified.   
 
And do you believe that there really is war among the gods, and terrible enmities 
and battles, and other such things as are told by the poets, and other sacred 
stories such as are embroidered by good writers and by representations of which 
the robe of the goddess is adorned when it is carried up to the Acropolis? Are we 
to say these things are true, Euthyphro? (7a). 
I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you why? 
Please do. 
I do not think that "where there is fear there is also shame," for I think that many 
people who fear disease and poverty and many other such things feel fear, but 
are not ashamed of the things they fear. Do you not think so? (12b-c); 
 
Plato’s treatment of poetry in the Euthyphro ends here with no further mention in the 
rest of the work. Nonetheless, it is worth highlighting the repeated presence of such a 
concern in Plato’s thoughts on poetry. Since the early dialogue, Plato shows to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 For a full treatment of such a question, I suggest the reading of Burnyeat, M., 1999. 
‘Culture and Society in Plato’s Republic’. Tranner Lectures on Human Values, 20.  
77 Guthrie, W. K. C., 1950, The Greeks and their Gods, Beacon Press, Boston, p. 117.  
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worried about the truth and the falsehood about gods’ tales. Although such an 
element has nothing to do with poetry as we know it, inevitably it recurs in the 
Platonic dialogues. The reason why that happens will be fully revealed in the part of 







2.3.3.  Hippias Minor: Plato on poetry and pursuit of the truth, part one. 
 
In the Hippias Minor we find two important elements: how Plato approaches poems 
and his attitude toward those who use extracts in order to give support to a certain 
thesis. As Plato points out, he does not criticize Homer. He also does not object the 
value of its poems. Rather, as he shows in this dialogue, he asks Hippias what he 
means while quoting Homer: 
 
Let’s dismiss Homer, then, since it is impossible to ask him what he had in mind 
when he wrote these lines. But since you are evidently taking up the cause, and 
agree with what you say he meant, answer for both Homer and yourself (365c-
d). 
 
In this passage Plato clearly shows how he interprets poetic verses. He asks Hippias 
the reasons why he quotes Homer. Plato continues to pursue this line of reasoning in 
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the rest of the dialogue. He analyzes the arguments his interlocutor advances. He 
expresses his attitude as follows:  
 
Hippias, I don't dispute that you are wiser than I, but it is always my custom to 
pay attention when someone is saying something, especially when the speaker 
seems to me to be wise. And because I desire to learn what he means, I question 
him thoroughly and examine and place side-by-side the things he says, so I can 
learn. If the speaker seems to me to be some worthless person, I neither ask 
questions nor do I care what he says. This is how you'll recognize whom I 
consider wise. You'll find me being persistent about what's said by this sort of 
person, questioning him so that I can benefit by learning something. (369d). 
 
Plato describes his attitude when he questions and discusses with his various 
interlocutors. One could say that the last passage quoted is not relevant in Plato’s 
attitude toward poetry; however, I would say that Plato here makes clear two things 
at once. On the one hand, he explains the purpose of his approach toward discussions 
and on the other hand, he affirms his interest in his interlocutor’s own idea, rather 
than in beating the discussant in debate – which is a peculiar feature of the sophists.  
We have already described the huge impact of Greek poetry in the everyday 
Athenian life in the first chapter. We see now how much in an oral culture like the 
ancient Greek one, the reference to the myths and poems was the customized 
practice. If Jaeger78 and Havelock79 revealed the enormous influence of poetry in 
historical and philological terms, we see now such factors in action. It is not a case 
then that Plato along with his many interlocutors quote and discuss Homer so often 
in every dialogue. In the Hippias Minor as well as in the Protagoras, for instance, we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Jaeger W. 1944. Paideia. The idea of Greek Culture, Oxford University Press, New York. 
79 Havelock, E. A., 1963, Preface to Plato, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
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find a clear explanation of how Plato deals with poetic extracts mentioned during 
discussions. In the latter work, he even makes a crystalline example of the hallmark 
between his attitude and the sophistic one. What it is interesting to notice here is that 
if the former, Platonic attitude was characteristic of Plato and his followers only, the 
latter (the sophistic approach to discussions) was much more typical at that time. 
Indeed, what rhetoricians, poets, priests, rhapsodes and, of course, sophists have 
especially in common is a systematic (although usually not justified) appeal to the 
myths and traditional tales expressed by poetry. The analyses of the next dialogue 





2.3.4. Protagoras: Plato on poetry and pursuit of the truth, part two. 
 
It is worth noting that at the beginning of the discussion, Protagoras asks the 
audience whether they prefer to listen to a myth rather than an exposition of 
argument. The reason why it is interesting is that the eponymous character affirms 
that he is able to make his own point in both ways. The role and the meaning of 
persuasion of a sophist overlap with the poet’s proper one. The two roles/professions 
seem to be perfectly exchangeable in Protagoras’s view. Such an element is further 
evidence of how poems could serve as instruments to give support to any claim and 
it is consistent with what we have already said about the common perception of 
poetry.  
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"I wouldn't think of begrudging you an explanation, Socrates," he replied. 
"But would you rather that I explain by telling you a story, as an older man to a 
younger audience, or by developing an argument?" (320c). 
 
The famous sophist Protagoras then tells a poem by Simonides in order to support his 
thesis. Socrates explicitly says that there is nothing wrong with poetry. On the 
contrary, he states that it is the chief part of a man’s higher education. That fully 
corresponds to the historical, common view but the matter relies on the (wrong) 
usage of poetry. Indeed, Plato points out a contradiction between Protagoras’ claim 
and Simonides thought. The latter is the author of the well-know extracts quoted by 
Protagoras himself in order to corroborate his claim.  
 
‘I consider, Socrates, that the greatest part of a man's education is to be in 
command of poetry (a), by which I mean the ability to understand the words of 
the poets (b), to know when a poem is correctly composed and when not, and to 
know how to analyze a poem and to respond to questions about it. So my line of 
question now will still concern the subject of our present discussion, namely 
virtue, but translated into the sphere of poetry. (339a). 
 
The sophist Protagoras quotes the following poem: 
Now, Simonides somewhere says to Scopas, the son of Creon of Thessaly: 
 
For a man to become good truly is hard, 
in hands and feet and mind foursquare, 
blamelessly built .  
 
Protagoras’ line of reasoning relies on the correct interpretation of such a 
poem.  
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Do you know this lyric ode, or shall I recite it all for you?" 
I told him there was no need, for I knew the poem, and it happened to be one to 
which I had given especially careful attention. 
"Good," he said. "So, do you think it's well made or not?" 
"Very well made." 
"And do you think it's well made if the poet contradicts himself?" 
‘No.’ 
"Take a better look then." 
"As I've said, I'm already familiar enough with it" 
'Then you must know that at some point later in the ode he says: 
 
Nor is Pittacus' proverb in tune 
however wise a man he was. 
Hard it is to be good, he said. 
 
"You do recognize that both these things are said by the same person?"  
"I do."  
"Well, do you think that the latter is consistent with the former?" 
"It seems so to me," I said (but as I said it I was afraid he had a point there). 
"Doesn't it seem so to you?" "How can anyone who says both these things be 
consistent. (347e-348a). 
 
From here to the following ten lines, Plato commits to the denial of Protagoras’ 
claim. In fact, what prima facie seemed a contradiction in the poet’s verses, turns out 
to be a coherent thought on virtue. Plato has Socrates say that ‘at first I felt as if I had 
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been hit by a good boxer’ (339e). Plato takes his time for replying and with help 
from another interlocutor, is finally able to reply to Protagoras, showing that the 
contradiction he previously pointed out was ostensible. Briefly, Plato’s argument 
relies on the difference between ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ (340c-d). A few lines later, 
Plato even offers what he calls ‘an interpretation of the poetry’ (342a). Further, Plato 
states his own attitude on writing, clashing with Protagoras: 
 
'What does it mean to fare well in letters; what makes a man good at 
them? Clearly, the learning of letters. (345a). 
 
Plato’s final point is worth mentioning, because it illustrates very clearly his 
criticism on the instrumental use of the authority of the classic poets.  
 
Ours is such a group, if indeed it consists of men such as most of us claim to be, 
and it should require no extraneous voices (a), not even of poets, who cannot be 
questioned on what they say (b). When a poet is brought up in a discussion, 
almost everyone has a different opinion about what he means, and they wind up 
arguing about something they can never finally decide (c). The best people avoid 
such discussions and rely on their own powers of speech to entertain themselves 
and test each other (d). (347e-348a). 
 
In a few lines, Plato points out several points both on poetry and on his philosophical 
activity. If the aim of the discussion is to find the pursuit of truth on a certain subject, 
neither the appeal to a poet nor to any external voice is helpful (a). I believe Plato’s 
first point aims to release poetry for such a theoretical frame. This does not mean that 
poetry is useless but, rather, as Plato specifies in the next breath, it is impossible to 
question the author (c) and it can be arbitrary to attribute to him a certain view, 
without explicit consistent textual ground for it. In addition, there is no possibility to 
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find a common agreement among the listeners (c). Hence, Plato describes how to 
achieve the goal of discussing correctly in such a context (d). This kind of discussion 
is based on the power of reasoning, and it is free of any external influence, like the 
divine one, i. e..  
It is finally worth highlighting that Plato himself quotes Homer in order to clarify 
how he deals with poetry in conjunction with philosophy. Indeed, discussing with 
Protagoras, he speaks as follows.  
 
I don't want you to think that my motive in talking with you is anything else than 
to take a good hard look at things that continually perplex me. I think that 
Homer said it all in the line, 
Going in tandem, one perceives before the other. (348d). 
 
As the last extracts proves then, Plato’s concerns regard neither poetry in itself nor 
its usage alongside philosophical research. Once again, his objections are purely 
directed at any specious or misleading usage. Such a process takes place, as Plato 
clearly reveals, whenever a few lines by any poets are called in support of any given 
claim regardless of the context, the author’s intention or simply the meaning of the 
whole passage. In opposition to that, stands the short extracts first quoted by 
Protagoras, which is prima facie consistent with and corroborative of the sophist’s 
claim. However, after Socrates’ analytic examination, it quickly turns out to be 
inconsistent with the whole poem, contrary to the author’s intention and thus, the 
sophist’s usage is fully misleading.  
 
Conclusion.  
In conclusion, since this first part of this study is devoted to the analysis of the so-
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called ‘early dialogues’, I have emphasized some constant features in Plato’s 
criticism toward poetry. Indeed, Plato’s criticism relies on a fundamental common 
misunderstanding of his fellow citizens: the supposed wisest of fifth century BC 
Athens lack the knowledge of the issue they pretend to be expert of. In the case of 
poets and rhapsode then, they also lack the understanding of their own profession.  
Nevertheless, alongside with the aforementioned elements, I have also emphasized 
Plato’s positive evaluation of poetry. Such appreciations, I argue, are not to be 
confined to the realm of irony. On the contrary, they represent in my view crystalline 
evidence that Plato did acknowledge poetry qua art.  
Such entities constitute a pattern that runs more or less throughout this work and it is, 
in my view, remarkable to notice that since the very beginning of Plato’s production, 
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Third Chapter. 
THE ION: 
Plato on what the poet does  
(and what the rhapsode does not know). 
 
Introduction. 
The Ion is a peculiar case in the Platonic Corpus. Over the course of time, Plato’s 
shortest dialogue has been regarded as either a harsh attack on poetry or an anti 
litteram, Romantic attitude toward the poetic creative process80. According to the 
former interpretations, both Plato’s criticisms and his ‘poetry-making theory’ destroy 
any value in poetry as well as poets’ wisdom and skills. On the other hand, the 
followers of the latter interpretive model read positively that only the divine 
inspiration appears to be the sole responsible for the making of (good) poetry.  
In what follows, I argue that none of these interpretations catch the essence of the 
dialogue. Indeed, my interpretation stands between the two aforementioned, opposite 
readings. More precisely, the aim is to show that Plato’s criticism against Ion does 
not regard the art of poetry (which I maintain he fully recognises as an independent, 
positive art); instead, I argue that Plato’s attacks aim to show the deep 
misconstruction of Ion’s own profession. Such misleading comprehension relies on 
the rhapsode’s twofold ignorance. Indeed, as Plato demonstrates, on the one hand Ion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 This peculiar trait, among other ones, has been rightly pointed out by S. Stern-Gillet in her 
seminar paper on the Ion: “On (mis)interpreting Plato’s Ion, Phronesis, Vol.49. No. 2 
(2004), pp. 169-201.  
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plainly lacks the (necessary) knowledge of the subject matters he talks about. On the 
other hand, the rhapsode lacks the knowledge of what poetry, as well as his trade, is. 
In addition, and this is even worse in Plato’s view, the rhapsode claims not just to 
know but, more importantly, to explain, to teach to the masses what he eventually 
lacks knowledge of. This peculiar feature derives from rhapsode’s unique role in 
Greece. He was indeed a hybrid figure, across the religious and the artistic 
dimension, whose peculiar role was both to create (new) poems and to teach the 
classic ones. Thus, the actual nature of Ion resembles a religious and moral guide as 
much as an artist. The rhapsode’s religious traits, as opposed to his artistic traits, 
were Plato’s main concern in his attitude toward Ion. At the end of the paper, I aim 
to reconstruct a positive account of Plato on poetry. I maintain that such an account 
is close to our conception of poetry and consistent with my interpretation of his 
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3.1.0. Introduction (530a-d): Beyond Ion, who is the rhapsode? 
	  
Ia - (Or what a rhapsode does). 
 
The opening of the Ion offers, in a very few lines, the blueprint for Plato’s criticism 
throughout the rest of the dialogue. Indeed, from the second statement on, Socrates 
makes clear the sarcastic attitude81 he will adopt onward toward the rhapsode: 
 
“Socrates: Don't tell me (a) the Epidaurians hold a contest for rhapsodes 
in honor of the god (b)?” (530a). 
 
Socrates seems to be surprised (a) that the Epidaurians provided a contest for 
rhapsodes in order to celebrate the semi-deus Asclepius. In Plato’s view, a contest 
for rhapsodes appears to contrast the intent of a festival named82 after the scientist 
regarded as the god of the science of medicine and healing83. Such a mix of surprise 
and irony will be Plato’s leit motiv toward Ion in the homonymous dialogue. Indeed, 
a few lines later, Plato has Socrates say: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 I endorse Del Soldaʹ′’s interpretation for what concern owe the reading of this passage. 
Pietro Del Soldà. «Verità della poesia e ispirazione divina nello Ione di Platone». 
Dialegesthai. Rivista telematica di filosofia (2009) World Wide Web: 
<http://mondodomani.org/dialegesthai/>, [135 KB], ISSN 1128-5478. 
82 The notion of ‘an inextricable link between festival and identity in the Greek world’ is 
largely documented in Games and festivals in the Greek world, Konig, J. P. 2009 Oxford 
Handbook of Hellenic Studies. Boys-Stones, G., Graziosi, B. & Vasunia, P. (eds.). Oxford 
University Press, p. 381. 
83 Ibid.  
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You know, Ion, many times I've envied (a) you rhapsodes your 
profession (b). (530b). 
 
In the sight of Plato’s attacks on the eponymous character throughout the dialogue, I 
read his declaration of envy (a) as a sarcastic statement rather than a philosophical 
stance. Instead, the last instance expressed in the passage above deserves closer 
attention. For the first time, Plato here explicitly recognizes Ion’s profession as an art 
(techne) (b). Since such a notion will assume a pivotal role in the dialogue, I will 
return to it at length in a later section of this chapter. For the time being, let me come 
back to the third and final instance of Plato’s sarcasm in his opening section of the 
dialogue. It will introduce us to a more detailed analysis of the rhapsodic art. At 
530b, Plato dwells on rhapsode’s look: 
 
Physically, it is always fitting for you in your profession to be dressed up 
to look as beautiful as you can (a). (530b).  
 
The vanity emphasized in the passage above is a rhapsode’s constant feature. As we 
have already seen a few lines before, Ion trumpets his victory in the contest that 
surprised Plato (530b). I highlight it because I do not think such a competitive trait is 
just a personal feature of the eponymous rhapsode. Rather, this reference clearly 
shows how much the rhapsodic art was far from being purposeless. On the contrary, 
the rhapsodes were compelled to create new rhymes as well as new interpretations of 
the classic texts. As a matter of fact, such a trait was an intrinsic feature of their 
profession. Further, a jury usually valued their creations. They therefore had to 
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promote their own art; they were compelled to extol their own products. This is the 
reason why the modern conception of the independent artist is very far from the 
reality of the rhapsodic profession in Greece. In this respect, it is crucial to 
emphasize what the rhapsode states few lines later. In 530b, Ion utters: 
 
 ‘I'm worthy (a) to be crowned (b) by the Sons of Homer’. (530d). 
 
He does not only exhibit his ability (a) (or his vanity (b)). He is compelled to stress 
his prime knowledge of the subject he masters, namely Homeric poetry. Once again, 
Ion mentions a prize, a certification of both his knowledge and ability. He searches 
neither for a general, regardless appreciation of his work nor for a disinterested 
expression of his ideas or feelings. Rather, the general acknowledgment of his 
mastering of Homer appears to be his main concern.  
A brief historical digression is required in order to gain a real understanding of the 
matter at hand. ‘[…] at a time in which oral performance is the dominant mode for 
the communication of epic, reflection about the poem do not focus on written text 
but on people: those who perform the poems, those who listen to them.’84 It is indeed 
in conjunction with such historical context that Plato’s criticism must be read if we 
want to make sense of it as well as properly understand it as part of Plato's work as a 
whole. 
Plato’s attitude toward Ion follows the same sarcastic spirit mentioned at the very 
beginning. Plato does not just acknowledge the rhapsodic art (tecné), he even gives 
an account of it at 530 b-c. The description of the rhapsodic activity goes as follows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Graziosi, B., 2002. Inventing Homer, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 4. 
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- and you have to learn his thought, not just his verses (a)! Now that is 
something to envy! I mean, no one would ever get to be a good rhapsode 
if he didn't understand what is meant by the poet (b). A rhapsode must 
come to present the poet's thought to his audience (c); and he can't do that 
beautifully unless he knows what the poet means. So this all deserves to 
be envied.’ (530b-c) 
 
In 530b-c Plato singles out the most important features as follows: the good rhapsode 
has to know the author’s thought: the reason why the poet says what he actually says 
(a). He has to deliver the poems (b). He also has to explain the meaning to the 
listeners (c). Such features match what has been already pointed out about the 
rhapsodic art in general. Plato clearly singles them out. Indeed, since the beginning 
of the dialogue he repeatedly stresses those features:  
 
And at the same time it is necessary for you to be at work with poets-
many fine ones, and with Homer above all, who's the best poet (a) and 
the most divine (b) and you have to learn his thought, not just his verses 
(c)! (530c).  
 
Plato advances here some of the points he will develop through the dialogue. He 
qualifies Homer as the best poet (a). But in the next breath he introduces another 
attribute: ‘divine’ (b). As we shall see soon, the divine dimension of the poet will be 
treated at length later on in the dialogue. In the conclusion (c), the third item repeats 
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one more time that a rhapsode has to learn the author’s thought, not just his verse by 
memory (c). Plato focuses on that: 
 
I mean, no one would ever get to be a good rhapsode if he didn't 
understand what is meant by the poet (a). A rhapsode must come to 
present the poet's thought to his audience (b); and he can't do that 
beautifully unless he knows what the poet means (c). (530c). 
 
Ion sustains the claim according to which it is essential for a good rhapsode to know 
the author’s thought.  Plato supports it by saying that knowing an author’s thought is 
a necessary condition in order to be a good rhapsode (a). Further, from the quotation, 
it seems that delivering the poet’s thought to an audience is the very essence of 
rhapsode’s art (b). 
 
That's true, Socrates. And that's the part of my profession that took the 
most work (a). I think I speak more beautifully than anyone else about 
Homer (b); neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus nor Stesimbrotus of Thasos 
not Glaucon nor anyone else past or present could offer as many beautiful 
thoughts about Homer as I can (c). (530d). 
 
It is worth stressing again that the relation between the rhapsode and the author is not 
a mere repetition or interpretation – at least, not in the sense in which we intend 
from, for instance, the theatrical representation of a written text. Ion does not just 
repeat Homer’s verses in front of an audience. Rather, starting from the very 
knowledge of the original texts, he uses them as a source, in order to produce new 
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ones, rather than rather than giving interpretations (in prose) of the classic poetic 
material,  (b – c). That is the reason why, as Ion confirms in the passage above, 
understanding the author’s thought is the hardest part of his work (a). On that 
ground, he claims to be the best rhapsode on Homer85. It is rather vital for the 
purpose of the present section to single out the important distinctions between poets 
and rhapsodes. ‘The activities of bards and rhapsodes are distinguishable already in 
the earliest appearances of the word rhapsodos. However, there are some passages 
where rhapsodes and composer (whether aoidoi or poietai) are treated as being 
essentially similar.’86 
Since the verses that the rhapsode utters are based on Homeric tales, they sound 
familiar to the crowd. Eventually, its appreciation determines the success of the 
rhapsode’s performance. Ion confirms it by saying that he is specialized only in 
Homer, and he does not reproduce Hesiod’s and Archilochus’ poems, (531a). To 
sum up, Ion claims to be able to explain what Homer says and what Homer means 
when he talks about certain subjects. Plato picks up these points in order to build up 
his first criticism.  
 
 
3.2.0. Plato’s first criticism against Ion (531a-534c). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 (To some extent, I would suggest that part of what Ion does is a kind of improvisation. But 
since that question is not central to my purpose in the present work, I shall not pursue it any 
further.) 
86 Graziosi, B., (2002), p. 32. 
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IIa - What Ion (does not) know(s)? 
 
Plato’s first criticism relies on Ion’s (lack of) knowledge of his own art. The 
discussion goes from 531a to 534c. On the one hand it focuses on what kind of art is 
the rhapsodic one. On the other hand it analyses Ion’s understanding of it.  
As we have already seen at the end of the last section, Ion admits that ‘the most 
difficult part of his job is to get understanding of an author’s thought’ (530d). Plato’s 
first criticism relies on this specific point: How well does Ion understand Homer?  
In order to answer this question, we shall analyse how the eponymous character 
justifies his knowledge. And we shall clarify what body of knowledge is at stake too. 
At the beginning of the discussion, in a close succession (531a-d), Ion makes the 
following set of claims: 
i. He proclaims to be an expert on Homer, only, (531a). 
ii. In so far as Homer and Hesiod talk about the same subjects, Ion claims to be able 
to explain their thoughts, equally well, (531b). 
iii. The expert of the subject matter treated in the poems, will explain better than 
anyone else the things that the aforementioned poets speak about in a different 
way, (531b).   
The rhapsode’s (supposed) mastery of Homer (i) will soon become a tricky point for 
Ion. As a matter of fact, he will fail to prove his mastery of Homer twice. There is an 
ambiguity on this point too. On the one hand, as Pappas points out, “Ion does not 
profess to understand any poet besides Homer: as he freely admits, he has nothing to 
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say about the rest (531a, 532c)”.87 On the other hand, in the next breath (at 531b), he 
plainly contradicts himself: 
 
Soc: Then, on those subjects, would you explain Homer's verse better and 
more beautifully than Hesiod's (a)? 
531b ION: Just the same Socrates, on those subjects, anyway, where they 
say the same things (b). (531b). 
 
The latter point deserves close attention. Indeed, herein lies the first mistake the 
rhapsode makes. His fault is twofold. On the one hand, this claim is inconsistent with 
the former. On the other hand, and for the first time explicitly, Ion glaringly begins to 
confuse his knowledge of Homer’s literature with the themes in Homer. I will return 
to this point below. Ion’s knowledge is a very debated point. In this regard Pappas 
argues, “Even when Homer and Hesiod speak about the same subject, such as 
divination, Ion can only explain the Homeric passage. But an expert in the field, says 
Socrates, can speak equally well about every instance of divination, and every 
discussion of it. Ion, then, has no craft-ability (techne), nor indeed any knowledge.”88 
However, Pappas is incorrect since this is not what the rhapsode intends to argue. In 
the passage above, the eponymous character does say he ‘will speak equally good 
and beautiful on those subjects Homer and Hesiod say the same things,’ (b). This 
suggests that the rhapsode mixes up his knowledge of the Homeric poems with the 
specific knowledge of the topics in them. But the very fact that the rhapsode overlaps 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Pappas, N., Plato’s “Ion”, the Problem of the Author, in Philosophy, Vol. 64, No. 249, 
(Jul. 1989), pp. 382. 
 
88 Ibid, p. 383. 
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two different subjects does not imply, I argue, that Plato is sympathetic with that. On 
the contrary, it is my understanding that Plato makes Ion say those things in order to 
emphasize a common flaw at that time, namely, the fallacious perception of who 
possessed knowledge and wisdom in the Greek society. I will come back soon on 
that too.  
It is also true, however, as Pappas remarks, that Ion reasserts it (a) at 532c. But I take 
that such a brief line is neither a claim nor an afterthought. I would rather identify it 
as a bright sign of Ion’s lack of confidence in his knowledge. As the text clearly 
displays, he constantly wavers and changes his mind, pressured by Plato’s 
compelling questions. Such a crescendo of changes of heart, lead the rhapsode to 
assert at the end of the dialogue the ridiculous claim that at least he has the 
knowledge on how to be a good general, simply by the means of the rhapsodic art. 
In that respect, I would also emphasize that Ion’s repetition of (a) and related 
inconsistency is conversely in full agreement with Ion’s baffled answers in this 
section of the dialogue. Such a stance is the result of Socrates’ cogent confutations of 
Ion’s inconsistent claims89. The reference to divination in Pappas’ reading leads us to 
Ion’s last claim in the beginning of the discussion with Socrates.  
 
3.2.1. The epistemic dichotomy. 
 
At 531b, Ion does not hesitate in answering Socrates’ question in the following way: 
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Soc: Well. Take all the places where those two poets speak of divination, 
both where they agree and where they don't: who would explain those 
better and more beautifully (a), you, or one of the diviners if he's good 
(b)? (531b). 
Ion: One of the diviners (c). 
 
The text shows that Ion, (and not Socrates!), confuses his knowledge of Homer with 
the knowledge of the things Homer talks about.  
The rhapsode here clearly fails to recognize an important distinction between two 
very different entities. It is one thing to be an expert of Homer; namely, what he 
wrote about, how and why. A fortiori, his importance, place and role in the history of 
literature. It is quite another, distinguished matter to be an expert of the subjects that 
Homer (or any other author) treats in his works. Such confusion between these 
radically distinctive concepts leads Ion to a faulty comprehension of both his art and 
profession. This is the reason why Ion affirms that, on any topic given, an expert in 
the filed will speak better90, (and not equally, as Pappas says), than the poet who will 
talk about it (c).  
The subsequent passage gives us further evidence of Ion’s misunderstanding. Indeed, 
it seems through an analysis of the text that Plato makes a kind of counter-example 
in order to highlight Ion’s fallacy: 
 
Soc: Suppose you were a diviner (a): if you were really able to explain 
the places where the two poets agree, wouldn't you also know how to 
explain the places where they disagree (b)? 
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Ion: That's clear (c).  
 
Ion’s confident (c) answer is the ultimate proof of his misunderstanding.  In any 
given case (b - even when the poets diverge), the expert in the field (the diviner - a) 
will speak better than any poets.  
On this ground, Plato has Socrates start his attack. It is basically a systematic 
confutation of his interlocutor’s claims. It begins with Ion’s inability to explain why 
Homer is better than Hesiod or any other poet (531d). In particular, Plato’s argument 
relies on the following, reasonable principle: 
 
Soc: Now if you really do know who's speaking well, you'll know that the 
inferior speakers are speaking worse. 
Ion: Apparently so. (532b). 
 
Plato supports his argument with two examples: mathematics and medicine. In both 
cases, as the rhapsode agrees, the expert will be able to recognize both who speaks 
properly and who does not. Such a pattern is at last explicitly stated at 532a91, and 
Ion eventually agrees with that too. In the next breath, Plato applies the very same 
argument to poetry, (532b). Plato’s argument goes this way: if Ion is an expert on 
Homer as well as on the other poets, he will be able to value all the poets who talk 
about the same things. Since that, as Plato has Socrates underline, all the poets speak 
about the same subjects. Nevertheless, Ion is not able yet to explain exactly what he 
knows about Homer and the other poets.   
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Soc: Anyone can tell that you are powerless to speak about Homer on the 
basis of knowledge or mastery (a). Because if your ability came by 
mastery, you would be able to speak about all the other poets as well (b). 
Look, there is an art of poetry as a whole, isn't there (c)? (532c). 
  
After having accomplished the refutation of Ion’s claims, Plato is ready to carry out 
his criticism. It is now clear that Ion’s ability to talk about Homer is not based on 
knowledge of what poetry is (a). Otherwise, as Socrates remarks (b), the rhapsode 
will be able to speak about all the other poets too. In fact, Plato explicitly recognizes 
the art of poetry as a whole too (c). Plato’s argument is actually based on this 
assumption. This is a most crucial point, which, except for the passage at 532d-e92, 
fills the discussion till the end of the section, (533c). I would now focus on it (c) and 
argue how such a peculiar point could throw new light on a very debated issue: 
Plato’s acknowledgment of aesthetic value (in art).  
 
3.2.2. Aesthetic value in the Ion. 
  
Plato takes painting, sculpture, flute playing, cithara singing, and even rhapsodizing 
as instances of subjects to master as whole. He dwells in particular on the first two 
arts listed. First of all it is worthwhile to stress again that Plato one more time 
acknowledges poetry as well as rhapsody as arts. But it is even more interesting to 
note that he plainly recognizes aesthetic value to these very different arts. We can 
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find such evidence, I argue, from the three different passages I list below. All of 
them belong to Socrates’ speech. 
 
i. Soc: Have you ever known anyone who is clever at showing what's well 
painted and what's not in the work of Polygnotus, but who's powerless to 
do that for other painters? Someone who dozes off when the work of other 
painters is displayed, and is lost, and has nothing to contribute but when he 
has to give judgment on Polygnotus or any other painter (so long as it's just 
one). (532e-533a).  
 
ii. Soc: Well. Take sculpture. Have you ever known anyone who is clever at 
explaining which statues are well made in the case of Daedalus. (533a-b).  
 
iii. Soc: And further, it is my opinion, you've never known anyone ever – not 
in flute-playing, not in cithara-playing, not in singing to the cithara, and 
not in rhapsodizing – you've never known a man who is clever at 
explaining Olympus or Thamyrus or Orpheus or Phemius, the rhapsode 
from Ithaca, but who has nothing to contribute about Ion, the rhapsode 
from Ephesus, and cannot tell when he does his work well and when he 
doesn't-you've never known a man like that. (533b-c) 
 
What all of the three extracts have in common, I maintain, is a plain reference to a 
peculiar value. Such a value is common to each art. In the first case, Plato talks about 
painted works. Some of them are well painted and some of them are not. By the same 
token, Plato qualifies Daedalus’ famous statues as well made. And even in the case 
of the rhapsodic art Plato acknowledges plain dignity to some works. These passages 
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are astonishingly left aside by commentators. Per contra, I would take these passages 
as evidence of the fact that Plato acknowledged that certain kind of (art)works, 
regardless of any possible function or purpose, have full dignity and may even be 
appreciated. (As he clearly does for Daedalus’ statues in the Ion as well as in the 
Meno). It is indeed clear from the text that neither the statues nor the paintings have 
any other reason to be valued but their pure appreciation. What makes those artworks 
well done or not is something of their own. Put in another way, they do not serve any 
other external goal or scope. To this extent, I value Plato’s mentioning of ‘give 
judgment’ (533e) as further evidence acknowledgment of aesthetic value in his 
thought. What Plato points to in the first case mentioned, is an aesthetic evaluation of 
any paintings, as Socrates states. The vexata quaestio of Plato’s acknowledgment of 
aesthetic value is harshly debated by commentators, not only in the Ion but in the 
Platonic Opera in general. Graziosi’s remark on the passage above is quite 
significant: ‘Throughout the Ion, Plato’s strategy is to assimilate Homer to 
rhapsodes, discredit the latter and thereby damage Homer. By suggesting extreme 
closeness between Ion and Homer, Plato flatters the rhapsode, who is unlikely to 
object, but actually present both poet and the rhapsode in an extremely unfavorable 
light. An example of this flattery is to be found at 533b-c, where Socrates points out 
that an expert in poetry must be able to talk competently about all four branches of 
mousike: aulesis, kitharis, kitharodia, rhapsodia and about their inventors: Olympus, 
Thamyris, Orpheus and the rhapsode Phemius.’93 Although I disagree with her 
starting point94, she points to something important. As I have already pointed out, 
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94 Namely Plato’s intention to assimilate Homer to the rhapsodes, which I will discuss later. 
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Plato discredits the rhapsode, but not (in order to damage) Homer too. On the 
contrary, he constantly values and appreciates Homer as ‘the best of the poets’.  
What it is really interesting is Graziosi’s emphasis on Plato’s account of expertise in 
poetry. Because it encompasses all its forms. In reference to the question of aesthetic 
value, the significance of such a point is huge. It provides ultimate proof that Plato 
had a conception of poetry regardless of the topic mentioned in it. The difference 
with the rhapsode’s view is plain. In the former case the expert in poetry is the one 
who knows all its instances. In the latter the expert on poetry is the one with specific 
expertise on the issues treated in the poems, above all. 
 
3.2.3. (Supposed) Wisdom and (True) Knowledge. 
 
I would now focus on a few lines at 532b.  
 
Socrates: I wish that were true, Ion. But wise? Surely you are the wise 
men (a), you rhapsodes and actors, you and the poets whose work you 
sing (b). As for me, I say nothing but the truth (c), as you'd expect from 
an ordinary man (d). I mean, even this question I asked you look how 
commonplace and ordinary a matter it is. Anybody could understand 
what I meant (e): don't you use the same discipline throughout whenever 
you master the whole of a subject? Take this for discussion painting is a 
subject to be mastered as a whole, isn't it? (532d-e).  
 
The above dialogue takes place when Socrates’ questioning makes Ion in trouble. 
The rhapsode’s first attempt to avoid such a compelling examination is by appealing 
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to the authority of poetry. We already know as a matter of historical fact in the 
ancient Greece, rhapsodes, actors, poets (all of them, it is worth noticing, were 
professionally involved in various degrees and manners with poetry), were valued to 
know the truth, either of the past, the present and the future times. According to the 
common perception, their wisdom and knowledge derived above all from their 
exclusivity and higher familiarity with the classic poems.95  
I believe that the reference is not incidental at all. On the contrary, I do think it sheds 
light on a wider contrast among so many heterogeneous figures96, which harshly 
contended each other over the right to be regarded as wise ones. Not just 
philosophers and rhapsodes, but rhetoricians and sophists too, as well as various 
religious figures and poets, played the same game, overlapping roles. All of them 
claimed to know the truth, and in most cases, they demanded their superiority by 
knowing or even by teaching how to grasp such knowledge. The impact of such a 
cultural confusion was made much more stronger by the absence of a secure, stable 
source of knowledge. The role and function of these heterogeneous figures 
sometimes twists each other. In this regard, it is worth highlighting that Socrates 
refuses to be called wise (sophoi) (532d-e). In opposition to that (a), he insists to 
commits himself only to seek the truth (c). In the passage above, Plato makes three 
things clear at once.  
(i) Rhapsodes and actors are trusted as ‘wise people’.  
This happens because of their knowledge of divine affairs and their privileged links 
with the gods. Such an exclusive familiarity with divine traditions and affairs is at 
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study.  
96 Asmis, E., 1992. Plato on Poetic Creativity. In Richard Kraut (ed.), 1992, The Cambridge 
Companion to Plato. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 338–364. 
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the core of their peculiar status. 
(ii) (Conversely) Plato is interested in seeking the truth, only. 
Further, the truth Plato refers to is something per se knowable by anyone (d); with no 
need to be explained (or to ask to) a rhapsode: ‘As for me, I say nothing but the truth 
(c), as you'd expect from an ordinary man’97. As a matter of fact, it can (and must) be 
pursued with the use of the logos, or through the means of a rational investigation. 
Such a way to grasp knowledge is absolutely open (e): ‘Anybody could understand 
what I meant’.98 
(iii) While this assertion could be prima facie seems just a witticism to the sophists, 
it is rather the sign of a completely different attitude toward (the search of) 
knowledge. On the one hand, Ion, as the most representative example of figures like 
actors, poets, prophets who claimed to be wise, relies on the authority of the classic 
poems for his knowledge. On the other hand, philosophers like Socrates stand. 
Instead of appealing to an instrumental, hermetic and ambiguous use of the tradition, 
the true philosopher  committed himself in pursuing a disinterested truth. Unlike the 
exclusivity of knowledge that artists like Ion relished, the philosopher’s inquiry, was 
free of charge and available to anyone.99 In view of all that, Plato’s harsh criticism 
derives from his radically different approach in the attainment of knowledge.  
Further, I would add that another dimension is involved in Plato’s criticism. To this 
extent, I find relevant to the passage at stake Dodds’ remark on the Republic and the 
Laws. In the following extracts, the prestigious historian points out the moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 We find a corresponding reference in the Apology too. 
98 See the Meno – slave-boy example. 
99 We have a plain demonstration of such stance in the Meno, where Plato successfully males 
a slave-boy grasp the truth.  
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dimension involved in Plato’s criticism in the aforementioned dialogues. To this 
extent, I argue that those criticisms overlap with my comments on the reception of 
poets and related figures as wise people. Dodds remarks: ‘On the other hand, Plato's 
third proposition—that the gods cannot be bribed—implied a more drastic 
interference with traditional belief and practice It involved rejecting the ordinary 
interpretation of sacrifice as an expression of gratitude for favours to come, "do ut 
des" a view which he had long ago stigmatised in the Euthyphro as the application to 
religion of a commercial technique. But it seems plain that the great emphasis he lays 
on this point both in the Republic and in the Laws is due not merely to theoretical 
considerations; he is attacking certain widespread practices which in his eyes 
constitute a threat to public morality. The "travelling priests and diviners" and 
purveyors of cathartic ritual who are denounced in a much-discussed passage of 
Republic ii, and again in the Laws, are not, I think, merely those minor charlatans 
who in all societies prey upon the ignorant and superstitious. For they are said in 
both places to mislead whole cities, an eminence that minor charlatans seldom 
achieve. The scope of Plato's criticism is in my view wider than some scholars have 
been willing to admit: he is attacking, I believe, the entire tradition of ritual 
purification, so far as it was in the hands of private, "unlicensed" persons.’100 Such a 
notation, I believe, corroborate my reading of the passage exanimated in this section. 
Indeed, the relevance of ritual purifiers in the worship of traditional Hellenic 
divinities shows the complexity of the relationship between gods and humans in 
Plato’s time. Endorsing Dodds’ suggestion, I submit that Plato, by the means of his 
first criticism, wants to release the Hellenic traditional worship from irrational fears, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Dodds, 1951, p. 221. 
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do ut des relations and all the elements that affect a genuine cult. Gods do not 
interfere with humans’ life, Plato says. The customized practise of ritual purifiers 
offered by travelling priests has nothing to do with humans’ personal responsibility, 
gods goodwill or simply luck, Plato says in his criticism. A fortiori, poets are not a at 
all a medium in the complex relation between humans and gods, despite what the 
poets told us.  
It is finally worth emphasizing that the above position is a consistent continuum in 
Plato’s attitude towards poets and related figures form the early dialogues (Ion) to 




















Plato’s second criticism (533d-536d). 
Divine inspiration as the cause for making good poetry. 
 
3.3.0. Socrates’ reductive account of poetic creation. 
 
After Socrates proves that Ion’s claims are inconsistent about poetry, he advances his 
own view. He starts a long monologue, (533d-535a), positing the following theory:  
 
As I said earlier, that's not a subject you've mastered – speaking well 
about Homer; it's a divine power that moves you, as a "Magnetic" stone 
moves iron rings. (533d). 
 
In his long speech, Plato makes a complex set of claims. I sketch them below in a 
brief summary. 
i. What makes Ion able to speak masterfully on Homer is not art but it is rather 
a                 divine force. (533d).  
ii. Such a divine force works like a chain (the well-know ‘Rings allegory’, 
533d-e). 
iii. The same, divine force invests the poets, the rhapsodes and the audience too.  
iv. Poets, in general, make poetry by virtue of the same divine inspiration too. 
(533e). (All the good epic and poets are instances of such a process of 
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inspiration.)  
v. The Muse makes the poets inspired and as out of their minds as bacchantes.  
vi. The poets themselves are aware of the divine source of their poems (534a). 
vii. Conversely, in so far as the poet is completely conscious, he is not able to 
make good poetry (534b). In order to support his claim, Plato recalls what is 
recognized as the most beautiful of the poems as the incontrovertible 
evidence of his theory.  
viii. As a matter of empirical fact, the poem by Tynnichus from Chaicis is the 
only one worth remembering of that author (534d-e).  
ix. The author himself admits that such a poem stems entirely from the Muse.  
 
Ion fully agrees, (535a). He even declares himself sympathetic with Plato's view 
according to which rhapsodes are ‘interpreters of interpreters’. (535a). 
 
Ion: What a vivid example you've given me, Socrates! I won't keep 
secrets from you. Listen, when I tell a sad story, my eyes are full of tears; 
and when I tell a story that's frightening or awful, my hair stands on end 
with fear and my heart jumps. (535c). 
 
Ion confirms the ‘trance-state’ in which he exercises his profession. More precisely, 
Ion seems to describe a process of personification between him and the character he 
represents. But Ion's performances are much more complex than what they seem. 
Indeed, a few lines later he goes on in depicting himself on the stage.  
 
Ion: I know very well that we do. I look down at them every time from up 
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on the rostrum, and they're crying and looking terrified, and as the stories 
are told they are filled with amazement (a). You see I must keep my wits 
and pay close attention to them (b): if I start them crying, I will laugh as I 
take their money, but if they laugh, I shall cry at having lost money (c). 
(535e).  
 
It is worth stressing the ambiguity in Ion’s speech. On the one hand he says to be 
fully unaware during his performance. On the other hand he maintains that during his 
performances he is very well aware of the audience’s reaction. Such a discrepancy 
reveals one more time the vagueness and inconsistency of Ion's claims. We can stem 
further elements from the passage just quoted.  
As Ion candidly admits, he has to terrify the audience in order to be rewarded 
worthily (a). It is not just a matter of offering a good performance as any actor 
conventionally should/would do. Ion must impress his public until people cry. Here, 
Ion is not just referring to the process of audience’s identification with the characters 
we have already stressed; rather, I suggest that Plato wants to emphasize the highly 
competitive trait of such performances. In order to shed light on the nature of such 
performances, I shall report what J. Koenic writes regarding such representations: 
“he describes the difficulties a philosophical speaker has in making himself heard 
above all the other distractions, and all the other less praiseworthy speakers, at a 
festival, with the implication that the link between festival and intellectual display is 
now so well known as to attract enormous numbers of speakers, as well as the few 
genuine like himself’101. 
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On this respect, it is useful to remember the depth and complexity inherent in the 
relation between performers and spectators. ‘There seems to have been a widespread 
concept of spectating as an active process, a performance of identity on behalf of the 
spectator not so far removed from modern concept of pilgrimage’, J. Koenic reminds 
us.102  
It is not the case that Plato dwells on this point. At 535e he iterates that the crowd is 
the last ring of the chain of divine possession.  
Plato reasserts that there is neither knowledge nor skill when Ion talks about Homer: 
Soc: […] that you have plenty to say about Homer but not about the 
others-is that it's not mastering the subject, but a divine gift, that makes 
you a wonderful singer of Homer's praises. (536d).  
 
Such a radical conception of poetry as divine gift is not as odd as it appears prima 
facie. Moreover, as Pappas points out, there is a gulf between being carried away and 
being out of one’s head, and Ion’s attitude on that is vague as usual. Such a gulf is 
open to different interpretations, since it is not clear the weight of the different 
ingredients in the process of making poetry. However, it is useful to bear in mind 
that the conception of poetry as divine gifts is doubtless older than Plato. Dodds 
recalls: ‘Older and more authentic is the repeated claim that minstrels derive their 
creative power from God. "I am self-taught," says Phemius; "it was a god who 
implanted all sorts of lays in my mind." The two parts of his statement are not felt as 
contradictory: he means that’ he has not memorized the lays of other minstrels, but is 
a creative poet who relies on the hexameter phrases welling up spontaneously as he 
needs them out of some unknown and uncontrollable depth; he sings "out of the 
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gods," as the best minstrels always do.’’103  
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3.4.0.  (536e – 541b): Ion’s failure.  
(Or what knowledge is). 
 
Ion rejects Plato’s claim according to which he speaks about Homer by virtue of 
divine possession, (536e). Once again, the rhapsode overlaps his knowledge of 
Homer with the knowledge of the subject matters Homer faces. His epistemological 
failure relies precisely in not realizing such a dichotomy. Although we have already 
faced similar fallacy from Ion in the previous sections, it is worthwhile to dwell more 
on that. Such a notion plays a pivotal role in the dialogue itself as well as in my 
interpretation. Indeed, both the commentators that praise Plato for his divine 
inspiration concept of poetry and those who charge him of disowning the essence 
and the value of poetry take for granted a central point, I argue. Namely, they assume 
that the epistemological failure mentioned above regards the rhapsode as well as 
Plato. Put in another way, those readings are based upon the conviction that Plato’s 
criticism to Ion shows that Plato did not see the dichotomy between to know a poem 
on the one hand and to know the subject(s) treated in the poem(s) on the other. But 
what is wrong with this argument is that it presupposes what it claims to shows. The 
very fact that Plato has Socrates emphasize Ion’s misconception in realising such a 
dichotomy, does not entail by itself that the author of the dialogue himself endorsed 
such a view. Per contra, I argue that the reason why Plato repeatedly104 attacks the 
rhapsode on the base of his twofold misconception is exactly to show how far the 
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rhapsode was from a real understanding of the matters he demanded to be an expert 
in. Indeed, as we have already emphasized in the course of the present study, the 
rhapsode lacks knowledge of both his profession and of the subject matters the bards 
he masters talks about. In this regard, I take Plato’s acknowledgment of aesthetic 
value as evidence that he was very well aware of the aforementioned dichotomy. If 
my approach has been right so far, the repetition of the arguments we are going to 
analyse can be read as further evidence that Plato fully acknowledged the dichotomy 
at stake. The dispute relies on the concept of profession. Ion fails to recognize which 
domain(s) are exclusively of the rhapsodes. His allegation, though wrong, points to 
something interesting. It raises indeed the question of ‘whether a scientific method is 
available for criticism of the poetic art105’.  
Alongside others commentators, LaDrière maintains that ‘the poet himself is not an 
expert in any kind of knowledge and, as poet, has not necessarily anything to teach 
us’.106 But such a view corresponds to our attitude toward poetry as a fine art. As we 
have already emphasized, this is not the same subject Plato is dealing with in the Ion.  
Instead, I endorse LaDrière’s view on Socrates’ poetic theory. He rightly points out 
that ‘it was not the purpose of the dialogue to present a doctrine about poetry 
contained in this description of it; for it is clear that in making Socrates resume the 
account of poetry given by ‘the poets themselves.’ (534a), and accepting this without 
demonstration or examination as sufficient for his purposes, Plato indicated as 
plainly as his method permitted that the problem of precisely why and how poetry 
came to be the scientifically valueless thing it was lay out- side the scrutiny of his 
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main inquiry, which is everywhere else so closely reasoned and documented.’107 He 
goes further: ‘What must to be denied is that the poetic process is its principal 
subject.’108 So far I agree with his reading. What I want do discuss is rather the 
second point he makes: ‘If the principal subject of the dialogue is not the process of 
producing poetry, neither is it the process of reciting poems’.109 A contrario, I do 
think that the complex process of reciting poems is at the core of the dialogue. “It is 
not the part of his performance which the rhapsode shares with the actor that is to be 
discussed in the dialogue, and the notion of success (or failure) is in any case entirely 
irrelevant to the discussion.’110 The performing part is vital to the dialogue’s purpose 
because it is vital to the rhapsodic art. The very fact that we can affirm that the poetic 
process by itself is not at the centre of the dialogue does not imply that neither is the 
rhapsodic art. Ion does not see the difference between poetry and rhapsodizing, Plato 
does. This is the reason why on the one hand the philosopher praises Homer (as well 
as other poets), and on the other hand he criticises the rhapsode. Moreover, the 
notion of success (or failure) is absolutely relevant not just to the dialogue, but above 
all to get understanding of the Greek society as a whole. 
Dodds is very clear about the vital role of success (or failure) in the Homeric society: 
‘Homeric man's highest good is not the enjoyment of a quiet conscience, but the 
enjoyment of time, public esteem: ‘Why should I fight, "asks Achilles, "if the good 
fighter receives no more than the bad? And the strongest moral force which Homeric 
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man knows is not the fear of god, but respect for public opinion, aidos, says Hector 
at the crisis of his fate, and goes with open eyes to his death. The situation to which 
the notion of ate is a response arose not merely from the impulsiveness of Homeric 
man, but from the tension between individual impulse and the pressure of social 
conformity characteristic of a shame-culture. In such a society, anything which 
exposes a man to the contempt or ridicule of his fellows, which causes him to "lose 
face," is felt as unbearable. That perhaps explains how not only cases of moral 
failure, like Agamemnon's loss of self-control, but such things as the bad bargain of 
Glaucus, or Automedon's disregard of proper tactics, came to be "projected" on to a 
divine agency.’111 
I am aware that Dodds’ remarks relate to the Homeric society specifically and not to 
the Platonic one. But I argue that the rhapsode’s initial reference to the importance of 
succeeding shows that Dodds’ remarks are still central in Plato’s own time. Put in 
another way, as Ion confirms at the very beginning of the dialogue, the main goal of 
his performance is to achieve the success among his audience. This is the reason why 
I believe that Dodds’ remark applies to Plato’s own society too.   
The distance between my conception of Plato’s Ion and that of LaDrière’s depends 
upon his radical underestimation of the role and the function of the rhapsodes in 
Greece. But since such an issue has been already treated at length in the second 
section on this study, I would confine myself here to notice that he radically ignores 
the historical significance of such a figure.‘[…] the presentation of commentaries on 
poems. This is a sort of lecturing on poetry, which as we have noticed includes praise 
and in general judgment of what is well or badly done. […] To settle this question is 
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the object of the dialogue. The problem of the Ion is not poetry, and not the recitation 
of poetry, but the criticism of poetry as Ion does it; and, by implication, such 
criticism of all similar art.’112 As I said earlier, if we ignore the historical context and 
the significance of the entities at stake, we are no longer able to make sense of 
Plato’s arguments. Plato was not concerned in the criticism of poetry as we conceive 
it. Otherwise, I wonder why he would have praised Homer and the other Greek 
versess and at the same time criticized so harshly the rhapsode?  
Thus, I disagree with LaDrière’s ‘literary’ reading of Plato’s criticism. My objection 
depends upon the fact that if the reader ignores the historical perspective, they easily 
lose the complexity of the entities at hand. Regarding Ion’s criticisms of Homer for 
instance, LaDrière reads them as a product of the inspiration as well. He even regards 
them as “impressionistic criticism”.113 But as I have already argued at length, what 
we are dealing with in the Ion are neither literary flaws nor artistic interpretations. 
Rather, what worries Plato is the (lack of) knowledge beyond the recitation (and 
explanation) of the poems. The huge impact of such peculiar, rhapsodic 
representations is, of course, part of his concern.  
Regarding the second half of the dialogue, LaDrière supports his claim by reference 
to Ion’s lack of techne and knowledge in his attitude toward poetry. He even draws 
the conclusion that: ‘And since all that Ion could possibly do by system and method 
he would have to do by some system or method which is not peculiar to a literary or 
poetic art or science, but is proper to some other art, it is concluded that there is no 
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literary or poetic art or science by which criticism can be practiced. The art which 
Ion professes is simply found not to exist.’114 
I have already pointed out several counterexamples to this conclusion. Indeed, I shall 
argue that a different kind of evidence is provided by the text. I would point to the 
many passages throughout the text, in which Plato explicitly mentions ‘rhapsodic art’ 
as such. To that extent, it is worth remembering that Plato does not just mention it, 
but he looks carefully at it. Indeed, in the first section we have stressed how he gives 
an account of that. An additional quotation in the second half of the dialogue follows 
the same line: 
 
Ion, since you have more experience with Homer's work than I do, you 
pick out for me the passages that belong to the rhapsode and to his 
profession, the passages a rhapsode should be able to examine and to 
judge better than anyone else (a). 
Ion: My answer, Socrates, is "all of them (b)." 
Soc: That's not your answer, Ion. Not "all of them." Or are you really so 
forgetful? But no, it would not befit (c) a rhapsode to be forgetful. 
Ion: What do you think I'm forgetting? (539d-540a). 
 
Plato makes clear here two things at once. In the first half he singles out the 
rhapsodic area of expertise. (a). Secondly, Ion’s reply shows how fallacious his 
understanding is. Even after Plato’s detailed criticism the rhapsode is not able to 
recognise what he should know and what is not relevant to his own profession/art 
and knowledge (b). It is finally interesting to notice what Plato says in order to 
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underline the flaws in his interlocutor’s answer. Ion asserts how inappropriate to be 
forgetful is for a rhapsode (c). This peculiar remark can be read as further evidence 
that Plato acknowledges the rhapsodic art as such. There is no clue of devaluation or 
presumption toward rhapsodizing qua rhapsodic art. When he harshly criticizes Ion it 
happens because of Ion’s misleading comprehension and use of poetry. In that 
respect, I am sympathetic with LaDrière’s comparison: 
‘And it is in conjunction with Plato's researches into sophistic that this dialogue must 
be read if it is to be properly understood as part of Plato's work as a whole. The 
rhapsode in his capacity of public lecturer, as critic, was as much a professional 
teacher as the sophist, or as the philosopher might be whom Plato envisaged; as such, 
his particular claims had to be dealt with, specifically. The question in the Ion is not, 
as it is in the Republic, of the poet's claim as teacher; that is only incidentally 
involved.’115  
LaDrière’s final point regards the difference between the knowledge of a poem and 
the specific knowledge of the subject matters mentioned in the poems. LaDrière’s 
maintains that Plato does not see such a dichotomy. ‘The judgment of poets is 
judgment of the quasi-scientific or philosophic truth of what the poets say; and such 
judgment is in the province not of one who professes knowledge of a supposed art of 
poetics, but of one who has scientific knowledge of the actual things of which the 
ppoet speaks. The poet’s achievement is to be judged in terms of his fidelity to the 
realities he reports.’116 He even associates Plato’s whole aesthetics to that principle. 
‘Plato never arrived at this distinction; so he remains our greatest example of the 
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constantly recurring fact that often those who begin by valuing art because of its 
assumed power of revealing reality and truth are forced to dismiss it in the end 
because upon examination they see that its capacity for such revelation is in fact so 
limited, and its value when judged by such a standard so disappointingly slight.’117 
LaDrière’s whole point relies on the assumption that the correspondence between 
truth and representation is the only criteria Plato uses in order to value artworks. But 
as we have already showed, this is not the case. Nor LaDrière does not give any 
evidence in support of his view.  
As I said before, the section of the dialogue under examination is a recurrence of 
Plato’s previous criticism. Ion does not recognize yet the borders of his art nor the 
epistemological dichotomy mentioned above. Pappas calls it ‘wilful ignorance’.118 
The reason is that the rhapsode uses Homer as a key, the vehicle to know anything in 
the world.  
In other words, Ion not only possesses no general knowledge, but also rejects it. On 
every important issue he turns his back on a search for the truth, preferring to know 
only what Homer thinks about the issue at stake. He will not aim separately at the 
truth of the matter. From Socrates' point of view, Ion's attitude is thus a perverse 
choice of ignorance over knowledge.  
One thing is to be out of mentally ill, even regularly and for a brief amount of time, 
‘But the repeated conscious choice of ignorance over knowledge is another matter.’ 
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Pappas reads Plato’s attitude toward the rhapsode as a continuum in his hostility 
toward the bards119. As I have already said, I tend to avoid interpreting a dialogue by 
reference with another one. It presents too many risks, and it leaves always the door 
open to the question of why one chooses a certain dialogue rather than another one 
for the comparison. I would rather suggest (and I do try) singling out constant 
features in Plato’s thought as a whole. So far as they solve, (and do not create), 
further inconsistencies. However, Pappas maintains that two elements recur: 
1. Philosophical dissatisfaction with the individual point of view.  
2. Simple ignorance of the poets (all pretenders to knowledge disappoint him).  
Pappas points them out picking up the parallel with painting in book X on the 
Republic: 
“The aesthetic sophistication of which we are so proud consists in knowing that this 
is not the point of painting. We have learned from not to look for knowledge about 
the bed on the basis of the painting, but rather to appreciate it as a painting.” But 
Plato never says that painting’s value or task, as well as any another art that today we 
qualify as liberal/fine art, relies upon its capacity to give us info on the objects of its 
representations. I thus agree on another issue pointed out by Pappas: “I claim that 
what bothers Plato most here is poetry’s power to fascinate us with the merely 
particular, or individual, or idiosyncratic.”120 I do think that Plato acknowledged such 
an entity, namely the enormous clout of words, especially in an oral culture like the 
Athens of the fifth century B.C. However, it is useful to remember, Plato’s criticism 
toward Ion does not rely on that particular point. This is also the reason why I 
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disagree with Pappas’s conclusion. Indeed, in the end he maintains that what Plato 
abhors about art is its representation. But once again, such a strong claim goes 
against what Plato has Socrates say regarding paintings, as well as sculpture, at 533a-
c. In both the examples, Plato clearly shows to be not at all concerned with the 
representational features of the aforementioned art forms. It is rather the case that in 
such an occasion121, I have already emphasized, it is likely to find hints of aesthetic 
value in Socrates’ speech. Indeed, a closer reading to the passages at stake suggests 
that the capacity to represent something would play a pivotal, positive role in the 
process of evaluating artworks. As a matter of fact, In Plato’s criticism there is no 
flaws in the subject matters Ion represents, qua represented.  
 
 
3.4.1. Rem tene, verba sequentur & verba tene, res sequentur.  
Poetry now as then. An Appendix. 
 
Throughout the remaining portion of section II (536e-540a) Ion unsuccessfully 
reiterates his argument. Once again, it relies upon the misapprehension between 
subject matters and different approaches to it. Such an issue, I shall stress one more 
time, is at the very centre of the dialogue. But what it is even more interesting is that 
we find the very same topic in contemporary literary criticism. Let me draw now the 
following comparison in order to emphasize the importance and actuality of the 
dialogue at stake. I draw such a comparison for another reason too. As it is to say, to 
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demonstrate that Plato’s criticism to Ion implies a conception of poetry as proper, 
self-stand art. Such a stance is very much consistent with what a XX century 
literature Noble praise-winner said.  
The 1975 Nobel Prize laureate Eugenio Montale once uttered: ‘You know, poetry is 
made by words.’ The poet’s prima facie trivial claim was actually an embarrassed 
reply to a friend of his. The matter relied on the fact that the poet could not recognize 
the (real) flower that he described in one of his composition122.  
Umberto Eco picks up this episode in order to ‘understand the difference between 
prose and verse’123, as he puts it. In the former case, the narrator must know both the 
subject matter(s) and be able to describe what she is talking about. Otherwise, the 
subject at stake was not necessary for the tale’s purpose, the author of The name of 
the Rose concludes. Thus, in Eco’s speech, the blueprint for the prose genre is the 
following: rem tene, verba sequentur. Roughly speaking: ‘first get firmly the things 
you want to talk about, and then you will find the proper words’. Conversely, we find 
the hallmark of poetry: verba tene, res sequentur. As Eco phrases it, ‘first you fall in 
love with words, and then the rest will follow by itself’. It means, among other things, 
the in the latter case neither the exact knowledge of the subject matter nor the proper 
words for describing it are essential for the bards.  
Following the same line of thought, we can draw a comparison with Plato’s Ion.  
Indeed, I argue that now as then, the essence of poetry relies upon the words by 
which prosody is made. Further, I urge that Plato was aware of such a dualism in 
literature. I would then highlight that the core argument of the Ion relies on the very 
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same issue. Unlike Eco however, as I argue throughout this paper, most of the 
criticisms to Plato does not match the blueprint that he finely singles out. This is the 
reason why, in the next section, I will focus on the real objects (and purpose) of his 
criticism. 
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3.5.0. What is the aim of Plato’s criticism? 541b-542b.  
 
Commenting the Ion, Halliwell reaches the conclusion that for Plato there is ‘only 
one criterion of poetic merit, systematically informative truth. A corollary of all this 
is that Socrates appears to rule out the possibility of any kind of fiction, or even of 
less-than-strictly-veridical poetic statements.’124 But Plato’s criticism of poets in the 
Ion does not concern the truth of their stories. Indeed, he clearly appreciates the 
beauty of their poems, without ever mentioning any concern about the truth or the 
falsehood of their stories125. If Halliwell were right in that, I wonder how it is 
possible to explain Plato’s repeated appreciations of poetry in general and Homer in 
particular in the course of the dialogue. Perhaps, Plato’s attitude appears puzzling 
because he recognizes the poets as being able to say ‘wonderful lyrics’, even if they 
have neither knowledge nor understanding of the things they tell about. Yet, what 
puzzles Plato is the process of creating poetry. If the only canon for evaluating 
poetry was systematically informative truth, Plato should recognize neither beauty 
nor any possible value in poetry. But as I have already shown in section II, he clearly 
does. Moreover, he does praise not just poetry, but plenty of different arts and 
activities, rhapsody included, (533c). 
Halliwell calls Plato’s attitude toward poets in the Ion ‘knowledge-inspiration 
dichotomy’. Although I believe he is in the right direction in emphasizing one 
fundamental element on Plato’s attack of the poets, I disagree with his conclusions. I 
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Princeton University Press, Princeton, p. 41. 
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on that in the Republic. But there is no clue of that in the Ion. 5 
	   117	  
believe Halliwell sheds light on Plato’s criticism, saying, ‘If poets are really to be 
counted as polymathic experts, than their work ought to be able to stand up to just 
the sort of hand-nosed scrutiny that Socrates applies in the Ion.’126 Nevertheless, I do 
not agree with his conclusion: ‘That is why the Ion, like the Apology, is ambivalent 
as well as undecided about poetry: it both exposes the demands that poetry cannot 
meet and leaves uncertain the basis of the ‘many fine things’ that are still to be find 
in it, while simultaneously intimating, in its central section, that poetic power may be 
partly rooted in the capacity to arouse intense emotional responses in its audience.’127  
As well as for what concerns the Apology, I do think the Ion is neither ambivalent 
nor undecided about poetry.  
In what follows, I contend that there is neither a dichotomy nor a contrast between 
knowledge and inspiration in Plato’s thought. I argue that one thing is stressing the 
lack of wisdom and knowledge of the poets in order to show that such supposed 
polymathic experts are wanting of the things they pretend to teach. As we have 
already emphasized in reference to the historical frame, this is due to the fact that the 
audience acknowledges what poets/rhapsodes said as teaching. Another, different 
question is to object the value of the poems from an aesthetic point of view, which 
Plato clearly does not. Rather, I believe that the Ion represents a hard attack against 
poets’ authority in the ancient Greek society. This interpretation explains why Plato 
repeatedly recognizes the beauty of the poems, but on the other hand he repeatedly 
shows the complete misunderstanding of Ion about his own activity. It also avoids 
any inconsistency in the text or dichotomy in Plato’s thought either. By itself, such a 
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position involves neither a negative account nor a devaluation of poetry. Halliwell 
rightly points out how inspiration can give a ‘causal hypothesis’128 for poetry. But it 
is hard to demonstrate that this is the only condition for making poetry. Both 
Halliwell and Woodruff129 agree on that. If we take for granted that Plato seriously 
thinks that inspiration is the sole condition for making poetry, we get more problems 
than we can resolve following such an assumption. For what concerns the issue of 
inspiration in the Ion, Halliwell comments: ‘But does not and cannot tell us what 
counts as, or how to appraise, good poetry, nor can it provides a more general 
understanding of the nature of poetry; inspiration is compatible with more than one 
criterion of poetic quality.’130 
On the same line, Woodruff says that ‘the account of inspiration is new in Plato. But 
it sits poorly with other platonic statements about poetry and poets.’131 He also 
singles out three elements that can go wrong with inspiration and poets:  
 
• Inspired poetry making is not motivated by the love of the kalon (‘the fine’). 
• It cannot issue in belief. 
• It has no purpose of the sort that would define a techne.  
 
I disagree with Woodruff’s interpretation for the following reasons. The lack of the 
love of the kalon is not a part of Plato’s criticism in the Ion. As Woodruff rightly 
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points out, it is part of the argument Plato advances in the Hippias Major, but in the 
Ion this is not mentioned as a fault in poetry making. In addition to that, I tend not to 
interpret certain dialogue in reference to another.  
For what concerns the second claim then, I believe this concerns dose not regard 
poetry in itself. Rather, the matter in Plato’s view is that the rhapsode Ion is not able 
to justify in any way what he does, why and with what purpose. I argue that 
Woodruff here is adopting toward poetry as whole the stance that Plato takes toward 
Ion. But the very fact that Plato’s criticism remains without answer by Ion does not 
imply a devaluation of poetry in itself by Plato132. This brings us to the third point: is 
poetry a techne? And if so, why? 
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3.5.1. Why poetry is art. (For Plato too). 
 
According to Woodruff’s final point, poetry is not an art. I believe the opposite. In 
Plato’s first criticism we find an important reference-point in support of the view I 
maintain. When Plato asks Ion how he can establish that Homer speaks better than 
anyone else, he draws two different comparisons. Firstly, he takes the example of 
medicine, in order to explain that the doctor - namely the expert in that particular 
field - is the person who knows better than anyone else who is right or not talking 
about health. This is a plain account of techné, I submit. The second example 
concerns painting and sculpture. I believe the latter comparison is illuminating in 
supporting the claim that Plato recognizes poetry as art for the following reason. 
Plato has Socrates ask whether an expert in such arts is able to discern the value of 
any sculpture or picture, by anyone.  
The truth-value of an artwork is not the matter at stake here. Otherwise a good 
painter or sculptor should be the man who knows how the subject of any painting is 
made, in order to represent it well, accordingly to such a reading. But evidently this 
is not the case for Plato. Indeed, he quotes the most famous artists in order to show 
that an expert in those fields knows when a statue is well done, and he does not just 
know one artist’s production.  
 
Well. Take sculpture. Have you ever known anyone who is clever at 
explaining which statues are well made in the case of Daedalus, son of 
Metion, or Epeius, son of Panopeus, or Theodorus of Samos, or any other 
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single sculptor, but who's lost when he's among the products of other 
sculptors, and he dozes off and has nothing to say? (533b).133 
 
What emerges clearly from the passage above is that Plato shows to believe that the 
goal of arts like sculpture and painting is to make beautiful pictures and statues. In 
this respect, Ion fails twice because he recognizes neither what kind of art poetry nor 
what the value of Homer is. Once Plato recognizes that the criteria for judging 
sculptures and pictures is how beautiful they appear, there is no longer room for a 
dispute whether the truth-value is the canon for judging whether an artwork is well 
made or not. There is a further clue that indicates that Plato accepts poetry as a 
specific art. As Woodruff emphasizes, inspiration is ‘far from being the distinctive 
condition of poets or artists, inspiration turns out to be a common factor in Plato’s 
explanation of human success.’134 But he also says “That there is no techne of poetry 
is an obvious consequence of Plato’s radical account of inspiration as possession.’135 
I want to contend such a conclusion for the following reasons. I argue indeed that the 
reason why Plato criticizes Ion relies on his conception and consequent 
acknowledgment of poetry as art, which strictly differs from the rhapsode’s one.  
However, Woodruff is not alone on this line of thought. In her seminal paper, Stern-
Gillet starts her treatment emphasizing the Ion possesses neither expertise nor 
knowledge on the topics he talks about136. Further, she urges that it is not clear 
whether Plato had a conception of art. What she is instead certain about, is that there 
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is no room for such a conception in the Ion137. More precisely, she asserts that ‘[…] 
poetry resists classification as a techne.’138 Further, she argues that ‘Poetry is unlike 
such traditional technai as arithmetic, medicine, painting, and sculpture.’139 But 
neither is clear why that is, nor how the appeal to tradition helps in throwing light on 
the (alleged) difference among the aforementioned arts. To that extent, Stern-Gillet 
mentions ‘the very manner’ by which Plato singles out what is (and what is not) an 
art. Yet she does not say more on what such a manner is. She maintains that 
Socrates’ main point is the following: “it is not knowledge or expertise that enables 
us rhapsodes to excel in their function but some form of divine possession.”140 Well, 
in response to this criticism I would say that everything depends on what kind or 
knowledge (and expertise) we talk about. Indeed, Stern-Gillet mentions several 
different elements in the passage above. There is no doubt that the vehicle to excel in 
rhapsodizing is not the knowledge of the subject matter. But we have already seen 
that this kind of knowledge is not the only one at stake in Plato’s speech, as already 
pointed out.  
Besides, Stern-Gillet insists on a completely passive account of creativity by the 
poets too. In her view, the difference between Democritus and Plato about the role of 
the author in the creative, poetry-making process is the following: while for the 
former the poet is “supremely and uniquely gifted”, for the latter he is “merely the 
recipient of rare good luck.” As I have in part already said, the very fact that Plato 
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acknowledges the power of inspiration in art, does not mean that the poet is simply a 
passive mean. Above all, not all the attacks that Plato addresses to the (singular) Ion 
correspond to Plato’s attitude toward (general) poetry.  
Stern-Gillet rightly emphasizes the gulf between Plato’s account of poetry and 
Kant’s and the Romantic one. In that respect, I am sympathetic with her view that 
Plato’s stance in the Ion is not at all an ante litteram Romantic attitude toward the 
creative process.  
For what concerns the issue of the techne of poetry, Stern-Gillet is against Janaway, 
who believes Plato had a conception of a techne of poetry. She does not face the 
parallel problem of a techne of rhapsody, which I think is strictly connected with the 
poetic one.  
Stern-Gillet herself mentions the danger of explaining a dialogue by referring to 
another by Plato. It is quite surprising though; that a few lines later she refers to the 
Protagoras and to the Gorgias in order to support her claim that Plato does not 
recognise poetry as a proper, independent techne. However, I endorse such a view, in 
so far as it regards a single dialogue. Instead, the path I want to take in order to 
sustain my claim refers not to a single dialogue but to Plato’s thought in its entirety.  
In the third dialogue Stern-Gillet takes in exams, poetry is no longer assimilated to 
rhetoric. It gains an independent status, according to Stern-Gillet it happens because 
in the case of the Phaedrus poetry is enriched by knowledge and by “a concern for 
truth.” 
From the analysis of the three works mentioned above, Stern-Gillet derives the 
‘techne standard criteria’:  
1. It aims at the truth; 
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2. It embodies general principles on the nature of its subject-matter or defining 
activity; 
3. It derives from such principles standards of excellence; 
4. It is concerned with good of its object or recipient; 
5. It can give a rational account of itself; 
6. It can be imparted by teaching. 
7. Each techne has an object that is exclusive to itself. (From the Ion, each techne 
has a distinctive field.)                                                  
Stern-Gillet argues that the lack knowledge affects in the same way Homer and the 
rhapsode. But they do not practise the same techne. That is precisely the reason why 
Plato’s criticisms are different. 
Moreover, Stern-Gillett wonders whether poetry is one single field or not.  
She believes it is not. Indeed, she argues, “at the time of writing the Ion, [Plato] 
meant to challenge the traditional status of poetry as techne.” It is worth to notice 
that she reads Plato’s mention of poetry as a techne at 532c8-9 as a tactic rather than 
a true statement. But it is not clear to me for what purpose Plato had to do that, 
instead of stating his criticism clearly. 
I also do not find convincing her interpretation of an argument ex silentio the fact 
that at no point in the main speech does Socrates explicitly deny the existence of a 
poetic techne. Failure to deny that something exists, it might be said, is compatible 
with assuming that it does exist’141. 
Later on, Stern-Gillett says poetry differs from the other technai. From this very fact, 
she derives that poetry is not a techne. I would rather ensue that poetry is a techne, 
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with just different goals and consequently with a different status. It explains why 
technical skills are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for achieving the 
excellence in poetry. Even if we agree with Stern-Gillett’s techne standard criteria, 
the fact that poetry does not match all of them does not imply that it is not a techne. 
Stern-Gillett rightly emphasizes that the modern notion of inspiration is quite 
different from the Greek one. (entheos). 
Nevertheless, she refers to three distinguished figures as R.G. Collingwood, Freud 
and Jung (At the very end the paper she also mentions the English poet A. E. 
Houseman, who is very much consistent with the non-rational conception of poetry 
making). 
All of them actually support a kind of non-technical theory of art. 
What is certainly quite different from our own time is the conception of deity. This is 
mainly due to the fact that divine forces and entity had a huge spread impact on the 
mass. From this very fact, we can say that to some extent the concept of inspiration is 
not exactly the same. But, in the light of what we have seen so far, I do not think it is 
so different, especially in Plato.  
In the conclusion, Stern-Gillett affirms: “Plato’s Socrates’ view is that poems come 
from a source that is other than the poets’ intellect and reason.” According to her 
view, Plato sustains such a claim with a twofold argument. On the one hand he 
attributes to the divine influence the creation of the poems. On the other hand the 
poets are unconscious, if not even mentally imbalanced, mouthpiece. 
Now, we could agree with Stern-Gillett, when she says that the claim according to 
which Plato’s account of poetry-making in the Ion is not an ante litteram account of 
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Roman conception of the poet as a creative genius. But this very fact does not entail 
a complete passive account of the process of artistic creation. 
 




3.5.2. Why Plato (rightly) criticizes Ion. 
 
I believe a further clarification is required in order to shed more light on Plato’s 
attitude toward Ion in the homonym dialogue. I would also sum up the main points I 
have presented throughout the paper. The argument I am going to present in this final 
section on the Ion plays a pivotal role in making my point. I argue indeed that Plato’s 
hard criticism against Ion aims to show that the rhapsode is completely mistaken in 
understanding the essence of his own art. If Plato believed, as Ion does, that an 
expert speaks better and more beautiful than any poet, he will not define Homer’s 
verses, and even Ion’s one, as beautiful. I also argue that from the very same reason 
we are now able to derive why Plato criticizes Ion. My view is that Plato wants to 
show that Ion demands to be a good poet and rhapsode claiming to speak ‘more 
beautiful’ than anyone else, but he is not able to elucidate what ‘more beautiful’ 
means; among the many other things he shows to be misled about.  
Plato accepts that Ion speaks more beautifully than anyone else, but he points out 
that it happens not by virtue of the knowledge he possesses of the subjects about 
which he speaks, but because of the very nature of poetry. Such an art, as well as 
painting and sculpture, has its own essence and goal. And Ion fails once again in not 
recognizing it. He does not grasp that the knowledge of the subjects he treats is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for making (good) poetry.  
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But as I have already pointed out, there is a further evidence for claiming that Plato 
acknowledges poetry as art of making beautiful poems regardless of any truth-value. 
When Plato draws a comparison between poetry and painting and sculpture, Ion is 
not able to understand that his own art belongs to the same set. What all of them have 
in common is indeed the goal of making beautiful artworks. Moreover, I suggest that 
the harshness of Plato’s attack is due to Ion’s peculiar role. Ion is not just a poet tout 
court, but he is Homer’s privileged interpreter. That, I believe, sheds light on why 
Plato’s critique to Ion is harder than his attitude toward poets in general. Ion speaks 
about everything, without having any knowledge of the subjects he tells about. In 
Plato’s view, what is wrong is that the rhapsode, by means of Homer’s legacy and 
authority, speaks about any issue. The matter is that when he is questioned about 
what he says, like in the Socratic discussion, his twofold ignorance comes out. On 
the one hand he ignores the essence of poetry as well as his own art. On the other 
hand he ignores the subjects he tells about. Further, the rhapsode demands to teach 
what he eventually lacks knowledge of, by virtue of a misleading appeal to the 
classical tradition. And it is interesting to notice that since this early dialogue we 
have a crystalline formulation of this argument. And such a pattern is at the base of 
Plato’s attacks to poets, rhetoricians and various religious figures. 
To this extent, an alleged opposite view regarding art must be faced and perhaps 
reconciled. Indeed, on the one hand Socrates says that the rhapsode (technē; 533d) 
and the poet (533e, 534c) do not speak through art, but on the other hand, sometimes 
Socrates’ pupil seems to hold the opposite view, namely that both the poet and the 
rhapsode do speak by the means of their own art. However, I would now advance my 
own theory in order to answer the question whether it is possible, for Plato, to speak 
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about poetry through art (techne), or not. Once such an issue about poetry will be 
solved, it will shed light on the issue of inspiration too. Which is, I maintain, strictly 
connected with the theme of Plato’s problematic attitude toward art in general and 
poetry in particular, (not just in the Ion). For what concerns the first question, I shall 
argue that the above inconsistency is actually only an alleged one, for the reasons I 
am going to present throughout this section. As we have seen in detail in the previous 
sections devoted to the analysis of Socrates’ attacks to the eponymous rhapsode, 
when Socrates says that the most beautiful poems are not reducible to a matter of 
tecné, he does not deny, I maintain, that art of poetry as such, its importance and 
value. Neither Plato argues that the art of poetry is useless for making (good) poems, 
I maintain.  
Rather, what he does say, I argue, is that the art of poetry is not enough for making 
(good) poetry. The famous reference to Tynnichus from Chaicis serves exactly this 
purpose: a lousy poet composed the most beautiful of the poems because of the 
Muses’ inspiration.  
Put in another way, for Plato speaking trough art is not a sufficient condition in order 
to produce beautiful poems. This is due to the peculiar nature of poetry, which is not 
reducible to a matter of mere tecné, according to Plato.  
Now comes into play the theme of inspiration, which occupies a good portion of the 
second half of the dialogue. I endorse Dodds’ claim142, according to which the divine 
origin of poetic compositions was archaic and shared. 143 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 It has already been discussed at page 97.  
143 Dodds, 1951,  p. 11. 
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However, one might argue that there is textual evidence of Socrates saying both that 
the rhapsode and the poet do (and do not) speak though art. I do not deny it, but I 
reply pointing out that the reason why that happens relies on the strategy Plato adopts 
toward the rhapsode throughout the whole dialogue. Namely, Plato wants to make 
plain Ion’s complete ignorance and unreliability. In order to fully accomplish this 
task, Plato does Socrates maintain complete opposite views, showing that the 
rhapsode is willing to endorse, step by step, such inconsistent views on the main 
features (and even nature) of his own professions. And the rhapsode does follow 
Socrates’ frequent changes of mind. To this extent, Plato’s strategy is a successful 
one, because the rhapsode shows not to even realize he argues for opposite claims 
from time to time.  
 








The main aim of this chapter is to emphasise the central themes and constant features 
of Plato’s attitude toward poetry in the Symposium. As we will see throughout this 
part of the work, some elements that I have already pointed out in the former sections 
will recur. But as the case of aesthetic experience in the Symposium shows, new, 
related entities of Plato’s aesthetics stand. And they give further evidence that Plato 
did not have a negative stance to poetry. But, rather, I believe that the elements that 
we are going to analyse throughout this part of the study contribute to prove that 
Plato had a consistent, positive attitude in the main dialogues of the middle period of 
his philosophical production.  
 
4. 1 .0. Symposium. 
 
First of all what is remarkable to note for what concerns the Symposium, is that the 
salient points in connection with Plato’s aesthetics lies more upon the whole 
structure of the dialogue rather than what we can find in single passages. Indeed, for 
what concerns the sake of the study, one point the Symposium is all about is people’s 
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private practice of poetry. Two main points worth emphasizing follow the 
discussion. First, a broader entity stands a part. It relies upon the way average fifth 
century B.C. Greeks experienced poetry. Although we have already faced the issue at 
length, the dialogue at stake illustrates a further step in comparison with what we 
have already highlighted in the first three chapters of this work. As a matter of fact, 
the main characters of the Symposium give us a typical picture of what a private 
banquet was.144 Above all, how pervasive the presence and role of (recitation of) 
poetry was.  
Another contingent concern regards the urgency to avoid the tricky matter of 
Pleasure in Plato. Which is, at any rate in my view, not centrally involved in Plato’s 
aesthetics. Or better say, I argue that pleasure is not in a necessary relation with (the 
experience of) art or artworks. As we will see very soon in details, pleasure in the 
Symposium is one of the many entities at play. But the role it plays is mainly in 
relation to aesthetics experience, I submit. Aesthetic experience is a central topic in 
contemporary aesthetics145. In what follows, I aim to show that in the dialogue at 
stake we can find evidence of aesthetic experience in Plato’s thought. Moreover, 
such a notion is in full accordance with the features previously emphasized about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 I am of course aware that the people portrayed in this dialogue as well as in others do not 
represent the majority of the average Athenians. Nevertheless, I would resist the objection of 
the non-true representation of real ancient Greeks in Plato’s works for the following reasons. 
Given the peculiar hierarchic structure of the ancient Greek society, the quantitative 
representation is out of the topic. I.e. Slaves for instances, even of they were the majority or 
at any rate a huge number, were completely put away of city life. Secondly, what Plato deals 
with (and whom we are interest in, in order to state his attitude toward poetry) are his city 
life interlocutors. It is true that in the dialogue under examination the participants clearly 
belong to an elite. But in most of Plato’s works, they are expression of the average people 
that crowed fifth century B.C. Athens. 
145  
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Plato’s stance on poetry. This especially will emerge plainly at the end of the 





4. 1. 1. Textual analysis.  
 
The first relevant topic we meet in the beginning of the dialogue is wisdom. Which is 
of course a theme we have already seen as often associated with poetry and poets. In 
this connection, we have also emphasized how Plato, since the Apology, has harshly 
objected such a traditional connection. It is not a case then that Socrates approaches 
the topic with his well-known irony, starting the discussion with his fellow 
banqueters. Agathon is the object of Socratic irony in particular. Indeed, according to 
Socrates, a few days before he showed off his oratory skills in front of thousands of 
Athenians (Symp. 175e). This is the reason why Socrates sarcastically argues that his 
own little wisdom is not so wide and powerful as Agathon’s one. A fortiori, it does 
not work so as Agathon ironically suggests at the beginning of the banquet. (175e). 
Neither the mere proximity nor the affinity, as later on the dialogue seems to suggest, 
fills the recipients of wisdom as a flux of water. But the striking example of the flux 
of water provides a good instance of some of the views we will encounter in the first 
half of the dialogue. The course of narration however, suddenly changes the minds of 
the discussants and the central topic turns out to be love, eros. Which will become 
the very subject around which all the participants will devote their own speeches.   
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More precisely, Phaedrus qualifies eros as ‘guidance’ (178d). Such a guidance takes 
the shape of a telos, according to which some actions have to be taken and some 
others not. It is true that in Agathon’s words that seems to have a moral significance. 
But such guidance is not confined to the moral domain, I urge. And the rest of the 
speech too goes in this direction.  
  
The essence of (my interpretation of) the Symposium lies then on this particular 
point, I submit. Plato here does two things at once, I argue. On the one hand, he gives 
to the reader a picture of how a typical private Athenian banquet was. As to say, 
abundant drinking and food, important and heterogonous guests. But above all, Plato 
gives us an account of how a typical private banquet should be like in his own 
view146. Namely, moderate assumption of alcohol, various guests who willingly 
decide to moderate not just the material goods but also the speeches they deliver. It is 
not the case then, that The flautist, an usual presence for the banquets, is kindly 
invited to leave the reunion. Indeed, all the speeches share important central features. 
Among which one stands apart, I submit. Which is the reference to the divinities. It is 
not only eros because of its peculiar features that deserves different treatment by the 
guests. Rather, each speaker treats all the mythological tales recalled in the dialogue 
at stake in a very original way. As the course of narration clearly shows, Plato is not 
at all against appealing to poets or divinities. Socrates himself does that and he never 
objects the numerous references the other speakers make. What it is really interesting 
to highlight to this extent is the way the discussion at the centre of the dialogues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 A further clue of the plausibility of this interpretation is given in Law, I, 639d-e, where 
Plato highlights how the banquets are always chaotic and without a guide.  
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takes place. One of the banqueters simply indicates a common topic. Any reference 
to the mythological material that follows is relevant to the topic and never just 
instrumental to corroborate any claim, external to the purpose of the discussion. 
Notwithstanding that, I believe Dodd’s above digression makes more sense now. 
What I mean is that the characters circumscribe the subject matter of their speeches. 
Of course they present their own view on the matter, but it is not a case I believe, that 
the speakers present a consistent set of references relevant to their view, instead of a 
single or unclear quotation147. The speakers reason around the relevant extracts they 
quote and Eros turns out to be in accordance with virtue and wisdom, one of the 
topic mentioned at the beginning of the dialogue. More precisely, Eros is not cause 
of everything could be vaguely connected to it. On the contrary, Telos and 
coherence, as well as its proper manifestations of are connected with Eros. Love, as 
any other divinity, cannot cause what is not relevant to it, Plato insists.  
 
4. 2. 0. Pausanias, on the objects of love. 
Pausanias wittily wonders whether there is just one kind of love, or rather two, as he 
eventually argues for. He first puts clearly that any action must be valued according 
to its telos. But he also advances with vim the claim that the form by which any 
action is performed will reveal whether it is well done, well expressed or not. Note 
also that an aesthetic nuance seems to be outlined in the passage at stake. Pausanias’ 
insistence on the ‘how’ any given act is done points to, I suggest, a certain beauty in 
the acts themselves. Because of an act can be exercised properly or not, according to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Like the sophist Protagoras does with Simonides’ extract, as emphasized in chapter II. 
	   136	  
its telos. Such a features will be picked up and further developed throughout the 
whole dialogue. Moreover, the final remark on what Pausanias himself classifies as 
general principle is, (along side Phaedo 98c), one of the most glaring expression of 
teleologism in causal relation in Plato’s thought. From 181b to the remaining part of 
his speech, Pausanias actually discerns between a pure, authentic kind of love and 
another, which is defined as ‘vulgar’ (181b). While the former is coherent with the 
acts it inspires and governs, the latter is inconsistent and produces inappropriate 
actions, not oriented to the eros, but rather to lower and second order goals like 
physical temporary possession, for instance. 
The reason for this applies in the same way to every type of action: considered in 
itself, no action is either good or bad, honorable or shameful.  Take, for example, our 
own case. We had a choice between drinking, singing, or having a conversation. 
Now, in itself none of these is better  than any other: how it comes out depends 
entirely on how it is performed.   if it is done honorably and properly, it turns out to 
be honorable; if it is done improperly, it is disgraceful. And my point is that exactly 
this principle applies to being in love: Love is not in himself noble and worthy of 
praise; that depends on whether the sentiments he produces in us are themselves 
noble. (180e-181a). 
Pausanias stresses the necessity to single out the proper manifestations of eros. The 
reason of such urgency relies on the need to identify what is caused by eros and what 
it is not. The main reason seems to be to escape an easy, generic as well as 
misleading desire-based attribution to eros. The “real” eros, is Pausanias’ main point, 
causes only certain actions that are inevitably directed to the object eros itself. 
Otherwise, different acts that are not directed to such a telor, nor are coherent 
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manifestations of the god,  
 
4. 3. 0. Eryximachus. 
Eryximachus, the third speakers, suggests a similar view. First he agrees on the 
former distinction between the eros manifestations and acts of different sort. But 
above all, at the end of his brief speech in praise of eros, he clearly shows to be 
sympathetic with the features already highlighted by the previous speakers. And 
although just a few, conclusive lines are worth of textual examination; they are of 
sparkling importance. Eryximachus utters: 
Such is the power of Love so varied and great that in all cases it might be called 
absolute. Yet even so it is far greater when Love is directed, in temperance and 
justice, toward the good, whether in heaven or on earth: happiness and good fortune, 
the bonds of human society, concord with the gods above all these are among his 
gifts. (188d). 
Eryximachus’s account of eros clearly shows two central points. Goal-directed 
manifestations and manifestations based on the same nature of eros. It is interesting 
to note the insistence on the word dinamis, repeated twice in 188d. This is the very 
same word we find throughout the dialogue, regardless of who refers to eros. 
 
4. 4. 0. Aristophanes’ speech. 
In the light of what we have already said about the former discussants, the final 
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passage at 193a seems to resemble the admiration to the perfection of the forms of 
love. Two main extracts are relevant here: 
It's because, as I said, we used to be complete wholes in our original nature, and now 
"Love" is the name for our pursuit of wholeness, for our desire to be complete. 
(193a). 
But I am speaking about everyone, men and women alike, and I say there's just one 
way for the human race to flourish: we must bring love to its perfect conclusion, and 
each of us must win the favors of his very own young man, so that he can recover 
his original nature. If that is the ideal, then, of course, the nearest approach to it is 
best in present circumstances, and that is to win the favor of young men who are 
naturally sympathetic to us. (193d). 
What it is clear in the text is the reference to the disposition toward an end. And once 
again, such an end (telos) echoes the attribute of perfection that the form of eros 
must have in order to be such.  
 
4. 5. 0. Agathon.  
The urgency to recover a consistent account of eros and its manifestations is still at 
the centre of Agathon’s thinking. On the one hand he focuses on the qualities, on the 
other Agathon speaks of eros as ‘enabling’ the recipient to do something.  
Now, only one method is correct for every praise, no matter whose: you must 
explain what qualities in the subject of your speech enable him to give the benefits 
for which we praise  him. (194e). 
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The perfection of the god causes only manifestations that are sympathetic with the 
god itself. But this is also the reason why the fifth speaker somehow disagrees with 
the previous one. His objection is the following:  
Those old stories Hesiod and Parmenides tell about the gods-those things happened 
under Necessity, not Love, if what they say is true. For not one of all those violent 
deeds would have been done no castrations, no imprisonments if Love had been 
present among them. There would have been peace and brotherhood instead, as there 
has been now as long as Love has been king of the gods. (195c). 
Agathon reiterates the features of eros sketched at the beginning of his discourse.  It 
is first worth highlighting the association with beauty: 
Enough for now about the beauty of the god, though much remains still  to be said. 
After this, we should speak of Love's moral character. (196b).  
Note that what the translator expresses as ‘moral character’ is actually virtue. I do 
not want here to contend the significance of the translation. I would rather confine 
myself to advance the hypothesis that the term virtue would suite the translation 
better, I submit. Indeed, I do not think that what Agathon says about Eros in the 
following lines has to be ascribed to the moral domain.  
The  main point is that Love is neither the cause nor the victim of any injustice; he 
does no wrong to gods or men, nor they to him. If anything has an effect on him, it is 
never by violence, for violence never touches Love. And the effects he has on others 
are not forced, for every service we give to love we give willingly. And whatever 
one person agrees on with another, when both are willing, that is right and just; so 
say "the laws that are  kings of society. (196c). 
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Rather, I interpret the above passage as distinguishing a manifestation of eros from 
what it is just an instantiation of a different sort and nature.  
In the first place-to honor our profession as Eryximachus e did his the god is so 
skilled a poet that he can make others into poets: once Love touches him, anyone 
becomes a poet, howe'er uncultured he had been before.148 
Eros works here like a flux, enabling the recipients to exercise certain capacity 
(poetry). And even those who are neither professional nor educated poets, are able to 
produce beautiful poems. This description fits well with the previous ones. 
Especially because the eros implies a teleological activity, (toward the beautiful). As 
the text emphasizes, eros is a sine qua non condition in order to produce beautiful 
poems.  
In the conclusive part of his speech, Agathon lists again the features already pointed 
out and shared by the previous speakers. But he also stresses the attributes of eros as 
causal agent. 
But once this god was born, all goods came to gods and men alike through love of 
beauty. This is how I think of Love, Phaedrus: first, he is himself the most beautiful 
and the best; after that, if anyone else is at all like that, Love is responsible. I am 
suddenly struck by a need to say something in poetic meter,  
Gives peace to men and stillness to the sea, Lays winds to rest, and careworn men to 
sleep. (197c).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Euripides, Stheneboea (frg. 666 Nauck). 
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Agathon himself though, expresses himself by the means of the lyric metre in order 
to corroborate further his claim. 
4. 6. 0. Socrates.  
Socrates starts his own speech praising the previous speakers, emphasizing the 
beauty of what he had just heard. But his approach is radically different from the 
formers speakers, both for what concerns the form and the content. Because of he 
basically reports Diotima’s speech first, but also because Plato has Socrates use a 
distinct approach to the matter. Indeed, although Socrates praises the beautiful words 
he has just listened to, he declares to be seeking the truth on the matter only, 
regardless of any aesthetic supplement. Nevertheless, as we will see very soon, what 
he says is consistent with the characteristics of eros already previously outlined.  
I. "He's a great spirit, Socrates. Everything spiritual, you see, is in between a god and a 
mortal." "What is their function?" I asked. (202e). 
II. Gods do not mix with men; they mingle and converse with us through spirits instead, 
whether we are awake or asleep. (203a). 
III. And Love is one of them, because he is in love with what is beautiful, and wisdom is 
extremely beautiful. (204b). 
Once again, eros is described as a spirit somehow in between god and human beings 
(I); Secondly eros works as a spirit, a flux that has an effect on the soul. Socrates’ 
further claim is that gods do not mix with men. That resembles one of Plato’s 
criticisms on the content of poetry in book II of the Republic. But it seems to me to 
resemble the distinction between over determination and thumos postulated at the 
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beginning of this section too. Finally Socrates repeats the association of eros with 
beauty, (unfortunately without further clarification).   
At 205b-d we find a suggestive comparison between eros and poetry. Before reading 
what Plato has Socrates say, I would emphasize that Plato starts his comparison by 
pointing out that the misleading reading of the nature of poetry relies on a linguistic 
misunderstanding: 
"Well, you know, for example, that 'poetry' has a very wide range. 
After all, everything that is responsible for creating something out of nothing is a 
kind of poetry; and so all the creations of every craft and profession are themselves a 
kind of poetry, and everyone who practices a craft is a poet." 
"True." 
"Nevertheless," she said, "as you also know, these craftsmen are not called poets. 
We have other words for them, and out of the whole of poetry we have marked off 
one part, the part the Muses give us with melody and rhythm, and we refer to this by 
the word that means the whole. For this alone is called 'poetry,' and those who 
practice this part of poetry are called poets." 
"True," 
That's also how it is with love. The main point is this: every desire for good things or 
for happiness is 'the supreme and treacherous love' in everyone. But those who 
pursue this along any of its many other ways through making money, or through the 
love of sports, or through philosophy we don't say that these people are in love, and 
we don't call them lovers. It's only when people are devoted exclusively to one 
special kind of love that we use these words that really belong to the whole of it: 
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'love' and 'in love' and 'lovers. (205b-d). 
When we refer to Love without further specifications, we point to a whole of things 
that seems to belong to it, Plato says. But when we refer to eros, we point to a 
distinct entity with specific attributes and a specific end. Plato here draws a 
distinction between Eros and poetry. The comparison relies on the consideration that 
poiesis, if considered without further specification as Love in general, means any act 
of producing. But the act of producing poetry is quite different from producing 
anything else. 
Plato reckons that in both poetry and love, the whole is different from the particular, 
despite of the same terminology involved in both cases. The central relevance of 
Socrates’ point contrasts to the mainstream interpretation of Plato’s attitude toward 
Art in general and poetry in particular. In fact, most of the commentators149 
maintained that the reason of Plato’s attacks lies on his incapacity to see the aesthetic 
value in poetry, and in art in general. But Plato’s point above clearly shows that Plato 
fully acknowledged the poetry is the act of production of any artefact as well as the 
product of the poets’ wok specifically. Plato, once again, shows to be fully aware of 
the artistic, aesthetic peculiarity of the poets’ creations. Bass says: ‘To make the 
point that works of art, like flesh-and-blood offspring, evince the human striving for 
immortality, Plato in the Symposium refers to “the children of Homer and Hesiod”, 
which reference has the incidental merit of suggesting that works of art, again like 
their biological counterparts, achieve a status independent of their pro-genitors. 
Undeniably, there are senses in which a painting has a life of its own. Furthermore, if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 To same extent this critique is already familiar to the reader. But I will become more 
evident from the next chapter and beyond, devoted to the analysis and comment of the 
Republic.  
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the primary justification of art is the aesthetic response it evokes in achieving that 
response one way or another, what does the intent of the artist matter?’150 
 
Conclusions. 
What is eros then? Its main features, as being in a strict connection with beauty, 
teleologism, and a consistent, causal relation with its manifestations, compose a 
specific cluster of properties, which enable the recipients to exercise certain 
capacities. The overall result then seems to resemble the striking picture suggested 
by Alcibiades in the ending of the dialogue. The last commensal draws a comparison 
between Socrates, whom Alcibiades declares intellectual affection, and the Silenus. 
Here is what Alcibiades says: 
It's a Silenus sitting, his flute or his pipes in his hands, and it's hollow. It's split right 
down the middle, and inside it's full of tiny statues of the gods. (215b). 
What distinguishes Socrates then, is the twofold quality to inspire his interlocutors 
with unique speeches. But such moving words, or ‘divine melodies’ (215b), as 
Alcibiades puts it, are already divine, and directed to the gods.  
Whether they are played by the greatest flautist or the meanest flute-girl, his 
melodies have in themselves the power  to possess and so reveal those people who 
are ready for the god and his mysteries. That's because his melodies are themselves 
divine. The only difference between you and Marsyas is that you need no 
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instruments; you do exactly what he does, but with words alone. 
The second quality is the capacity of the aforementioned words (and acts) to reveal 
themselves as having inside the image of the god, like the statues of Silenus that 
Alcibiades quotes. 
But, as Alcibiades rightly says, ‘the resemblance goes beyond appearance, as you're 
about to hear.’ (215b).  
I argue indeed that the eros takes the shape of the Silenus statues that Alcibiades 
compares to Socrates. It inspires unique words and acts. And for the very same 
reason, they point to the Form they are direct to, as an end. 
 








My purpose in this section is to offer a detailed analysis of Plato’s criticisms and 
consequent censorship of poetry in the first part of the Republic. My goal is to show 
that Plato’s educational programme is aimed to promote an autonomous and full 
development of the individual in the society he envisages. In accordance with this 
theory, the censorship and the banishment of the poets in the Republic are consistent 
with this claim by virtue of the fact that they regard pedagogical tales and patterns 
used as textbooks, and because they are aimed to ensure a full intellectual growth. In 
order to prove my claim, first I present the context in which Plato introduces his 
criticism against Homeric and Hesiodic poetry. Then, I offer a detailed analysis of 
Plato’s arguments against poetry. Afterwards, I will discuss different contemporary 
approaches to the subject as well as a comparison with our own educational system 
and standpoint regarding educational issues and patterns to promote. I am confident 
such a comparison will reveal the pure pedagogical purposes that lead Plato’s 
criticism to poetry in this part of the Republic. 
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5. 1. 0. Context. 
 
It is worth recalling the context in which Plato deals with poetry in the Republic. In Book I, 
Plato discusses with Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus, the main characters of the 
dialogue, about what Justice is and whether it is good for itself, for its consequences, or for 
both. After long discussions, there is no common agreement about the issue at hand. Thus, in 
the beginning of Book II, Socrates suggests moving the debate into a bigger context because: 
“(t)hen perhaps justice may exist in greater proportions in greater space, and be easier to 
discover. So, if you are willing, we shall begin our inquiry as to its nature in cities, and after 
that let us continue our inquiry in the individual also, looking for the likeness of the greater in 
the form of the less” (Plat. Rep. 368d-369a).  
Plato envisages an ideal community in order to find social justice. In his view, the nature of a 
city is “due to the fact that no one of us is sufficient for himself, but each is in need of many 
things” (369b). Such notion introduces a central claim in Plato’s Callipolis. Since ‘no one is 
sufficient for himself’, a specialization of works within the community is necessary for the 
state itself. We must notice the importance of such a principle. In fact, it matches the 
paradigm of the city: “One man one trade is better” (370b). Julia Annas calls this the 
‘Principle of Specialization’: where each individual is responsible for one job as opposed to 
many.151 The argument for the benefits of specialisation goes as follows: 
The proper work or function of a thing is that which it only does, or it does best. 
Whatever operates does it work well by virtue, and badly by defect or vice. The proper 
function of the soul is to reason, manage, rule, deliberation and life (soul is the vital 
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principle). Therefore the virtue of the soul is to reason, management, rule, deliberate 
well152. 
 
We must pay attention to the Principle of Specialization, also known as the Proper Work 
Argument (PWA). It explains how and why the ‘just’ society works: different people with 
different talents do what their own nature allows them to do best, and the difference in the 
talents satisfies various peoples’ needs. For the same reason, if the city will need to go to the 
war (374a) then the city will need soldiers, also. In full accordance with the PWA the ideal 
city requires full-time soldiers, Plato named them the “Guardians”. Plato’s first treatment of 
Poetry regards their education. 
Because the work of our guardians is the most important of all, it will demand the most 
exclusive attention and the greatest skill and practice. […] Then it will be our business to 
do our best to select the proper persons and to determine the proper character required for 
the guardians of the city? Yes, we shall have to do this. (374d-375a). 
 
Thus, in Plato’s view, guardians are the soldiers of the ideal city. What features do they have? 
Plato answers this question with a comparison:  
In many animals, but perhaps best in that with which we compared our guardians. 
Well-bred dogs, you surely know, are naturally of that disposition – as gentle ad 
possible to their friends and those whom they know, but the very opposite to 
strangers. (375d). 
 
A few lines further, Plato is even clearer: 
Then he who is to be a good and noble guardian of our city will be by nature 
philosophical and spirited, and quick and strong. (376c). 
 
We must notice that “be by nature philosophical” means, as Plato points out in 376b, “to be 
fond of learning”. Hence, to be inclined to learn is an important feature for guardians.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Edited by Professor Theodore Scaltsas, Ancient Philosophical Text 1 lecture notes. The main 
treatment of this argument is in Republic 325d-354a, but it is present in Republic 374a too. 
	   149	  
Now let us turn our attention on the subject of learning. In what follows, I shall inquire into 
Plato’s first criticism of poetry, particularly its content (377b-392c). 
 
5. 1. 1. Plato’s first criticism against Homeric and Hesiodic poetry. 
 
The starting point of Plato’s discussion of epic poetry is the following:  
Our first duty then, it seems, is to set a watch over the makers of stories, to select every 
beautiful story they make, and reject any that are not beautiful. Then we shall persuade 
nurses and others to tell those selected stories to the children (377c). 
 
Plato stated here the first canon for guardians’ primary education: Beauty. However, it is not 
immediately clear what he means by that. In what follows, I clarify the meaning of Plato’s 
phraseology. Indeed, a few passages later, he expresses his first criticism in more detail, 
using Socrates as the mouthpiece of his ideas: 
Those, I said, that Hesiod and Homer and the other poets have told us, for surely they 
have composed untrue stories, and have told, and do tell them, to men. But what kind do 
you mean, and what fault do you find in them? A fault, I said, that deserves immediate 
and emphatic condemnation, especially if the untruth have no beauty in it (377d). 
 
These passages deserve close attention for several reasons: Plato’s attack against Hesiod and 
Homer lies on the “untruth” of their stories. In passage 377c Plato stated that the stories that 
are not beautiful are to be rejected but then, according to passage 377d, he seems do admit 
that some kinds of beauty is possible in untrue stories. Yet, the relation between Truth and 
Beauty is still quite unclear153. We must be careful about the terms “beauty” and “beautiful” 
in passages 377c-d. Plato used the word “καλος”. As J. Annas points out:  
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Plato describes the training of his Guardians’ characters in term that are as much 
aesthetic as strictly ‘moral’. Education is to produce people who are attracted to 
good and feel repulsion for evil, finding it ugly and vulgar. We must not think that 
this emphasis in the aesthetic point of view indicates a detached and ‘arty’ 
attitude: rather Plato thinks that there is no sharp distinction between aesthetic and 
moral attitudes. His point is made more forcibly in Greek because the word he 
uses for ‘beautiful’ of ‘fine’, καλος, is used for what is admirable and good of its 
kind.154 
 
In her remarks on this subject, Annas stresses the strong relation between the Fine and the 
Good and, furthermore, she emphasizes that ‘kalos’ objects have the power to improve 
character: “Goodness or fineness of speech, music, form and rhythm follow on goodness of 
character, he claims, and lack of form, rhythm, and harmony are akin to poor language and 
good character (401e, 401a).”155  
We shall hazard a guess that a story could be untrue just in that specific events it describes 
did not happen (for instance a story about Achilles, if Achilles did not exist) and still be 
beautiful in that it teaches good lessons. Though, conversely, Socrates seems to be using 
‘true’ to refer not just to factual correctness but also to truth of the underlying moral. We 
have good reason, therefore, to doubt whether we ought to translate ‘καλος’ as ‘beauty’ just 
in moral contexts. Such a translation seems to cover a too narrow sense of what καλος 
means. Thus, for the time being, let us consider that the passage above does not imply in 
itself a clear relation between truth and beauty, rather, it seems to admit the possibility of 
other types of beauty not strictly connected with truth.  
Extract 377d seems to suggest that at least a certain kind of beauty is possible in 
untrue stories. Indeed, it does seem odd that we should find beauty in untrue 
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stories, especially if beauty has a moralised sense. On the contrary, in the above 
passage Plato ex admits the possibility of beauty in untrue stories. Such a 
speculation explains why, and on what ground, Plato praises Homer and Hesiod. 
He does so by evaluating them on an aesthetic ground. Indeed, I argue that the 
passage above shows that Plato acknowledges a kind of beauty that is separate 
from the true-value evaluation as well as from any moral one. Untrue and amoral 
beautiful stories do exist, Plato admits it at 377d:  
 
Those, I said, that Hesiod and Homer and the other poets have told us, for surely 
they have composed untrue stories, and have told, and do tell them, to men.  
 
But what kind do you mean, and what fault do you find in them? A fault, I said, 
that deserves immediate and emphatic condemnation, especially if the untruth 
have no beauty in it (377d). 
 
But the reason why in this occasion, as to say as ‘founders of a city, not poets’, Plato censures 
such stories lies on the educational and moral ground that this stories incidentally hold, 
because they are the ones that are to be told to children. And Plato specifies a few lines later 
(378d-e) that children are not, because of their age, able to distinguish truth from falsehood 
and what is right from what is not. But what is even more interesting for the purpose of this 
section, is to stress how the kind of beauty Plato refers to at the end of 377d differs from 
other kind. To this extent, I advance the claim that Plato refers here to an aesthetic beauty.  
In this connection, it might contribute to the understanding of Plato’s view on truth his 
argument about essence and representations of the gods. It is on the basis of this that he 
argues against poetry. Why are such stories untrue? Plato’s argument for his criticism was the 
following: The divinity is truly good and must be described as such. Nothing that is good is 
harmful; what is not harmful does not harm, what does no harm, does not do any evil, what 
does no evil cannot cause any evil, God is beneficial and it causes good fortune and not all 
things. Then, the divine are responsible for the things that are good, but not responsible for 
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the evil (379a-c). In full accordance with this theory, Plato defines the troubles in Homer’s 
and Hesiod’s poetry since the beginning of his attack:  
When any man in describing the character of gods and heroes does it badly, like an artist 
whose drawing is absolutely unlike the things he wishes to draw.  
Well, firstly the poet, who told the greatest of falsehoods of the greatest of beings, told a 
falsehood with no beauty in it, when he said that Ouranos did what Hesiod said he did, 
and that Kronos took vengeance on him. And as for the deeds of Kronos, and what he 
suffered at his son’s hands, even if these stories are true, I should not think we could so 
lightly repeat them to the young and foolish. It were best to be silent about them, or if 
they had to be told, it should be done under the seal of silence to as few hearers as 
possible, and after the sacrifice not of the mystic pig but some great and almost 
unprocurable victim, so that very few would hear the story. (377d-378a).  
 
In the passage above, Plato states not just a literary critique but he also argues that the tales 
that do not correspond to his canon have to be banned. What is the meaning of that 
censorship? Is Plato involved in a moralist or even totalitarian position or, rather, is he 
concerned in the growth of the children and he purses pedagogical claims? I am inclined to 
believe that his approach is educational and neither totalitarian nor moralist, and in what 
follows I will offer my reasons for presenting my alternative approach. 
 
 
5. 1. 2. Is Plato’s first criticism a stern literature critique or he is proposing a new, 
revolutionary educational pattern? 
 
Now, what is the matter with such untrue stories? Why are they so dangerous in Plato’s 
view? For the modern reader, the falsehood of stories is not a defect in itself or even a factor 
in what is good or bad in our approach to literature. In that respect, one might reply that 
factual falsehood is certainly not a determinant but, rather, a falsehood of underlying moral 
may be. Even if we accept that it is morality and not Truth that Plato objects to, it is 
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insufficient reason to imply a censorship. Modern libraries and bookstores are full of books 
with doubtful morals.  
However, for Plato any immorality in a story seems a grave fault indeed. Once again, why? 
Plato gives us an interesting (although not completely compelling answer) in the last passage: 
stories that emphasise the immoral nature of the divine allow people to justify wrong and bad 
behaviours. Plato here introduces a new element: such stories should be banned not only 
because they are not true but also in virtue of their effects on society. Broadly speaking, 
(false) stories regarding any wicked behaviours of gods are dangerous because common 
people feel permitted to adopt the same bad conduct. The moral is the following: “if the gods 
do such things, then why cannot I do the same, at least in similar conditions?” From here 
until the end of Book II (383c), Plato offers several quotations (four) in order to show how 
often Homer, Hesiod and Aeschylus, in particular, have drawn untrue and misleading stories 
about gods.  
Before introducing Plato’s quotation in details, I would begin by outlining some of the ways 
that philosophers have conceived Plato’s first criticism of poetry. In her fundamental book An 
introduction to Plato’s Republic, Julias Annas points out: “Plato suggests that we develop in 
young children attitudes of attraction to what they will later see as morally good and 
repulsion to what they will later learn to be morally bad.”156 Further she emphasises that 
Plato’s philosophy of education is a training of character rather than “a transfer of knowledge 
into the soul157”. But first she defines Plato’s educational program as paternalist158 and then 
she argues that Plato’s educational system is authoritarian because it is the only one 
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available159 and because “it is undeniable that his educational system aims to impose on 
children a single set of values in such a way that they will not be seriously sceptical about 
them either at the time or later in life.”160 Yet, this is a strong assumption to make and Annas 
identifies the background for her criticism with a comparison to contemporary educational 
patterns:  
‘[...] most educational theorists would hold that this cannot be the proper function 
of education. Education, it is widely held, must aim to produce people who are 
autonomous in that they can think independently and can ask themselves whether 
they find it better to continue to hold the values in which they were brought up, or 
to choose to live by another set of values161. 
 
Taking up Annas’ view, we open up to the theory that ‘Socrates creates a literature that is 
dangerous precisely because it can be used in the service of politics’ as Naddaff believes.162  
This view is mistaken, though, and, given a different interpretation of the evidence, it is clear 
that Plato’s educational program is neither paternalist nor authoritarian. Namely, as opposed 
to a goal of authoritarian indoctrination, Plato envisages a new systematic education in order 
to free the mass from superstition and arcane fears. According to such an approach, he 
pursues his aim in the only possible way -- he expurgates poetry from mendacious and 
deceptive myths, which to this point had been the chief and most common source of learning 
for youth and the equivalent of encyclopaedic knowledge for adults. This is the answer to the 
question of why Plato wants to censor poetry163.  
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With respect to censorship, I deeply disagree both with Annas and above all with Naddaff, 
who replies to this thorny question with two answers. First:  
Socrates produces an innovative function of literature as a whole, one that breaks 
with the tradition: literature is philosophy’s supplement that compensates for 
philosophy’s lack of traditional status as paideia. As such, censorship constructs 
literary tales created in the image of a philosophical discourse that follows strict 
rules of argument. Censorship transforms, for example, the gods of Homer and 
Hesiod so that they are absolute paradigms of goodness, deprived and depleted of 
any hint of evil. It ultimately forms a series of philosophical tales that are the 
necessary fictions by which citizens live’164. 
 
Secondly:  
‘Socrates resorts to the censorship of literature as the condition of possibility for 
the emergence of his ideally just city, his city in speech. From the position of a 
political censor, he deploys the repressive mechanism of censorship to produce a 
city that can overcome tradition and convention. […] It is indeed a serious 
philosophical and political failure on Socrates’ part to rely on censorship to 
produce virtuous subjects and states.’165  
 
Since Plato modifies neither the role of poetry in Greek paideia nor adds philosophy in it, I 
do not see how the censorship he makes could produce “an innovative function of literature”. 
Although it is the gods, not the tales, whom Naddaff describes as absolute paradigms of 
goodness, I do not see how the tales purged by censorship, missing the hint and evil events 
and bad features regarding the gods, could fill the gap of the lack of philosophy in Greek 
education or being “absolute paradigms of goodness”. Even if we accept the last point, I 
wonder, do we tell to our children tales underlying bad models? I do not think so. Moreover, 
since that the only difference between Homeric and Hesiodic poetry and the new one 
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envisaged by Plato restricts immoral themes and plots in connection with the divine, how 
could such purged stories “follow strict rules of argument”, like philosophical discourse?  
If Naddaff refers to the censorship of the forms as well as the contents, (but she does not 
explicitly in this occasion), then I argue that the pure narrative exposition of purged tales is 
not a sufficient condition to imply reciprocity with philosophical works. In fact: how could 
we define a philosophical discourse? If we consider, for instance, the Platonic Corpus, then 
M. M. McCabe points out:  
But should we speak of ‘The’ Platonic dialogue Form? After all, the dialogues 
come in all sort of difference forms: some are dramatic, others merely formalized 
discussion (compare the Phaedro and the Statement); some are in direct speech, 
others narrated (compare the Gorgias and the Symposium); some seem to have a 
beginning, a middle, and an end, whereas others begin, or end, in the middle of the 
things (compare the Euthydemus and the Philebus); some have Socrates in the 
central role, and others are dominated by less engaging, but more authoritative 
figures (compare the Theaetetus and the Sophist). We may miss the complexity of 
Plato’s ways of writing if we reduce his dialogue to a single and canonical shape. 
Such reduction might be hopelessly banal (because vastly general), or else simply 
false.166  
 
One might well think, of course, that this is quite reasonable if poetry is seen as a source of 
truth. Naddaff seems to be interpreting it that the poets themselves did not see it this way and 
that for this reason Plato’s attitude is innovatory. Naddaff therefore interprets Plato’s 
innovative criticism and censorship as a failure, both political and philosophical, because is it 
aimed to produce virtuous citizens.  
I agree that censorship is a political failure only if it is aimed to limit the freedom and the full 
develop of the people, as it usually happens in authoritarian regimes. In that case censorship 
is aimed not to produce virtuous citizens but, rather, citizens that identify themselves in the 
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ideals of the maintenance of the regime. Censorship in a dictatorship is aimed to separate the 
mass from their full development as thinking individuals, via a lack of information and via 
propagandistic models that are functional to the power. Also, in our own societies, the legal 
system consists of a number of bans and even censorship and we accept them because they 
are supposed to be rules aimed to improve our own community. But I wonder, is it the same 
case for Plato? I answer in the negative, and, a contrario, I shall argue that if censorship is 
aimed to guarantee the correct growth of the people, it is no more a political and 
philosophical fail. Rather, it is the rules that make a community a community. We accept 
censorship, for instance in tales for children, because they are aimed to better growth and 
education.  
Now, the question comes to be, does the censorship of poetry envisaged by Plato ensure 
better growth and education? In what follows, it is made clear through the evidence that 
Platonic censorship was beneficial. In the light of censorship (and even if we accept, at least 
to some extent, Naddaff’s claim that such a censorship of poetry produces ‘literary tales 
created in the image of a philosophical discourse that follows strict rules of argument’), I 
shall argue that an education based not just on tales but also in the active engagement in 
conversations and dialogues is better than one based just on stories. In order to corroborate 
my claim, I refer to a recent pedagogical study on the matter.  
We find an important clue that Plato’s educational programme was more in line with the 
modern conception of education identified in a recent study published by the The Official 
Journal of the American Academy of Pediatrics. According to Zimmerman et al.’s research:  
The framing of advice offered to parents may differ depending on how adult 
speech is understood to foster child language development. If adult speech input is 
presented as intrinsically valuable, because it serves as a model for language that 
children intuitively copy, then parents can conclude that the more adult speech the 
better, even if some of this adult speech comes through television or videos. Many 
parents have drawn exactly such conclusions. On the other hand, if the primer 
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value of adult speech is to potentate child speech as part of a trial-and-error, 
experiential process of language acquisition, then adult speech is valuable 
inasmuch as it fosters child speech, and either adult speech or electronic stimulus 
that crowds out child speech may be counterproductive.167 
 
Thus, not just stories and tales for children, but also conversations with adults is the best way 
to develop intellectual capacities in the children: 
Yet the most effective reading is dialogic reading168, which involves explicitly 
soliciting language use by the child. More generally, parents should be taught that 
although adult speech is valuable, an equally important goal should be to get kids 
talking as much as possible. […] Finally, it could be that the child-adult 
conversations are themselves causing language development. Such a casual 
conclusion would be consistent with several strands recently introduced in the 
empirical and theoretical literatures on child language acquisition.169 
 
Eventually, the overall conclusion of the study is the following:  
This research provides strong, albeit not absolute, evidence from naturalistic 
observations that adult-child conversations are an essential component of child 
language development. Parents should continue to be encouraged to provide 
speech input to their children by talking to them, reading them books, and by 
telling them stories. At the same time, it should be made clear to parents that an 
important goal of this talk is to elicit talk from the child. Reading and story telling 
should be punctuated by questions and exchanges, and it may be appropriate to 
counsel parents to encourage parent-child conversations. Parents should strive to 
read and talk with children and not merely to them. Parent-child interactions are 
best when they are a two-way street. 
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168 My emphasis. 
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In the light of the last remark should be now clear that Plato’s worries about the oral-based 
education through tales were fully justified. Above all, because of the strong impact of an 
oral education, it is clear that Plato’s purpose to provide boundaries for such an education is 
more than legitimated. It is also evident that his intention to modify the traditional 
educational programme by analysing and discussing the tales is an undoubted improvement 
for achieving a better intellectual development of the young students. Plato’s prima facie 
moralistic position reveals Socrates’ pupil as being incredibly close to modern pedagogical 
trends. 
Now that it is evident that Plato’s attitude toward poetry is consistent with educational 
purposes and that his first censorship is neither paternalistic nor authoritarian, I shall now 
outline his arguments in some details. In fact, I believe that further evidence could be 
provided by a textual analysis of the objections against Homer and Hesiod made in Book II 
of the dialogue.  
 
5. 1. 3. Plato as educationalist: textual analysis of his criticism of Homeric and Hesiodic 
poetry. 
 
In order to provide further evidence that Plato’s claims in censoring poetry are aimed to 
produce the full development of the person, it might be best to begin analysing in detail the 
arguments he puts forward. A primary clue of Plato’s educational grain in censoring poetry is 
given to us by the criticisms mentioned above; the untrue stories about gods have to be 
banished because they are “not to our advantage nor self-consistent in the telling” (Rep. 
380c). The general idea of Plato’s attack is that if we allow representations of gods as 
responsible for everything that happens to human beings (i) changing their own aspect, (ii) as 
deceptive and evil and (iii) the overall result will be that humans are going to be fearful, 
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cowardly and trapped in a daydream of any time and origin. Let us introduce Plato’s 
quotations from Homer and Hesiod and his related criticisms in order to prove our claim, 
before discussing my reasons for presenting my objections to Annas and Naddaff ’s view, in 
the next chapter. 
(i) Two tuns of gifts there lie  
In Zeus’ gate, one of good, one ill, 
Which when Zeus mixes for any man  
One while he frolics, one while mourns, 
But as for the man who gets no mixture but only of the second, 
Sad hunger in th’abundant earth doth toss him to and fro 
Nor with the statement that Zeus is to us  
The Giver both of woe and weal. (Rep. 379e). 
 
Plato’s remark on the above quote is the following: 
And we shall not praise any one who says that Zeus and Athene were responsible 
for Pandarus’s violation of the oaths and treaties, or that Themis and Zeus caused 
strife and division among the gods, nor shall we allow the young to hear the words 
of Aeschylus, when he says 
God sends a curse on mortals 
When he would utterly destroy a house. (Rep. 380b). 
 
Plato picks up two points here: “[such amoral tales] are neither to our advantage nor self-
consistent in the telling” (380c). A reader of this passage will notice that here Plato states 
again the two kernel points in his criticism: these tales are negative both for their essence and 
for their effects. This is precisely the leitmotiv of his critique against poetry. Furthermore, 
there is a keyword here that is worthy to notice: advantage. I believe that it deserves a deeper 
analysis, and therefore I will elaborate on this point later.   
Plato’s main worries for what concerns such verses are that they portray gods as 
unpredictable, capricious and wicked beings who have the power to rule in the life of 
common people. Consequently, human beings are like unfettered boats at the docks – at the 
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mercy of the waves. A further, peculiar feature that constitutes Plato’s criticism is that the 
gods are drawn as capable and even used in appearing in several and deceitful guises: 
 
(ii) “Like such poor stranger pilgrims do the gods,  
All shapes assuming, glide through towns and towers, (381d). 
 
On the last quotation Plato objects:  
And we will have nothing to do with the many other lies of that sort. And the mothers are 
not to be persuaded by the poets into frightening their children with evil stories that 
forsooth there are certain gods that go about at night in many strange shapes (ii). If they 
will do, they will both blaspheme the gods and make their children cowardly. (381e). 
 
The cumulative effect is the same; such evil and divine creatures, which are basically 
unrecognizable and wayward, puzzle humans. More precisely, according to such stories, 
divine creatures “going about at night in many strange shapes” confound humans, and that is 
false in Plato’s view. Secondly, Plato finds another fault with the effects of this type of 
stories, because they “make children cowardly”. 
Thus, once again, Plato stresses two points: the falsehood and the negative effects of stories 
about amoral deities. I believe that the pedagogic purpose of his critique is manifest with 
reference to mothers who tell such tales to children. The last quote that Plato offers in the 
conclusion of Book II makes clear one more salient point (that we shall pick up in more detail 
later): poetry was experienced as collective reading and not as a private practice. To forget 
that, I urge, makes Plato’s objections simply incomprehensible.  
The span of life from sickness free, 
And telling all my fate that gods had blest,  
He sang a song of gladness to my heart. 
I dreamed the lips of Phoebus could not lie 
Being divine, touched with the seer’s skill. 
But the singer, he the wedding guest,  
The same who sang these words, is he who slew 
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My own dear son (383b). (iii). 
 
When anyone says such things about the gods we shall be angry, and shall not give him a 
chorus (a); nor shall we allow out teacher to use his poems to instruct the young (b), if our 
guardians are to be god-fearing and godlike so far as may be? (383c). 
 
As can be seen from the last remark, the collective readings (a) practised with the aid of the 
chorus, and the educational (b) role of the poetry, are manifest. Moreover, Plato’s criticism 
always presents the same objects, the falsehood and the negative effects of the tales told to 
children. 
In the light of the last quotes, it should also be evident that his critique and the related 
censorship aims to ensure an equilibrate growth of the children. Taken in isolation, from this 
assumption it follows that Plato’s first censorship of poetry can be treated by the same 
method as question regarding education, and not Aesthetics or Politics. However, Plato’s 
attitude toward poetry is still quite problematic and controversial for several reasons. Thus, in 
order to show that Plato’s attitude is not illiberal but, rather, that it aims to guarantee a full 
development of an individual, I will offer in the next section a wider analysis and a related 
discussion with some contemporary interpretations. 
 
5. 1. 4. Plato’s philosophy of education in the second book of the Republic. 
Some contemporary remarks. 
 
As we have already seen in the first section, Plato criticised Homeric and Hesiodic poetry 
because of the false and misleading representations of the gods. Plato saw this falsehood as 
damaging to those listening, particularly the children. His criticisms of Truth in poetry 
underscore wider educational concerns. Plato not only pursued pure pedagogical purposes 
regarding the first censorship he makes in the Republic, but I also submit that such a 
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censorship was the sole resort for a guarantee in the correct development of the children. In 
contrast to the evidence found in the literature, this section tackles Platonic education using 
some different approaches. Contemporary scholars hold, a contrario, that Plato’s criticism 
and the related censorship had political aims (Naddaff, 2002), or a paternalistic or even 
illiberal connotation (Annas, 1981, Pappas, 2003). In rejecting such views, the breakthrough 
of Plato’s educational pattern can be shown in comparison with our own, modern educational 
concepts. Finally, I will introduce an issue regarding the role and the function of literature in 
our own society (borrowing from the ideology of some modern literary critics), in order to 
emphasis the deep difference between Greek literature, in relation specifically to Homeric 
and Hesiodic poetry on the one hand, and modern literature in the West on the other hand. 
 
5. 1. 5. Is Plato a modern pedagogue or is he a paternalistic, illiberal censor? 
 
I shall now proceed to a more detailed discussion about how Plato’s first criticism and 
censorship have been faced by contemporary scholars. As indicated by my examples, Plato 
stated two main canons in order to establish the proper education of young children: first, the 
truth and second, the behavioural effects of the listeners of the tales. Although Annas is right 
in stressing that this is the only educational pattern envisaged by Plato, I do not see any 
authoritarianism in his canons. Annas, in fact, defines as ‘authoritarian’ Plato’s educational 
pattern by virtue of the fact that it is the only one envisaged in Callipolis. However, the 
notion of ‘authoritarian’ implies what is “in favour of or demanding strict obedience to 
authority.”170 In Plato’s educational program there is no evidence of programs ‘aimed in 
favour of or demanding strict obedience to authority’. Plato does not change the state of 
affairs in his time, when the poetry was not just the major, but also the only source of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Oxford English Dictionary, Ed. By C. Soanes, Oxford University Press, New York, Us, 2001. 
	   164	  
knowledge. He does not want to replace an artificial source of learning subordinate to an 
exterior, political claim. A contrario, he wants to censor the same poetry that he often praises 
and takes like a model, from the parts that produce a negative effect in an educational 
context. 
Do we not do the same? In our society we fix a quite rigid system of rules in our children’s 
education that accompanies them from the early childhood until we call them adults. In that 
respect, we provide for our sons and daughters an educational system full of boundaries and 
restrictions because we think it is best for children. Just like Plato’s purposes, we choose the 
right things to teach and we do not allow that everything is taught to them but only 
particularly things we believe to be correct and true.  
Annas also stresses that there were not “alternative schools” in ancient Greece but I am 
inclined to believe that this is not a real objection. The concept of alternative schools is 
something that belongs to modern societies, and I wonder how much we allow for alternative 
schools nowadays. Our educational programs are fixed in rules that allow different choices 
within it, not outside. For instance, Plato refers to the schools where one gets one’s basic 
education as a child. Even in such modern, primary schools there are rules and regulations for 
what one is allowed to tell to children and what one cannot. In basic schools, there is no room 
for an utter freedom of speech.  
From the age of five- or six-years-old, our children go to an official educational institution 
that we call ‘school’. Explicit and implicit criteria rule those schools and they are the product 
of both pedagogical and scholastic patterns. What is taught, including how and from what 
sources, is based in well-known data accessible to teachers, children and parents. This point 
is even more apparent in reference to modern professional schools where the regulations are 
rigid and strict. Let me take an extreme case that will clarify this point entirely. We allow 
doctors to operate on us if they have a degree by our medical schools or an equivalent 
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recognised by them, for instance. In that respect, our culture is absolutist as well as Plato’s 
one.  
Moreover, just like Plato, we adopt the same canons: the seeking of the truth and the efficacy 
of the technique. Annas says also:  
It is made clear that free intellectual inquiry is to be limited to the elite who have 
come through the long secondary education; nobody else is to be encouraged, or 
allowed to put forward ideas that have political import. […] reason is to reinforce 
the beliefs that have been brought about already, not to introduce a questioning 
and critical attitude.171 
 
Also, in our society, “elite who have come through the long secondary education” is 
supposed to be the right people in order to rule us in the best possible way. I agree with Plato 
that highly educated pupils are generally the best ones to decide for the masses. Obviously, 
we choose our leaders through free elections and supposedly give a person from any 
educational background equal chances at leadership. 172  
I agree with Plato that the most important canons have to be the truth, a fixed morality and 
the beneficial. This is particularly evident in political positions and even more in high-
ranking state officials. This last point, in particular, corresponds to the well-educated people 
that Plato envisages for the government of the ideal community.  
Besides, for what concerns Annas’s claim that nobody else is encouraged or allowed to have 
and to promote different political ideas, I do not find any evidence for that in the text (and 
Annas does not indicate anyone). Rather, the fact that most people are excluded from 
government might be taken to imply that they are expected to agree with the rulers about 
what is best. This is not the place to face Plato’s political view, which is why I confine 
myself to address it in connection with the educational issues at stake. In that respect, I 
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suggest that a comparison between the political condition in the Athens of the fifth and fourth 
centuries BC with the Platonic ideal state can demonstrate firstly that his state is more open 
in terms of the possibility to access to the highest classes for anyone (such a condition was 
granted from the so-called ‘Platonic Communism’). Secondly, the difficult and long 
educational program ensured that only the best persons were in a position to rule.  
Surely, the last condition was much more meritocratic than an elite formed by noble descent. 
We know, in fact, that:  
Democracy at Athens was both more and less democratic than modern Britain or 
the United States; more, for the reasons just given: the ekklesia enjoyed more 
immediate power than a modern electorate, partly because the number of voters 
was so much a smaller in Ancient Athens, and less, for a reason also concerned 
with the number of voters: whose groups – slavers; women; the subject allies, 
whose lives were affected by many of the ekklesia’s decision – were excluded 
form the franchise. This left some 40,000 adult males who were eligible to vote. 
Of these perhaps as many as 6,000 (which is nearly the maximum seating of the 
Pnyx, the ekklesia’s meeting place, and was the quorum required for certain kind 
of decision) may have attended for important debates.173  
 
However, just the fact that Plato himself in the Republic discusses and proposes an alternative 
system seems to me good evidence that he does not want to censor free inquiry. Rather, the 
difference between Plato and modern society is not as great as Annas thinks but perhaps this 
means that our society is, if not authoritarian, then it is at least ‘absolutist’ to some extent. In 
what follows, I will offer some analogies in order to demonstrate this claim. 
In addition, this conclusion seems fully corroborated by what Annas herself wrote about the 
essence of Plato’s educational conception:  
Now it would be wrong to think that Plato intends education to be a process of 
brainwashing which will instil the right beliefs and ensure that they are held, 
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whatever the intellectual state of the person holding them. If all Plato cared about 
was bringing it about that the right beliefs he held, he would not have thought of 
education as a training of people’s characters, for this would be unnecessary; all 
that would matter would be the effective implanting of the right moral beliefs in 
the young, there are more direct and effective ways to do that than the character 
training Plato recommends.174 
 
According to this last passage, Annas stresses that Plato does not want to “instil the right 
beliefs and ensure that they are held”; then, what is Plato’s claim in education? Referring to 
Plato’s educational aims, Annas says: “Education is not, Plato says, a transfer of knowledge 
onto the soul, like putting sight into blind eyes; it is more like turning the eye to the light. 
(518b).”175 Thusly, Annas agrees with the author of the dialogue, but she finds something 
wrong in the way Plato pursues his claim: “Why should people whose early years have been 
moulded by training in accepting the moral values of their society have preserved the 
capacity for intellectual rigour and creativity required by these further studies?”176 My 
answer is that people educated in the way that Plato envisaged should be more capable at 
preserving their intellectual inquisitiveness rather than others, in virtue of the theoretical 
skills and aptitude they possess. Moreover, they are naturally prone to maintain 
inquisitiveness, in virtue of the education that they received based not on false, deceptive and 
fearful stories, but rather on tales, which have the aim to bring up people without irrational 
fears.  
In that respect, Annas’s approach is simplistic. We do try to instil decent values in our 
children and, yet, we do not think this removes their capacity for independent thought. 
Rather, the question of how the capacity for acuity can be fostered is a difficult one. The goal 
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of this study is to demonstrate that Plato’s censorship was aimed to improve such a capacity. 
Through this work I analyse Plato’s criticism and the peculiar features of Greek poetry in 
order to show that. For the time being, I shall argue that Plato wants to avoid a sterile 
educational programme, which has the ending result of producing a person like Polemarchus, 
who has just “rigid principles and no real understand of them”, using Annas’ words. Now, 
how can we avoid the production of people who are incapable of true understanding? Plato’s 
solution is to review what was the only source of available learning – poetry.  
Incidentally, the contents and form by which poetry traditionally was assimilated and 
practised was particularly close to indoctrination, especially due to the way it was 
practised177. If my approach has been right so far, then the subjects that Plato adds in Book 
VII — namely, mathematics, calculation, geometry and dialectic — provide all the necessary 
theoretical instruments for a full development of the person. Now the question turns out to 
be: how can we define the full development of the person? According to the PWA, “the 
virtue of the soul is to reason, management, rule, deliberate well”. Like Plato’s model, 
contemporary educators stress both true beliefs, as well as moral and technical skills, in order 
to make everyone able to make decisions for his or her own life. In virtue of what Annas 
wrote about Platonic educational policy, I am inclined to concur with her conclusion that: 
In America children’s education is run on Platonic lines. As far back as 1918 the 
National Education Association listed seven main objects for education in 
secondary school ‘health, command of fundamental processes […] worthy home 
membership, vocation, citizenship, worthy use of leisure, ethical character.178 
 
Why is the US educational model so close to the Platonic one? According to Annas, the 
similarities between the US and Platonic models of education depends on the fact that “Plato 
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is the first thinker systematically to defend the notion of training of character rather that an 
acquisition of information or skill179”  
Now, I wonder, is it possible to get such a goal without referring to Ethics? Does the 
reference to Ethics make this approach “paternalist”? Annas wonders: “But this is one thing 
to protect young children from the bad effects of racism and sexism in their reading, and 
quite another to forbid an adult, after extensive education, to read D. H. Lawrence: This is, 
precisely, paternalism, treating adults as though they were children.” Following Annas on this 
question, Pappas asks: “To what extent does the censorship in fact trim poetry in accord with 
the truth of the matter? And how far into the community will Plato reach to suppress false or 
insidious poetry?”180 These questions raise an important issue: we could accept Plato’s 
censorship if it regards school books and young children’s general education but, Pappas 
goes on: “The problem, often overlooked, is that everyone in the city is affected by the 
censorship.”181 Thus, if we want to free Plato from paternalist accusations, we have to answer 
these questions. In order to solve the problems arising from these questions, first of all, we 
must keep in mind the elementary difference between ancient and modern society’s 
perception of literature. In fact, based on their positions here, the fundamental assumption on 
which both Annas’ and Pappas’s objections depend is that a common adult in ancient Greece 
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5. 1. 6. What kind of literature Plato is talking about? 
 
It is crucial to realize the fact that discussing the ancient perception of literature as though the 
ancients had similar access to it as we do today is based on a misleading comparison with 
Homeric and Hesiodic poetry in the age of Socrates. If we miss this central point, then we are 
led to believe that “Plato has no serious interest in thinking about Art”182 or even that “the 
censor Plato created a literature so potent and dangerous that it could transform individual 
behaviours and beliefs and the social and cultural order, not to mention the discursive 
practice of philosophy itself.”183 Rather, the problem now becomes how ancient Greeks 
experienced poetry. In fact, today’s reader is perfectly aware of the distinction between 
literature for children and other kinds of literature. A fortiori, the modern reader is able to 
decide what type of literature she or he likes best. It is assumed that the reader is capable of 
distinguishing aesthetic values from any source of learning and general knowledge in virtue 
of the unlimited number of books available to everyone. However, were such conditions 
present in ancient Greece as well? This question now becomes crucial for our purposes in 
understanding the real object of Plato’s criticisms.  
In fact, the whole of Annas, Naddaff and Pappas’s analysis and criticisms are based on the 
comparison between modern literature and ancient Greek poetry. Upon such an assumption, 
Annas argues: “but it is one thing to protect young children from the bad effects of racism 
and sexism in their reading, and quite another to forbid an adult, after extensive education, to 
read D. H. Lawrence”.184 In a similar fashion, B. Aune raises a question regarding the 
difference between aesthetic values and moral or practical vales:  
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‘[…] one of the most exemplary novelists and poets of our century, Vladimir 
Nabokov, at the end of a course of lectures on European literature, made a special 
point of emphasizing the non-didactic character of dramatic literature. The novels 
he had discussed in the course will not teach you anything, he said, ‘that you can 
apply to any obvious problems of life. They will not help in the business office or 
the army camp or in the kitchen or in the nursery.” The knowledge about the 
novels that he had been trying to share with his students was, he said, ‘pure 
luxury’: style and structure — glorious style and structure — are the essence of a 
literary work of art; great ideas, he said, are [aesthetic] hogwash. Substantially, the 
same view of literature has recently been expressed by Professor Harold Bloom in 
his seminal book The Western Canon185. Although he defends what used to be 
called “the great writers” of the Western literary tradition against their current 
critics, he rejects the position of neo-conservative defenders of those writers who 
emphasize the moral value of imaginative literature. In his view (and I quote) 
‘Reading the very best writers--let us say Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, and 
Tolstoy--is not going to make us better citizens. Art is perfectly useless according 
to the sublime Oscar Wilde, who was right about everything.’186 In expressing his 
agreement with Wilde on this matter Bloom did not mean to imply that art is a 
frivolous endeavour that has no serious value. It does have such value, in his view; 
but the value is aesthetic, not practical. Art enriches our lives, but it does not 
instruct us or improve our understanding. It is not, qua art, science or philosophy; 
and it does not compete with them. If we want instruction in morals, political 
theory, or social matters, we should not look for it in imaginative literature. We 
should look elsewhere. I doubt that most people concerned with the arts would 
agree with Nabokov and Bloom.187 
Thus, Annas, Aune and Bloom raise questions about the difference between aesthetic and 
practical values, and they based the analogy on modern literature. However, in the light of 
what we have already seen, it is clear that the object of the above scholars’ speculations is not 
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the same as Plato’s critique. Rather, if we want to make sense of Plato’s attitude toward 
poetry we must not lose sight of the real object of such a critique.  
Aune disagrees with Nabokov and Bloom about whether literature has a purely aesthetic 
value, as Nabokov and Bloom maintain, or whether it has moral significance. Let us 
concentrate on the last question before turning to Aune’s own view at the end of the work. I 
will compare Bloom’s and Nabokov’s views with the intrinsic educational value of Greek 
poetry. In his articulated analysis, Jaeger focuses on the distinctive features of Greek epics, in 
order to clarify its preeminent and structural educational role in the Greek society. As he 
points out, “Greeks […] were the first to recognize that education means deliberately 
moulding human character in accordance with an ideal.”188 According to Jaeger, Greek 
educational models are based on the assumption that the world as a whole includes the 
individual as something that belongs to it. This concept, where the individual is a possession 
of the whole is fundamental to the understanding of ancient Greek thinking because it means 
that the discovery of universal laws that rule for is a fresh factor with powerful implications. 
Like all principles, these universal laws give the people knowledge about the world and, 
therein, moral modes of conduct thanks to the constitutive link between the community and 
the individual. As Jaeger states, “[…] the distinguished and effortless ease of the Greek mind 
was produced by their lucid realization of the fact (concealed from earlier nations) that the 
world is governed by definite and comprehensible laws.”189  
The reliance of the people on universal laws is why poetry was an all-embracing source of 
learning. Poetry became the main, privileged reference for every possible answer for 
common people since it communicated these universal laws.  
In fact, poetry’s presentation of the universal laws will be the first answer to Bloom, who 
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singles out the discriminating factor between art and science or philosophy, in instructing us 
or improving our understanding of the world. The link between the world and the community 
was a constitutive feature and function of Greek poetry. Jaeger remarks:  
By discovering man, the Greeks did not discover the subjective self, but realized 
the universal laws of human nature. The intellectual principle of the Greeks is not 
individualism but ‘humanism’, to see the world in its original and classical sense 
[…] the essence of education is to make each individual in the image of the 
community. […] The Greek mind owes its superior strength to the fact that it was 
deeply rooted in the life of a community. […] That is what lifts classical Greek 
literature out of the category of pure aesthetics, in which many have vainly tried to 
understand it, and gives it the immensurable influence on human nature which it 
exercised for thousands of years190. 
 
Thanks to the elucidation of poetry’s position as a medium for the conveyance of universal 
laws, Plato’s position on censorship should be clearer. It is true that censorship of poetry goes 
beyond education, but the point is that poetry was not just the source of learning for children 
but also the main source of knowledge for the masses. It expressed and transmitted the 
fundamentals of Greek culture. That is why the whole of the Republic is based on the idea 
that education is an integral part of the establishment of the State.  
The position of education in the Republic is evident indeed in the title of the dialogue: 
πολιτεια. This Greek noun, πολιτεια, expresses both the individual’s citizenship and the 
whole of the laws that constitute the state. That is why on the one hand, Plato’s worries about 
poetry and education, in general, have been given significant space in the dialogue, and on 
the other hand, as Havelock remarks, “[…] only about a third of the work concerns itself with 
statecraft as such.”191  
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In light of the last remarks, we are led to read Plato’s attempt to establish a fixed educational 
program as well as a bowdlerized poetry as an integral part of the constitution process of 
Callipolis, the ideal city he envisages, as something peculiar to Greek culture and conception 
of a State, rather than an authoritarian attitude, which is usual in modern dictatorships. In 
fact, answering to Adeimantus about what stories should be told in the ideal city in Book II, 
Plato clearly points out the nature of his approach: 
I answered, Adeimantus, you and I at this juncture are not poets, but founders of a city. 
The founders ought to know the canons in accordance with which the poets should tell 
their stories, and which they are not to be allowed to transgress, but they need not 
themselves compose stories. (378e-379a) 
 
Plato here makes it clear that he does not deal with poetry from an aesthetic perspective 
because of its particular role of founders on the State. That does not imply he ignores the 
aesthetic value of the educational tales. Rather, it is not a matter statesmen should be 
primarily concerned with. If they were concerned in it, then the stance of those statesmen 
would appear totalitarian. On the contrary, from the analysis of the passage, it is evident that 
Plato is worried about the practical and moral values because they are implicit in Homeric 
and Hesiodic poetry in its structure as well as in its practise.  
This is a controversial point, only if we still consider Homeric Corpus as we consider modern 
literature. A fortiori, if we deal with Homeric poetry as an educational model for children as 
well as an encyclopaedia for adults, we agree with Plato that the most important canons have 
to be the truth, a fixed morality and the beneficial. However, if we do not recognize these 
peculiar features of poetry, then we confuse the matter at issue for Plato and we are led to 
think, as Naddaff does, that such tales “[…] become the means of persuading citizens to 
believe what perhaps is not natural but is certainly the effect of the uncensored poets’ cultural 
influence – namely the necessity of privileging familiar, social and political obligations over 
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individual needs and autonomy.” 192 Yet, as indicated before by Jaeger’s analysis, the 
connection between community and personas is congenital in Greek poetry.  
This connection is strong evidence that remits Plato’s labelling as a paternalist or even an 
illiberal. Educational purposes as well as common ideals are firmly in the centre of Plato’s 
thinking because they were rooted in a poetry that demonstrated universal laws. Therefore, 
Plato’s concerns about poetry’s role in education and politics, as well as his proposed 
solutions therein, are not any more paternalistic than the poetry that he reviews. Jaeger goes 
on: “In this process education becomes culture for the first time: that is: it becomes a process 
by which the whole personality is modelled on a fixed pattern.”193  
So, what is the problem with such a pattern in Plato’s view? Havelock, who follows Jaeger’s 
line, gives a compelling answer:  
What guidance, he [Plato] asks himself and his readers, can traditional poetry give 
us in morality? His answer is: very little; that is, if we take the stories told of the 
gods, heroes and ordinary men at all seriously. They are full of murder and incest, 
cruelty and treachery; of passions uncontrolled; of weakness, cowardice and 
malice. Repetition of such material can only lead to imitation and by unformed 
and tender minds. Censorship is the sole resort. Plato’s position is not very 
different, in short, from those who have advocated a similar editing of the Old 
Testament for younger readers, except that, the condition of Greek mythology 
being what it was, his proposal had to be more drastic.194 
 
Thus, according both to Havelock and Jaeger, a strong morality was present and implicit in 
Greek poetry and Plato’s censorship is “the sole resort” in order to establish a new 
educational model, which aims to promote a development of a person through narration of 
tales, which have to be neither misleading about gods, nor harmful for listeners’ behaviours. 
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This is the essence of Plato’s position toward poetry, at least in the first part of the dialogue.  
In my own view, what makes Plato’s approach neither authoritarian nor paternalist but 
actually enlightening and extremely close to our vision is the lack of any form of political or 
educational authoritarianism, the strong presence of a new morality, and the aim of a full 
theoretical development of the individual. Annas points out that:  
Such a pure morality has never before been envisaged. What Greece has hitherto 
enjoyed […] is a tradition of a half - morality, […] according to which the 
younger generation is continually indoctrinated in the view that what is vital is not 
so much morality as social prestige and material reward which may flow from a 
moral reputation whether or not this is deserved.195 
 
Therefore, on the one hand, the contents, the role and – above all – the function of Greek 
poetry and, on the other, the forms it expressed and the ways it was practised (we shall treat 
this topic in the next chapter) implies an educational policy. Once we have clarified the 
object of Plato’s attack, we are able to reply to Pappas’, Aune’s and Annas’ worries.  
Now, it should be evident that Homeric and Hesiodic poetry was the only source available 
not just for children, but also for adult for what concerns morality. Annas herself, talking 
about racism patterns sometimes present in US education, affirms that Plato wants to avoid 
conflict in morality due to the fact that “[…] these people have been brought up to find the 
wrong things attractive and repulsive, and the result is a chronic conflict in moral 
personality.”196 Now if we apply Plato’s arguments against Homeric poetry to educational 
pattern, we find them still valid and relevant, also according to who criticised him as a 
literary critical reviewer. Once we have shown that we cannot consider Plato’s attitude 
toward poetry as literary criticism simply because such a poetry and literature were simply 
absent and unfamiliar to Greek society, we are able to reply both to Aune and Bloom. Do we 
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allow our own children to listen to stories about incest, cruelty, treachery, passions 
uncontrolled, weakness, cowardice and malice regarding anything, especially the divine? 
Surely, we do not. In response to Aune, as well as to other scholars on the same line of 
reasoning, I present here an original argument, ‘The Lolita Argument’.  
 
 
5. 1. 7. The Lolita Argument. 
 
The famous novel Lolita by Vladimir Nabokov, provides, I believe, an interesting element of 
comparison. Indeed, I wonder what should be the result of an education based on the repeated 
and isolated reading of Lolita. This is in fact the real matter we are dealing with in the case of 
ancient Greek poetry in the second book of the Republic. More precisely, instead of 
textbooks, we have a serial of repetition of a certain cluster of tales, having as main 
characters folk divinities. Further, as Plato emphasizes at length, in most of the stories such 
divinities commit the worst acts. In addition to that, it must be recalled that ancient Greeks 
had quite a different conception and relationship with their divinities as Wilamowitz points 
out: ‘The gods are present. To know and recognize that for the Greeks this is a given fact, a 
datum, is a first and necessary condition for an understanding of their belief and cult.’197  
For what concerns Lolita, there is no doubt that the modern reader finds aesthetic value in the 
novel and we know that the modern readership is not involved in the risk of repeating what 
the main character actually does198. However, once again, the matter at stake is no longer 
Greek poetry, which is much closer to a regular textbook than what we generally call 
literature. In this way, one point appears to be particularly relevant. E. Asmis recollects: 
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Plato’s quarrel with poetry takes its start in the fact that Greek poets had a crucial 
role in the creation and transmission of social values. It was traditionally believed 
that poets, like prophets, were inspired directly by the gods with wisdom about the 
human and divine condition. It was the prerogative of poets to make know the 
past, present, and future to their contemporaries and future generations by oral 
performance of their poems.199 
	  
Asmis’s fundamental remarks reckons how the averages Greeks perceived poets’ words. The 
Lolita argument I put forward in this section is based exactly on this ground. Since the 
radically different nature (transmission of values) and purpose (to make know the truth about 
the past and the future) of classic Greek poetry, the reader should make a move in order to get 
a real understanding of Plato’s critique of poetry. Instead of referring Plato’s arguments to 
modern literature in general and poetry in particular, we should apply Socrates’ pupil 
concerns to children texts books. Conversely, since classic Greek poetry was the only source 
of learning available, we should wonder whether the isolate oral repetition and representation 
of Nabokov’s masterpiece could work as vehicle of moral values.  
Moreover, once we have shown what the real subject at stake is, then how would we 
appreciate the reading of Lolita, if it was our only available source of learning?  
Equally, Plato wants to ban the damaging material because it was the main important source 
of learning and knowledge. An exhaustive answer to this question appears at the end of the 
present work. It will be made clear that the purpose of Plato’s censorship is to create an 
educational tecné, which aims to seek the truth and the beneficial, in distinct contrast to the 
concept of art for art’s sake. Therefore, my goal will be to demonstrate that Plato’s 
censorship in educational and learning patterns was the first step for the birth of literature 
meant as art for art’s sake in Western civilization. But I do not want to anticipate what has 
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not yet been demonstrated. Thus let us continue our analysis of Plato’s arguments in the 
Republic, moving on to the third chapter of the dialogue. This will give us also the 
opportunity to investigate deeper the ways in which poetry was practised in the age of Plato. 
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Chapter VI.  
Republic Book III.  
 
6. 2. 0. Textual examination of Plato’s criticism in Book III. 
 
Continuing from Book II, Plato focuses on the aims of a right education. The aims determine 
the best way to get a good education (Teleologism). He essentially asks the following: if we 
want to educate children with no irrational fears and false beliefs, should we allow them to 
listen to any tales, even if they include stories about incest, cruelty, treachery, passions 
uncontrolled, weakness, cowardice and malice regarding all of the gods? His answer, as well 
as ours, I suppose, is that it is not.  
Let us now proceed to the textual analysis, in order to demonstrate that Plato’s account of art 
is consistent with the epistemological approach we used to interpret it. In the very beginning 
of Book III, Plato made even clearer the purpose of his censorship. He expressly used a 
teleological approach. It primarily refers to Plato’s theory of form. Before analysing Homer’s 
lines, he declares the goals he wants to achieve, and according to them, he establishes the 
proper canons for assessing such claims: 
  
‘So much, then,’ I said, ‘for stories of the gods. We have settled, it seems, which of them 
our children may hear and which they may not, if they are to grow up to honour the gods 
and their parents, and to hold friendship dear. (386a).  
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If we analyse the objections that Plato presents, all of them present the same leitmotiv: first he 
stated the aims, and consequently he investigated the best way to accomplish them. In fact, in 
the next breath, he states that the soldiers must be brave, and consequently he says:  
Come, then, if they are to be brave, must they not be told such stories as will make 
them have no fear of death? Or do you think that any man was ever brave who had 
this fear in his heart? (386a).  
 
Therefore, he paid attention to the Homeric lines that could be harmful in assessing the claim 
stated before: to mould brave soldiers. His censorship, as well as in Rep. II, is directly 
functional to the purpose previously indicated:  
Then, it seems, we must prescribe for intending poets concerning those stories 
also, and tell them that they must not simply abuse Hades, but rather praise it. For 
their stories, as ordinarily told, are neither true nor useful to those who are to be 
warriors. (386c). 
 
Henceforth, Plato quotes six extracts from the Iliad and the Odyssey, describing the afterlife 
as a terrifying and horrendous place. Plato himself gives evidence that his approach is 
teleological in the remark he makes after Homer’s quotes. In fact, he clearly asserts the goal 
to accomplish (c): 
 
We shall bid Homer and the other poets not be angry if we strike out these 
passages and all like them, not that they are not poetic (a), or that they are not 
enjoyed by most people (b), but that the more poetic they are, the less must they 
be heard by boys and men who are to be free (c), fearing slavery more than death. 
(387b). 
 
The last passage deserves close attention because Plato himself admits that the lines he 
quotes are poetic and most people take pleasure in listening to them. However, the point was 
that these features do not serve the purpose of a free education and brave training. A 
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contrario they constitute an obstacle to the aim he points out. This is the reason why they 
have to be censored. Plato adopts the same policy from the subsequent line until the end of 
the analysis of the contents of poetry (390a). The claim he pursues can be assessed only 
through a censorship of Homer’s lines that make soldiers too emotional. Brave soldiers must 
be inclined neither to crying nor to laughter. As professional soldiers, they have to be free 
from external influences.  
That is why the harmful extracts were to be banished. As already pointed out, the censorship 
is ‘the sole resort’ for obtaining the goal. The only difference between Books II and III is that 
the first one related to primary education, whereas the second one concerned more guardians’ 
character. At the end of his criticism, he emphasises that such tales were not ‘suitable’ for the 
purpose of moulding characters to temperance. The term he uses twice, επιτηδειος, is in fact 
an adjective that expresses the suitability of something: 
οὐ γὰρ οἶµαι εἴς γε σωφροσύνην νέοις ἐπιτήδεια ἀκούειν: εἰ δέ τινα ἄλλην ἡδονὴν 
παρέχεται, θαυµαστὸν οὐδέν. ἢ πῶς σοι φαίνεται; (390a). 
 οὐ µὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὔ µοι φαίνεται ἐπιτήδειον. (390c). 
 
And those that follow it, and all the impertinence of private men to rulers, whether 
actually spoken or related in poetry, are they excellent? (390a). 
‘On my word’, he said, ‘I think such stories are not conducive to self-restraint. (390c). 
 
In my on own view, the last two quotes constitute important evidence that Plato’s approach 
was teleological rather than moral or even aesthetic. In fact, the repeated use of the term 
suitable for defining the criteria of the tales demonstrates that the aims establish the canons.  
Of course, there is room for debate about that issue. One might say that the fact that this 
thought was present in Plato’s mind does not imply in itself that he used it in his approach to 
poetry in the Republic. Even the fact that Greek poetry was the main source of common 
knowledge, although a necessary condition, could be insufficient for considering Plato’s 
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approach as epistemological. In fact, the theory of form that we recalled above for 
interpreting Plato’s attitude concerns primarily Plato’s metaphysics, rather than 
epistemology.  
From a modern point of view, there is a sharp distinction between metaphysics and 
epistemology. However, in order to understand the relation of the two subjects in relation to 
Plato, it will be useful to contextualise the issue. There is a strong connection between 
epistemology and metaphysics in Plato’s thought, as White describes: 
For some time philosophers have thought of epistemology and metaphysics as 
different branches of philosophy, investigating, respectively, what can be known 
and the basic properties and nature of what there is. It is hard, though, to see any 
genuine boundaries here. The issues irresistibly overlap. Certainly in Plato there is 
no such divide. His view about what there is are largely controlled by ideas about 
how knowledge is takes its character from convictions about what there is that is 
knowable. As a result his doctrines have a different shape from characteristically 
moderns ones.200 
 
What is more, and of particular relevance to this topic, is Plato’s account of τέχνη in Book I. 
Some philosophers, though not all, hold the first and last books of The Republic as 
appendices. I shall argue, however, that if we adopt an epistemological approach, it will be 
evident that the first and last books constitute an integral part of the entire Republic. 
Furthermore, I believe both the points – on the one hand the continuum between Book I and 
the whole of the dialogue and, on the other hand, the link between Plato’s account of τέχνη	  
and the teleological approach – are made all the clearer when Socrates discusses with 
Glaucon and Polemarchus about justice. In order to confute Polemarchus’ claim, namely that 
justice consists in ‘that to render to every man what is owing is just’ (332e), Plato showed 
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that it was not clear what it means and then moved to define particular crafts like medicine, 
cookery and navigation in virtue of the aim of such craft. Once again he used the term τέχνη, 
and his ultimate conclusion was the following: 
And is not the natural end of the art to seek after and provide this? (341e) 
 
This passage deserves close attention for several reasons. Firstly, it represents an evidence of 
Plato’s approach. Secondly, Plato’s criticism is deeper than could be seen prima facie. In 
fact, the origin of Polemarchus’ belief was a verse made by the poet Simonides. The problem 
was that Polemarchus was not able to justify his own statement; he just quoted Simonides, 
nothing more. He had a general idea, but he was not able to explain why he thought so. After 
few passages, he himself admits: 
 
[…] but I do not know now what I have said. Still I am in of the same opinion, that justice 
is to help your friends and harm your enemies. (344b). 
 
Thus, Polemarchus, who gives voice to ordinary people’s views, expresses something that he 
(believes to) knows. Moreover, it is worthy to recall that his knowledge derives from poetry.  
Let us conclude this section with an epistemological remark. As D. Pritchard points out:  
In his book, The Meno, (See 96d-100b), Plato compares knowledge to the statues 
of the ancient Greek sculptor Daedalus which, it is said, were so realistic that if 
one did not tether them to the ground they would run away. Plato’s point here is 
that mere true belief is like one of the untethered statues of Daedalus, in that one 
could very easily lose it. Knowledge, in contrast, is akin to a tethered statue, one 
that is therefore not easily lost.201   
 
As can be seen from the last remark, Polemarchus thought to possess knowledge, when really 
he had only beliefs. The result is that he loses it very easily. He does not possess knowledge, 
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but just a confused opinion derived from the authority of a famous poet. And the problem 
was that, as Socrates pointed out in Book III: 
He will, if practise is to follow theory. (389d).202 
 
In this way, Plato confronted the essential problem with poetry: it fails as source 
of knowledge. The importance of such a failure is stated in the passage above: 
people follow (inconsistent) poets’ advices about the most important issues 
without having any real understanding of them. More precisely, they confuse mere 
beliefs with knowledge. Later in this thesis, I will face this central point more 
directly. By analysing Book X, I will demonstrate how Plato’s attack against 
poetry became harder without exception and that the poet’s lack of knowledge is 
the basis upon which Plato elaborated his criticism. For now, though, I emphasise 
that Plato’s criticism and related censorship of the contents of poetry is based on 
educational purposes. In this occasion in fact, Plato treats poetry as a skill that 
must be evaluated for such a purpose. The criticism and the related banishment 
derived form the fact that, as Plato shows, the contents of epic poems fails in the 
purpose of educating people.  
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Indianapolis: Hackett, p. 1027. 
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6. 2. 1. Plato’s objections against the forms of poetry (398c-403c). 
 
The aim of this second part of the chapter is to offer a detailed analysis of Plato’s arguments 
against the forms of poetry in Book III. I will also offer in this section a detailed treatment of 
the intricate concept of mimesis, which Plato faces first in Book III and second in Book X of 
the dialogue. This last point will also provide the link for the next paragraph, in which I will 
treat Plato’s criticism against mimesis in detail. 
 
6.2.2. Plato’s first treatment of mimesis: What is this thing called Mimesis? 
In Book III, after his criticism and the related censorship of the contents of the poems, Plato 
introduces his arguments against the forms of poetry. Analysing Greek epics and mythology, 
he emphasizes that there are three types of narration: simple, (pure narration without direct 
discourses); imitative (when the poet speaks as he was the character he is talking about); and 
a mix of the previous styles (392d). Yet, one feature affects Plato above all: the imitation that 
sometimes takes place in the last two narrative styles. In order to clarify his view, he quotes 
the beginning of the Iliad before then referring to the rest of the poem as well as the whole 
Odyssey in order to show how often it happens in Homer. It is important to emphasize that 
the matter at issue here is not just the simple stylistic distinction between the first person style 
of narration and the third person style. Rather, because of the oral nature of poetry during this 
period, it is the much more absorbing process of personification that takes place. Here Plato 
introduces the controversial concept of mimesis, one of the most perennial debates in the 
history of philosophy. Talking with Adeimantus, he provides a first account of such a 
process: 
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But when he speaks in the person of another, shall we not say that he then always makes 
his style as nearly as possible like that of the man whom he has announced to be 
speaking? (393c). 
But if a man makes himself either in voice or in look like another man, does not he 
imitate that man? (393c) 
 
I think it is important to emphasize that his worries concern the process of imitation that takes 
place between the ‘reciter’ and, not only the poet, as I will soon show, but also the characters 
that she or he represents. Therefore, the matter at issue here is not just whether admitting 
tragedy and comedy − namely the genres in which this process is more present − into 
Callipolis; rather the question is whether or not to allow such to the guardians, as Plato 
explicitly asserts: 
 
‘Well, then, that is what I am trying to say, that we must come to an agreement as to 
whether we should allow poets to make their narrations by means of imitation, or partly 
by imitation and partly by the other methods, in which case we should have to determine 
where each method should be used, or whether we should forbid imitation altogether.’  
‘I think,’ he said, ‘ that you are considering whether we shall admit tragedy and comedy 
into the city or not.’ 
‘Possibly.’ I said, ‘but possibly even more than that. I don’t myself know as yet. We must 
go where the wind of the argument carries us.’ (394c).  
 
This is an important distinction to bear in mind in order to grasp Plato’s criticism of mimesis. 
The phraseology once more may tempt the reader to think that mimesis here regards the 
relation between the spectator and the reader on the one hand and the player or the character 
on the other hand. For instance, for an individual to feel pity for Hamlet while watching or 
reading Shakespeare’s classic could be taken as an example of mimesis. Although this 
phenomenon could be interpreted as partaking into the wide concept of mimesis, this is not 
the case in Plato’s criticism. By virtue of the regular oral performance of poetry, the process 
of imitation that worries Plato regards not just the poet who recites epic tales but also the 
	   188	  
people who take part in an active way to such a recitation. Textual evidence of that 
fundamental distinction between our own approach to literature and Plato’s is given a few 
passages later when his pupil introduces his criticism with the following question:  
‘Then, Adeimantus, consider whether our guardian ought to be imitative or not.’ (394e). 
‘[…] Have you noticed that the practise of imitation, if it is begun in youth and persisted 
in, leaves its impress upon character and nature, on body and voice and mind?’ (395d). 
 
Thus, the mimesis that Plato defined above is the process of identification between the person 
who recites a poem and the characters he represents: it is a common practise that involves 
most of the people in the community due to the usual first person recitation.  
In the previous chapters, we gave historical basis for advocating this claim and now we find 
textual evidence in Plato’s analysis and critique. The modern distinction between the 
spectator and the player is not at stake here. Plato is worried about the effects that imitation 
leaves in people. For the modern reader, this could seem to be a slightly odd claim. 
Nowadays, nobody believes that, when one reads a poem or watches a play, she or he become 
like the characters represented in the artwork. Still, if the practise of poetry is something that 
from childhood onwards always implies an active participation in the recitation of such 
poems and it is the usual habit both in big social occasions (theatre) and in small ones 
(familiar mess table), Plato’s claim appears justified. That is why he is not simply concerned 
with whether or not to admit tragedy into Callipolis, rather he wonders whether to allow 
mimesis to the guardians. And he gives grounds for this claim in virtue of the usual active 
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6. 2. 3. ‘We must go where the wind of the argument carries us’. 
Why Plato criticizes mimesis (394d). 
 
In the light of the last remarks, we are now capable of understanding Plato’s comments about 
the process of mimesis: ‘if it is begun in youth and persisted in, leaves its impress upon 
character and nature, on body and voice and mind.’ (395d). Moreover, I believe that it is not 
perhaps difficult to accept Plato’s worries about mimesis with reference to the importance of 
Greek epics in proposing itself as a model of behaviour for the listeners. In what follows, I 
will present the reasons that allow me to think so. For what concerns the link between 
mimesis and behavioural patterns, S. Halliwell emphasizes:  
The crucial link between this first stretch of books 2-3’s critique of poetry and the 
subsequent introduction of mimesis is provided by the premise that (poetic) 
narratives induce and shape belief in their audience, a premise reinforced by the 
consideration that gods and heroes, the central characters in so many myths, have 
a paradigmatic standing in the value system of the culture […] This is buttressed 
by the argument that, because mimesis involves ‘self-likening’ or psychological 
assimilation, it follows that the young Guardians should be exposed to the 
mimetic mode of poetry largely for the presentation of virtuous characters.203 
 
Halliwell here introduces a pivotal point: mimetic poetry is allowed and even recommended 
to the young Guardians when it represents good and useful characters. At least in part, this is 
also a controversial point because – as we will see shortly – in Book X Plato seems to 
disallow poetry entirely within the city. In Book III, however, it is clear that Plato allows 
such a process to the guardians, when it is aimed to represent good and useful characters.  
However, Plato’s attitude on mimesis in Book III is also debated. According to Naddaff,  
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What Socrates fears most about poetic imitation is its lack of limits. The old-
regime poets could imitate anyone, anything, any way. A medium of excess, the 
uncensored poetry set the stage for the poetic audience’s excessive, limitless 
transformation. At the same time, however, Socrates recognizes the transformative 
power of this medium, of a mimesis that determines psychological and ethical 
habits and natures. […] Limiting the scope of mimetic poetry, Socrates engenders 
a poetry without limitations, a poetry that recognizes no boundaries between the 
actions, words and thoughts represented in poetry and those performed in life.204 
 
I agree with Naddaff that Plato’s primary concern is the lack of limits in poetic imitation. I 
also agree that he was aware of the enormous power of mimetic poetry; it was powerful 
enough to be capable of determining “psychological and ethical habits and natures”. 
Basically, that is exactly the reason why the author of the Republic wants to limit it.  
However, I do not think that Plato wanted to invent a new poetry without limitations. On the 
contrary, I believe that his worries concern the fact that mimetic poetry was so common, 
usual and powerful for the reasons I have already mentioned, that it created in the reciter, ‘no 
boundaries between the actions, words and thoughts represented in poetry and those 
performed in life.’ That is why Plato is so extreme in his criticism. This premise is vital in 
order to understand Plato’s attack upon mimetic poetry. For instance, Halliwell clearly points 
this out:  
Where poetry uses the dramatic mode, the reciter is drawn intensely into, and 
thereby takes on, the mental and ethical cast of the poem becomes the world of the 
mind imaginatively (re)enacting it. This point highlights a continuity, at the level 
of concern over the psychological influents of poetry, between the earlier scrutiny 
of poetic muthoi and the present analysis of poetic ‘form’. It ought also to show us 
that Plato’s questions can connect with problems that are still ours.205 
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Paradoxically, I would argue that Naddaff’s criticism of Plato is the same as Plato’s criticism 
of poetry, and my main objection is the following: why should Plato aim to create a new, 
model of poetry without limits, if, in his own view, this was the main fault in Greek epic? 
Naddaff affirms that:  
Socrates guarantees the efficacy of this education not by excluding poetry as an 
essential element, but by establishing a deliberate and serious continuity between 
art and life. Just as this art will imitate the guardians’ lives, the guardians’ lives 
will imitate this art. Even more precisely, Socrates’ supervision of subjects of 
poetic imitation transform the poetic experience into a performance in which the 
guardians, by their mere participation, actively fashion and constitute themselves 
as virtuous, as finely crafted, works of art.206  
As I have already largely illustrated, poetry was not practiced as a passive participation. 
Besides, that is why Plato focuses one more time on the subjects of mimesis when he 
examines the forms of poetry, since he had already faced its contents in the previous 
discussion with Adeimantus. What I mean by this is that the contents were never just a 
narrative subject but, a contrario, they always implied an active participation. That is why the 
contents became so important when Plato faces the question regarding not just what was to be 
said, but also how. 
In this connection, I agree with Nehamas about Plato’s objections to the use of poetry in 
education:  
Plato’s attitude toward what young children should recite, read, and learn from 
(for this is subject at this point) is quite reasonable. The actual discussion of 
poetry in Book II and III concerned the elementary education of the young 
Guardians, and Plato, I think, was quite willing to allow imitative poetry to play a 
crucial role in that enterprise. He consider the use of poetry proper in education 
[…] since he thinks that imitation can become ‘habit and nature’; if, therefore, a 
child’s object of imitation are also example of imitation, he thinks that they will 
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be beneficial. His claims about poetry (and the other arts, which he does not here 
contrast with poetry) at 401a-402 s shows that he is thinking of the very beginning 
of Guardian’s education. He believes that by proper imitation, a child not yet 
capable of understanding can develop a preference for Beauty and goodness and 
will embrace understanding in friendship when it does finally arrive (402a3-4).207 
 
Nehamas captures here a salient point: Plato allowed mimesis if it was aimed at developing 
“a preference for Beauty and goodness and will embrace understanding in friendship when it 
does finally arrive”. 
Nehamas’ point will be clearer in the next section in particular, when I will treat the proper 
melody and rhythm but for the time being, let me concentrate on the benefits of the proper 
objects in children’s education. Plato’s educational program in general and his criticism of 
poetry, in particular, were aimed to ensure a full intellectual development of the people. Now 
we face Plato’s position toward mimesis, and in his criticism we find that what worries him 
the most is the process of identification between the reciter and the characters.  
Now, the question emerges: is Plato’s attitude toward the objects of mimesis so far from our 
attitude to the objects of education? When we tell stories to our children, we certainly try to 
instil decent values in our children and yet we do not think this removes their capacity for 
independent thought. Rather, our educational programs are aimed to ensure a thorough, 
intellectual development for the young. What I am suggesting here is that to promote good 
and useful models is not a sufficient condition to imply an inculcation of certain models. One 
might say that the process of mimesis itself implies an inculcation of certain patterns but I do 
not think so. Rather, Plato wants simply to give good models that, as Nehamas rightly 
emphasizes, the young will recognize as such when they mature. This recognition will come, 
not because they were brought up to believe faithfully in them, but rather because, once they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Nehamas, 1999, pp. 254-255. 
	   193	  
have grown up, they are able to distinguish between good and bad things because they are 
only then intellectually capable.  
This is particularly evident in Plato’s introduction to the bad models that one must not 
imitate: 
‘Then we must not allow person for whom we say we care, who are men, and men who 
must grow up good, to imitate a woman, whether she be young or old, either railing at her 
husband, or striving and vaunting herself against the gods, thinking that she is happy, or 
overcome by misfortune, or grief, or tears; much less we shall we allow them to imitate 
one who is ill, or in love, or in labour’ (395e).  
 
In the light of what has been said so far, Plato’s concern appears justified. The suggestive 
motto stated by Plato in the introduction of the treatment of the forms of poetry – “We must 
go where the wind of the argument carries us’ (394d) – is the key to understand his attitude 
toward mimesis. The next step of his argument carries us to the treatment of mimesis with 
reference to the Proper Work Argument. 
 
6. 2. 4. Why does Plato use the Proper Work Argument against Mimesis?  
 
According to Halliwell, “Plato’s arguments move from the acknowledged educational status 
and cultural influence of poetry within his own world to a statement of the need to control 
poetic content in the interests of ethical ideology, individual psychological development, and 
the social order as a whole.”208 Halliwell points out here a strong link between mimesis and 
the social order of the community. It is an interesting point, because Plato uses the Proper 
Work Argument to limit the guardians’ process of mimesis. This is the argument advanced by 
Plato in reference to mimesis:  
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‘Does not the answer follow from what we have said already, that each man can practise 
well one profession but not many, and that if he attempts more, and meddles with many, 
he will fail in all to attain creditable distinction?’ (394e). 
Plato here explicitly mentions the ‘principle of specialization or ‘PWA’, which I have 
illustrated previously in this study. In the next breath, Socrates applies such a principle to 
imitation: 
‘Then will not the same argument apply to imitation? The same man cannot imitate many 
things as well as one’ (394e).  
 
This point could sound quite strange to the modern reader. Why does Plato apply a principle 
that limits a guardian to only one act of imitation? Burnyeat answers this question as follows:  
This is not the question whether the Guards should indulge in mimicry at parties, 
but whether, when free of military duties, they should engage in the poetic 
“performance” of writing and producing tragedy or comedy, which would involve 
them in imitating many different characters with no narrative interludes (394e 8-9, 
395b) in front of a large audience (397a). No doubt Socrates also means that the 
Guards should not be mimics at a party, nor enjoy acting in plays. They should not 
imitate any unworthy character, let alone a whole variety of them (395c-96b); they 
should imitate only characters they wish to emulate in their own lives. But the 
primary focus of the argument is on the Guards as themselves mimetic 
storytellers, impersonating many characters both good and bad. Only later does 
Socrates raise the prospect of a professional dramatist arriving from abroad and 
seeking admittance (397c–98a). This interpretation explains why the premise used 
to outlaw tragedy and comedy is the “one man-one job” principle.209 
 
Thus, on the one hand, Burnyeat’s interpretation explains Plato’s use of the Proper Work 
Argument in reference to mimesis. On the other hand, it emphasizes that Plato’s prime focus 
in mimesis are the Guardians and he is not concerned for the moment in professional 
dramatists. He refers to them in the beginning of his speech but immediately focuses upon the 
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guardians (394d). From this assumption, it follows that Plato’s first argument against 
mimesis does not regard poets themselves. I will return to this point shortly but for now I will 
focus on Halliwell’s remark. The connection introduced above by Halliwell, apropos of the 
link between “poetic contents in the interests of ethical ideology, individual psychological 
development, and the social order as a whole” appears clearer now. Yet, it does not have 
negative or authoritarian implications. It is vital to emphasize this factor, because scholars 
have criticized Plato as a totalitarian because of his criticism of mimetic poetry.  
In that respect, Plato’s worries about the objects of mimesis should not be read as an interest 
in promoting certain models that are functional to maintaining social order in the city. Rather, 
Plato pursues two reasons for censoring mimesis. First, he wants to guarantee the best 
possible result in any art (τέχνη). Secondly, he is concerned in preserving the guardians’ 
intellectual growth. What is particularly relevant for my purposes here, though, is that Plato 
argues against mimesis for two major reasons. First, a guardian will not perform his imitation 
well, because he does not understand the character; second, the guardian will fail in his daily 
tasks because he has imitated an evil character. Therefore, due to the enormous power of 
mimesis, people who recite epic poems fail not just in the mundane daily tasks of life but also 
in performing epic poetry.  
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In a similar way, in passage 395a, Plato states that the same persons are not able to write 
successfully both tragedy and comedy, even though they are professional writers. 
Adeimantus also confirms this fact as basic and unquestioned.  Moreover, in passage 395b, 
Plato notices that different actors usually played tragedy and comedy because the different 
genres required different talents in order to be represented in the best possible way. I would 
suggest, then, that the underlying implication of his criticism is the recognition that acting 
and writing are professions that can only be done well through specialisation.  
This point is not as trivial as could appear prima facie, for the reason that Plato does not 
reject their work in writing or playing comedies rather than tragedies. That is, Plato is not 
attacking players or authors qua players or authors. Per contra, he refers to them in order to 
show that even people who write and perform comedy and tragedy do a better job when they 
focus on one specific area. Therefore, the principle of specialization regards poets and 
authors too. To sum up, it is worth emphasising the following points in Plato’s first treatment 
of mimesis: i) Plato’s main objective was primarily related to the guardians’ forming of 
character; ii) Plato does not attack epic authors, actors or rhapsodists qua authors, actors or 
rhapsodists and iii) he applies the PWA to the mimetic poetry in order to preserve guardians’ 
growth. 
Thus, I would disagree with Halliwell’s overall conclusion regarding Plato’s view of mimesis 
in Book III where he says:  
Distinctions between narrative modes and their points of view have now become 
the common fare of narratological and related kinds of criticism. But Plato’s 
argument is not focused on technicalities as such: at its heart is an anxiety over the 
heightened states of mind – the self-likening, absorption, and identification – 
(allegedly) entailed by participation in the dramatic mode. Ii is legitimate and 
instructive, I believe, to read this aspect of the dialogue as a radical attack on the 
workings of imagination itself, where imagination is to be understood as a 
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dimension of the mind’s capacity to explore the possibility of difference in its own 
life.210 
 
It is important to grasp that what worries Plato is the “habit of making themselves resemble 
madmen, not the mind’s capacity to explore the possibility of difference in its own life”. In a 
seminal line, Plato clearly expresses this point: 
Nor, it would follow, may they imitate bad men or cowards, or men doing actions of the 
contrary nature to those we described, reviling and caricaturing one another, using 
abominable language, whether drunk or sober, or committing any other faults of speech or 
action characteristic of that class of men in their personal demeanour and their relation 
with others. I think, too, that they must not get into the habit of making themselves 
resemble madmen, either in word or action. They must know madmen and bad men and 
women, but they must neither do nor imitate any of their actions’ (396a).  
 
It is explicitly asserted that the guardians must not “get into the habit of making themselves 
resemble man either in word or action”. Although, the guardians still have to know them. The 
key to understanding the deep difference between “get into the habit of making themselves 
resemble man either in word or action” and to ban “the mind’s capacity to explore the 
possibility of difference in its own life” is given by the usual first-person recitation of the 
poems.  
Plato’s attitude on mimetic poetry does not aim to avoid the possibility of knowing difference 
in one own life; rather, it was aimed to avoid the contamination derived by mimetic poetry in 
daily life. Such a contamination of genres, contents and issues affected everyone by a 
substantial confusion and lack of knowledge about the things they recite. I will explain 
thoroughly what I mean by ‘lack of knowledge’ in the next section where I will focus 
specifically on the reference to the full banishment of poetry expressed in Book X of the 
Republic. For the time being, let me quote another extracts of the arguments made by Plato in 
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his criticism of mimesis, in order to corroborate my view that Plato wants to avoid the 
imitation described above as a substantial confusion and promiscuity of models and 
characters: 
‘Then’, I said, ‘ as for the man of a different character, the more contemptible he is, the 
more will he imitate everything without discrimination and think nothing beneath him, so 
that he will attempt in sober earnest, and before a large audience, to imitate everything, as 
we said a moment ago – thunder and the noise of the wind, and of hail, and of axles and 
of pulleys; the notes of trumpets and flutes, and the bleating of sheep, and the cries of 
birds. And so his manner of speech will all involve imitation of voice and form, with 
possibly a little simple narration’ (397a). 
 
Let me focus on the first part of the quote. (I will return to the second part in the last section 
of the chapter). Plato objects to both the notion that anyone can imitate anything and that 
imitation can take place without limiting content and forms, even in front of a big social 
audience. In light of what we have said so far in relation to the pivotal role of poetry in Greek 
culture, Plato’s worries are justified. His use of the Proper Work Argument is effective for 
showing the dangers that lacking limitations of who could represent any character, even in 
front of a big audience, could have on an oral culture. This is not just a matter of different 
narrative characters, but rather, important epic figures and models that were taken as 
examples in common people’s life. 
In order to support my view, let us discuss the second part of Burnyeat’s analysis. On passage 
397a, he focuses on the difference between being a guardian and being a poet or an actor as 
distinct crafts (τέχνη):  
In the ideal city each man is to devote himself to the practice of one craft is 
anticipated by Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae 130ff., where the tragic poet 
Agathon assumes in all seriousness the habit and the habits of the women he 
portrays; at line 156 he calls this mimesis. Note that the disjunctive generalisation 
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has now been extended to cover imitating the sounds of nonhuman things, animate 
or inanimate; originally it meant imitating people, as is shown by the masculine 
pronoun at 393c. In ancient Athens the poet was also the producer, as we would 
call it in Greek, it, because he trained the chorus. No craft or skill is needed to sit 
and watch a play. Some skill is needed for reciting a speech from Euripides. But 
much more is required to write and produce a play yourself. The Guards’ sole job 
(395a), their special craft (395b) is defending the freedom of the city (395bc). 
Hence they must not even to do what cultivated Athenians often did, combine 
their main pursuit with the writing of tragedies (395a 1-2). (In real-life Athens, 
Sophocles did it the other way round: he served twice as general.) If it is true, as 
Socrates claims, that no one can successfully combine two imitative crafts, either 
as a poet of both tragedy and comedy or as an actor in both (395ab), a fortiori no 
one can successfully combine an imitative craft with a military career (395bc). 
The argument turns on the exclusive demands each craft makes on its 
practitioners. It is dramaturgy as a craft, much more than amateur theatricals, that 
Socrates wants the Guards to avoid, so that they concentrate on developing and 
practising the skills appropriate to their proper task.211 
In full accordance with this interpretation, we are now able to understand why, on the one 
hand, Plato’s overall conclusion about mimesis for the guardians is the following: 
‘We shall admit the simple imitator of the good man.’ (397d). 
Then we must speak to our poets and compel them to impress upon their poems 
only the image of the good, or not to make poetry in our city (401b). 
On the other hand, Plato rejects a poet who is able to imitate well ‘every conceivable 
object’, asserting that such a poet is not useful in Callipolis. 
‘Then apparently if there comes to our city a man so wise that he can turn into everything 
under the sun and imitate every conceivable objects, when he offers to show off himself 
and his poems to us, we shall do obeisance to him as to a sacred, wonderful, and 
agreeable person, but we shall say that we have no such man in our city, and the law 
forbids there being one, and we shall anoint him with myrrh, and crown him with a 
wreath of sacred wool, and more austere and less attractive poet and story teller, whose 
poetry will be to our profit, who will imitate for us the diction of the good man, and in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Ibid, 272. 
	   200	  
saying what he has to say will conform to those canons which we laid down originally 
when we were under-tasking the task of educating the soldiers (398a). 
 
 
6. 2. 5. Plato’s goal in censoring melodies: ‘When we have done so, we must make our 
metre and our melody to suit the words describing such a life, and not make words to 
suite metre and melody’ (400a). 
 
Once Plato has examined ‘the branch of music which relates to literature and stories’ (398b), 
he focuses on the songs and melody (398c). Since melody is constituted by words, harmony 
and rhythm (398d), he faces them all. In analysing the various melodies, he states that he is 
going to adopt the same attitude used in facing the contents as he does with the forms of 
poetry (398d). He also states that the modes and rhythms allowed will correspond to the 
canons of the subjects and manners already analysed. That is why, in accordance with 
Glaucon, he banishes the plaintive harmonies like the Ionian and the Lydian. The reason why 
they have to be banned is once again because they are not useful for educating the guardians 
(399a). Plato also examines the rhythms in the same way. In passage 400a, Plato clearly 
asserts the following principle:  
‘When we have done so, we must make our metre and our melody to suit the words 
describing such a life, and not make words to suite metre and melody’ (400a).  
 
It is vital to emphasize this principle. In full accordance with the attitude adopted in 
criticizing mimesis, Plato is concerned with the harmful effects that certain melodies could 
invoke in the listeners. This is clearly his primary concern, and is exactly what he wants to 
avoid.  
In his view, the effects are so powerful that they are capable of determining the word λογος. 
The Ancient Greeks used this word for expressing both thought and language. In Homer for 
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instance, it used to mean only ‘word’ just in two occasions. More generally, it used to express 
speech, clause, expression, narration, even fame and literature. It characterises humans and 
that is why, in my own view, it so important in this context.  
To Plato, the λογος must be preeminent in people’s growth and life. A fortiori, a guardian’s 
education and life must follow this principle. If this does not happen, the guardians are 
vulnerable and easily influenced by the melodies. Yet, Plato also states two new interesting 




6. 2. 6. The New Canons. 
 
It is important to emphasize that Plato states two main guidelines in analysing melodies. 
First, he clearly affirms that the λογος is more important than the melodies, and that the 
melodies must follow the word and not vice versa. I believe this is a pivotal concept because 
the pre-eminence of λογος on the melodies means that the guardians are aware and have the 
control of what they sing and say. What Plato wants to avoid here is the type of music that 
could shock and distort guardians’ behaviour. His solution, based on the censorship, is to 
follow the paradigm of the pre-eminency of the λογος. If the guardians maintain control of 
what they say, they are able to express themselves and do not lose their own personality.  
The comparison between Greek poetry and our own literature is incorrect because the two 
subjects are deeply different for what concerns their role and weight: we do not have to 
compare Plato’s censorship of melodies to contemporary music styles. As Burnyeat points 
out:  
And not only music in the narrow sense of rhythm and attunement. Plato’s word 
covers music and poetry together, because in the ancient world you usually hear 
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them together, as song. Those rhythms and attunements convey verbal messages 
to the soul, and Plato is as concerned about their content as about their musical 
form. In an ideal city, the whole culture must be as ideal as possible, because all 
of it influences the character of the citizens.212  
According to Burnyeat, Plato is concerned with the ‘verbal messages to the soul’, and the 
solution he finds for educating the guardians is to state the pre-eminency of the word. If the 
word rules the music, the guardians – qua persons who are able to express themselves – rule 
the music, and not vice versa. With that in mind, the second step is to define the proper 
features of the songs that, as we have already noticed, have to follow the word.  
In defining the proper features of the songs, Plato introduces a new element. From the last 
line quoted above (400a) until the end of his treatment of education based on µουσική (403c), 
he states several times the following principles: i) gracefulness corresponds to a good rhythm 
(and vice versa); ii) the good rhythm is assimilated to a beautiful style (and vice versa) and 
iii) musical rhythm and musical mode conforms to the words, and not vice versa.  
However, the question remains: what does Plato mean by ‘graceless’? Burnyeat argues that, 
In Plato’s advocacy of the idea, the key terms are gracefulness and its opposite, 
gracelessness - gracefulness can be seen both in inanimate things like buildings 
and furniture and in living things. In a person, gracefulness can show in their 
physical movements, in their stance or the way they hold themselves, and also in 
their talk and how they think. If you are sympathetic to the idea that the material 
environment has effects on the soul (particularly, but not only, when you are 
young), that over time it influences your character and outlook in all sorts of ways 
you are not aware of, then gracefulness is a good example of a quality that can be 
taken in from the material environment and internalized as a quality of mind and 
spirit. Gracefulness is attractive. It is a quality we welcome and would like to 
have ourselves. Certainly, it can be faked, an outer garment disguising an unjust 
soul (366b). But true grace is the reflection of virtue in a harmonious soul 
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(554e).213 
 
Thus, it is worth noticing that Plato states the quite reasonable idea that rhythm and melodies 
strongly influence human beings and from that assumption follows the principle that a state 
must check the quality of them. Therefore, I would agree and conclude with Burnyeat’s 
remark in emphasizing that: “Music is decisive because of its influence on your sense of 
beauty, your taste, the eighteenth century called it - which in turn guides your response to 
other things in the environment. In this way, music is included in the same range as material 
and moral culture.”214 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Ibid, 220-221. 
214 Ibid, 222. 
	   204	  
 
Seventh Chapter. 
Republic X: why the Banishment is not Real Banishment. 
 
Introduction.  
This chapter is entirely devoted to the treatment of Plato’s arguments on poetry and the 
notorious banishment he postulates in the ending book of the Republic. Throughout the 
chapter I will present a detailed analysis of the text, along side a wide confront with the 
relevant scholarship on the matter.  
 
7. 1. 0. Why does Plato want to banish poetry? 
‘I must not honour a man more than I honour the truth’ (595d). 
 
In the beginning of Book X, Plato emphasises the pattern by which he will lead the hard 
attack against mimetic poetry in general and Homer in particular. At passage 595a, firstly, he 
asserts that there is no room for mimetic poetry in the ideal city. This first argument (595a – 
602c) faces mimetic poetry and is based on the imitation that characterises it. Both Plato’s 
account of and his criticism of poetry in Book X are strictly different from the previous ones. 
In passage 595b, he states that the city should ban mimetic poetry because it referring to the 
separation of the different parts of the soul. Plato presents his second argument (602c-605c) 
from a basis firmly set within the bounds of the primary one denouncing poetry. More 
precisely, Plato tries to demonstrate that the inferior part of the soul – opposed to the 
reasoning and superior, rational part – accepts at face value the notions expressed by mimetic 
poetry.  
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Although it is, perhaps, clear in passages 602c-605c, I am inclined to believe that the answer 
to why Plato wants to banish mimetic poetry is expressed, though somewhat enigmatically, in 
passage 595c. In that passage, while talking about Homer, Plato says:  
 
‘I must not honour a man more than I honour the truth’ (Plat. Rep. 595c). 
 
This principle is the leitmotif of Plato in Book X. In what follows, I will show why and how 
Plato’s quote above is to be interpreted as a paradigm of his attitude toward poetry in book X. 
This chapter will also shed light on Plato’s uncompromising attack and banishment in the last 
book of the dialogue, in order to reveal that his attitude is aimed to release poetry from the 
educational and political role it had in the classical Greek society. 
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7. 1. 1. Plato’s account of mimesis in Book X. Why does Plato compare 
painting with mimetic poetry? 
 
First of all, it is crucial to reiterate here the role of Plato’s Theory of Forms in order to get 
some understanding on his first argument against poetry in the last book of the Republic.  
Here, then, is Plato’s Theory of Forms, relevant (if for no other reason) since in Book X they 
are explicitly expressed in order to explain why the poetry at issue is ‘mimetic’. More 
precisely, Plato faces the question of ‘what is imitation?’ and he refers to the Theory of 
Forms in order to define what ‘imitation’ is.  
According to his Theory of Forms, for Plato there are three different types of objects: 
i) Forms of general ideas or real objects. They are perfect, immutable and at the highest 
level or knowledge. Made by a god (e.g. the idea of the bed). 
ii) Individual, real objects, which belong to the real world and are produced by humans 
by means of knowledge and craft (e.g. a material, physical bed). 
iii) Images, paintings and imitations of real objects and things, imitated by mimetic artists 
without any knowledge and craft concerning the effective creation of those (e.g. a 
representation of a bed). 
Plato refers to the Theory of Forms in order to argue that there is no real knowledge of 
the things represented in mimetic art. In fact, he argues that mimetic art does not refer to 
the essence of the things (the forms) but it refers just to their appearance (598a-b). In 
Plato’s words: 
Imitation, then, is far from the truth, and apparently it manages to make all things just 
because it attacks only a small part of each, and that an image. The painter, for example, 
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will paint us, we say, a shoemaker, a carpenter, and all other workmen, though he has no 
knowledge whatever of their crafts. But nevertheless, if he is a good painter, he may paint 
a carpenter and show the thing at some distance, and so cheat children and stupid men 
into thinking it is really a carpenter. (599c). 
 
Imitative man has no knowledge of any value on the subject of his imitation; that 
imitation is a form amusement and not a serious occupation; (602c). 
This imitation concerned with something that is third from the truth. (602c). 
 
It is worth noting that Plato connects here ‘imitation’ (without any real knowledge) with 
painting. The reason is that, on this occasion, mimesis is intended as the literal copy of the 
appearance of a thing. In that respect, Plato even refers to the use of a mirror and its role in 
the reflection of things. He makes this comparison in order to emphasize that the painter, as 
well as one who uses a mirror, represents things without any knowledge of them -- especially 
the craftsman’s skill required to make such objects.  
Yet, why does Plato apply the third principle of his Theory of Forms to poetry? Plato’s 
criticism appears odd to the modern reader. In fact, we ask neither the painter nor the writer 
to have a deep and complete knowledge of the things they paint or write. The reason is that, 
for us, such knowledge is not a hallmark for good or bad painting or writing. Conversely, 
Plato maintains that it is the biggest fault in mimetic art. Is it really so?  
In order to solve the puzzle, I believe it is useful to clarify the real object of Plato’s attack. 
Even so, the subject of his attack is a controversial point. Nehamas maintains that Book X of 
the Republic is an attack solely upon poetry, not Art as a whole. His argument is that Plato 
does not banish the artists altogether, only the poets. In this way, Nehamas recalls that 
painting, like poetry, is imitative. Using the Theory of Forms, Book X makes a parallelism 
between poetry and painting in order to show the same imitative nature and their remoteness 
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from the truth. However, as the text clearly shows, Plato banishes the poets only and not the 
painters. Thus, as Nehamas rightly points out, being imitative is not solely sufficient to 
explain the banishment from the city. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that Plato does not 
banish all poetry, but just the imitative one: 
In no way we are admitting [in our city] as much of it as is imitative (595a5).  
 
What is wrong with imitation in poetry? Annas believes that Plato’s attack in Book X aims to 
show that “art in general is worthless.”215 She focuses on the following point in order to 
explain why Plato refers to painting: “The point to be taken over is that the artist, in whatever 
medium, produces without knowledge of this product.”216 She also rejects the comparison 
between poetry and painting because “Homer cannot be said to copy the appearances of 
things in anything like the way that the illusionistic painter does.”217  
I disagree with Annas, though. First, it is unclear whether, in Plato’s view, “art in general is 
worthless.” Rather, Plato was likely aware of the enormous power of art in general and epics 
in particular. It is highly likely that, in his view, art was extremely powerful, even dangerous. 
For this reason, he held that poetry had to be examined and limited. It is useful to 
contextualize Plato’s criticism. In fact, due to Nehamas’ previous remark, we are able to say 
that not mimetic poetry qua mimetic art has to be banned. If it was so, also the painters, as 
well as any other artist within the city had to be banned. In that respect, Plato’s comparison 
with painting aims just to explain the remoteness of poetry from the truth. Plato’s main target 
in Book X is, once again, Homer (and the epic poets). This is evident in the conclusion of the 
first argument he presents against mimetic art: 
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My dear Homer if, as you say, you are not thrice removed from the truth concerning 
virtue, a manufacturer of an image, and what we have called an imitator; if you are but 
twice removed, and can now what practices make men better individuals and better 
citizens, can you not mention a city to which you gave a better government, such as 
Lycurgus gave to Lacedaemon, and many other persons to many cities great and small? 
(599e). 
 
Thus, Plato mentions just epic poets. As Nehamas has emphasized, Plato does not mention 
any banishment of the painters or any other mimetic artists.  
It is also worth noting that imitation in Book X is quite different from that of Book III. Annas 
points out: “And we cannot apply to book 3 to fill out the sense in which the poet ‘imitates’, 
for in book 3 mimesis is not what Homer does, but what the person reciting Homer does, 
when he comes to the bits of Homer that are in direct speech.”218 I agree with Annas’ analysis 
about the difference regarding the definition of ‘imitation’ between Books III and X but I 
disagree with her conclusion. She says that: 
The difficulty about the shift in range of ‘mimesis’ has been noted often enough. 
One result is that in book X we have no idea of what it is for the poet to imitate, 
other than that which is given by the comparison with the painter. But, as we have 
seen, this is the disputable point: Why should the painter provide a good 
comparison?219 
In answer to Annas, I argue that Plato’s criticism of imitation in Book X is precise and 
correct in reference to knowledge.  
In order to assess my claim, I refer to the same basis I used in the previous chapters for 
interpreting Plato’s view on poetry and mimesis. In fact, in the first chapter of this thesis, I  
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explained that Plato’s attitude on poetry in Books II and III aimed to guarantee a full 
intellectual growth of the children first and of the young guardians second. In that respect, his 
criticism and the related censorship of poetry reflected the primary reason for his critique. As 
I have already illustrated, this was due to the peculiar features of Greek poetry. Now, in Book 
X we face a different account of mimesis. It concerns knowledge because Plato holds that 
poetry was the main cultural source of information for the people. Plato in fact criticises epic 
poets because they do not have knowledge of the things they are talking about. I shall argue 
that such a claim is justified if we bear in mind the fundamental role of the poets in an oral 
culture like Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. At the beginning of the study, I gave 
historical evidence in order to corroborate such a claim. I think that if we apply this view to 
Plato’s criticism in Book X, we will recognize more clearly why Plato’s critique was correct.  
 
7. 1. 2. Knowledge and lack of knowledge in mimetic art. 
 Or the reason why Plato objects the epistemic value of poetry. 
 
Why does Plato object the lack of knowledge in the poets? My answer is that Plato had in 
mind that they were the main source of general wisdom and knowledge for the masses. Due 
to that understanding, he was worried about the type of teaching expressed via poetry. That is 
why he wonders, above all, about the level of knowledge of the poets. This claim is 
consistent with Asmis’ view on ancient Greek poets: ‘Plato’s quarrel with poetry takes its 
start in the fact that Greek poets had a crucial role in the creation and transmission of social 
values. It was traditionally believed that poets, like prophets, were inspired directly by the 
gods with wisdom about the human and divine condition. It was the prerogative of poets to 
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make known the past, present, and future to their contemporaries and future generations by 
oral performance of their poems.’220  
We have already demonstrated that, in Books II and III, Plato analysed and criticised Greek 
epics because it was not a good and efficient source for educating children and the young 
guardians. I would argue that, in Book X, Plato adopts the same attitude from a slightly 
different perspective. Plato’s starting-point, which is consistent with our analysis in the 
previous chapters, is that Greek poetry was the main provenance of learning for the young as 
well as a major source of knowledge for the adult. That is why, at the end of the first 
argument against mimetic poetry, Plato asserts:  
We must examine tragedy and Homer its leader, since people tell us that tragedians know 
all arts and all things human that relate to virtue and vice and things divine. For a good 
poet, they say, if he is to make a beautiful poem on his subject, must do so with 
knowledge of that subject, or fail altogether. We must then inquire whether these persons 
have met with the imitators and been cheated, and, on seeing their productions, have 
failed to perceive that they are at three removes form being, and can easily be made 
without knowledge of the truth - for their productions are appearances and not realities – 
or whether there is something in what they say, and good poets really have knowledge of 
those subjects of which their description are approved by common opinion (598e-599a). 
 
Thus, Plato wonders what degree of knowledge poets hold on the matters that they talk about. 
Surely we do not ask our poets or novelists a similar question but I suppose we demand a 
high level of knowledge and competency from teachers and from those who profess 
themselves experts in the realm they teach. On the same line, Plato makes the following 
point:  
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Well, my friend, I imagine that we must come to this conclusion about all these matters. 
When any one announces to us that he has met a man who knows all handicrafts, and who 
of all the things known by each separate individual has a more exact knowledge than any 
of them, to such a person we must reply that he is more or less of a fool, and has 
apparently met with a wizard and imitator, and been cheated into thinking the man 
possessed of universal wisdom, all because he could not distinguish knowledge and lack 
of knowledge and imitation (598d). 
 
In a city where everyone does his or her own job and he or she is supposed to know what 
they do, there is no room for a man who affirms to know everything and that claims to 
‘possess universal wisdom’. This is clearly Plato’s view. However, the most interesting 
question becomes whether or not Plato’s criticism about knowledge is justified or not. In fact, 
Plato refers to ‘universal wisdom’. As we have seen above, such ‘universal wisdom’ derived 
from the general belief that the poets, due to the recitation of their epic poems, possessed and 
made known past, present and future events.  
The value of such poems was due to the claim that they were directly inspired by the gods. 
This fact was a serious mistake in Plato’s view. How could he accept people who had no 
understanding or knowledge about the issues upon which they spoke?  Even more, they were 
talking about the most important subject matters of the time without any criticism or 
discussion.  
Based on this, it is necessary to refer to another salient point: Greek mythology was not a 
rigid and fixed series of stories with defined characters, events and topics like the Bible, for 
instance (although, it is also worth noting that the Bible itself is a single set of canonical 
books that belonged to a wider collection of stories and tales, which were quite different even 
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among themselves). However, Greek epic poetry was a dynamic compendium of tales, 
figures and events that changed continually. According to Asmis:  
The value transmitted in poetry evolved continuously. While many poems – most 
prominently those of Homer – were passed on with little or no change from one 
generation to the next, poets and performers were continually reinterpreting the 
past. Poets not only preserved values but also questioned and subverted the 
traditions they inherited, and long before Plato’s attack on poetry, there were 
poets who condemned poets. The first known critical attack on poetry was by the 
poet Xenophanes in the sixth century B. C. In the same epic meter used by Homer 
and Hesiod, Xenophanes denounced these poets for ‘attributing to the gods 
everything that is a shame and reproach among humans – to steal, commit 
adultery, and deceive one another.221  
Asmis stresses three important points here. First, Greek mythology was a rich source from 
which the poets took the necessary elements for making poems. The second point emphasizes 
that there were neither rules nor limits concerning how to use the enormous cultural heritage 
expressed by epics. The arbitrariness, in this respect, was so wide that the ‘ancient quarrel’ 
Plato mentions as the conflict between poetry and philosophy was present among poets 
themselves, too. Finally, it is important to highlight that the process of ‘attributing to the gods 
everything’ was growing and it was something that worried the poets, too.  
Personally, I see the breakthrough of Plato’s criticism deriving from an epistemological 
approach. In Book X he wonders whether the poets have knowledge of the things they 
(pretend to) teach via composition and recitation of their poems. What the poets recite 
regards the most important issues in people’s life such as justice, warfare, virtues and in light 
of the educational function and encyclopaedic role of Greek epics. That is why Plato wonders 
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whether poets have knowledge or not. And whether they should be admitted into the city 
under the shape of the sacred voices of the god.
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7. 1. 3. Which knowledge is the matter at hand? 
 
 Obviously, the general question apropos of what ‘knowledge’ is, represents a wide and 
controversial topic, even in the contemporary philosophical debate. Yet, for the time being, I 
am concerned only with knowledge in connection with Greek poetry and Plato’s arguments 
in the dialogue at stake. I may therefore confine myself here to describe the types of 
knowledge that Plato’s objections imply. Once we have pointed out that Plato’s criticism is 
consistent with our previous analysis of Greek poetry as universal encyclopaedia, the most 
interesting bet is to show whether his epistemological objections are correct or not. My own 
view is that they are correct, and in order to demonstrate that I will use a recent note based on 
comparisons to contemporary epistemology. Thus, I compare Plato’s arguments against 
poetry in Book X and the concepts of ‘ability knowledge’ and ‘propositional knowledge’.  
Endorsing G. Ryle’s view on the matter from his work, Concept of Mind222, D. Pritchard 
distinguishes at least two types of knowledge. He starts his analysis with ‘ability knowledge,’ 
‘which is often referred to as ‘know-how’ since it involves knowing how to do something 
such as ride a bike or swim. It is usually contrasted with propositional knowledge, which is 
knowledge of a proposition. The two types of knowledge are treated differently because, 
intuitively at least, one might know how to do something, such a swim, without having any 
relevant propositional knowledge.’223 Thus, knowledge as ‘know-how’ is a constitutive 
element in all the arts that requires certain skills, for instance, making a shoe or making a 
statue or a poem.  
However, there is also another type of knowledge, the ‘propositional knowledge’. Pritchard 
explains: 
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This is knowledge that something (i.e. a proposition) is the case. It is typically 
contrasted with ability knowledge, or ‘know-how’. The two types of knowledge 
are treated differently because, intuitively at least, one might know how to do 
something, such a swim, without having any relevant propositional knowledge 
(without, for example, knowing that you can swim, perhaps because you forgot 
that you could until you fell in water).224 Thus, on the one hand, we have the 
knowledge required for producing certain objects (know-how) and, on the other 
hand, we have the truth of propositions as ‘propositional knowledge’.225 
 
I would argue that Plato’s first argument against poetry is based on the lack of these two 
types of knowledge. In passage 599e, Plato wonders whether anyone, following Homer or 
any poets’ advice, has been able to cure any sick person: 
 
Well, one other question we may give up the idea of calling Homer or any other poet to 
account, by asking whether any of them had medical knowledge, and was not merely an 
imitator of medical discourses; where are the people whom any poet, ancient or modern, 
is said to have restored to health, as Asclepius did; what student of medicine they have 
left behind them to match the descendants of Asclepius. And so with the other arts we 
may refrain from such questions, and let be (598e). 
 
This is a clear example of ‘propositional knowledge’. In fact, Plato explicitly refers to ‘the 
truth of propositions’. In this specific case, he refers to poems that mention medicine and he 
wonders whether anyone has ever been restored to health according to the information found 
in the poems. In order to corroborate his criticism, Plato also makes another example 
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regarding the art of government. In this occasion, he wonders whether any city has been ruled 
successfully, following Homer’s suggestions: 
 
But when Homer tries to tell of the mightiest and most noble things, of wars and 
generalship and government of cities and the education of man, then it is only fair we 
should question him, and inquire: ‘My dear Homer, if, as you say, you are not thrice 
removed from truth concerning virtue, a manufacturer of an image, and what we have 
called an imitator; if you are but twice removed, and can know practices make men better 
individuals and better citizens, can you not mention a city to which you gave a better 
government, such as Lycurgus gave to Lacedaemon, and many other persons to many to 
many cities great and small? Does any city name you a good lawgiver and its benefactor? 
(599a). 
 
Plato adopts the same attitude in this second example. He stresses that no one ever founded a 
city according to Homer’s advice. Thus, he refers to the ‘propositional knowledge’ of 
Homer’s works. 
Afterwards, in the last section of his first criticism, Plato refers to Homer’s direct influence 
and education. He wonders whether Homer had ever educated anyone directly. However, 
Plato shows that Homer had not, which is why Plato concludes that Homer also fails as an 
educator, a point which corresponds to ‘know-how’, or ‘practical knowledge’: 
 
‘Well, if there is not mention, of many inventions, contrivances of use in handcrafts or in 
any other branch of action, which would show that he was a clever practical man, like 
Thales of Miletus, or Anarcharsis the Scythian?’ 
‘No, nothing of that kind.’ 
‘Well, if there is no mention of public services, do we hear that Homer in his lifetime was 
guide and educator to certain individuals, who loved him for the inspiration of his society, 
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and who handed down to those who came after them a Homeric way of life? Such was 
Pythagoras. For that master was greatly loved for such reasons, and his successors even 
up to the present day talk of the Pythagorean manner of life, and seem somehow to be 
quite distinct from other people’ (600a-b).  
 
In the light of the last quote and related comparison, I think, we are now able to answer the 
question regarding the comparison with painting. In fact, like the painter who imitates the 
visual aspect of a thing, the mimetic poet is able just to tell about a thing without knowledge 
of it. He is also removed from the truth because he is not able to express true and precise 
propositions apropos of the things he is talking about (propositional knowledge is seen here 
with comparison to the painter who is not able to say how to create a real object).  
The second degree of remoteness concerns Plato’s second objection, as well as the painter 
who is not able to create the real object he draws: the mimetic poet fails in educating people 
in his own life. Here, Plato refers to Homer. First, he recalls that there were no Homeric 
schools like the philosophical ones, i.e., and that Homer did not have direct followers. 
Second, he mentions that he was famous for not having educated even the persons closest to 
him:  
For if the stories about Homer are true, Socrates, his companion Creophylus, would has 
an example of education even funnier than his funny name. For they say that Homer was 
very much neglected in his lifetime, not to speak of what happened afterwards (600b). 
 
One might say that the last objection applies to Homer only. Yet, Plato anticipates such an 
objection referring to others who had followers for their teaching and he wonders why the 
same does not happen with other poets. Moreover, this last claim concerns not just education 
in a narrow sense but also knowledge and rules that allow people to live better or to create a 
state which follows patterns and ideas expressed by poets: 
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Why Protagoras of Abdera and Prodicus of Creos and many others can by their private 
intercourse inspire their followers with the belief that they will be unable to rule either 
households or their city unless these masters superintend their education, and for this 
wisdom of theirs they are so devotedly loved, that their disciplines almost insist on 
carrying them about shoulder high (600c). 
 
Thus, Plato wonders whether or not Homer and the other poets possessed knowledge about 
the things they told. Plato shows that no one has ever been restored to health, nor has anyone 
every ruled a city based upon the advice of epic poets (propositional knowledge). Then he 
wonders whether such poets have ever educated or to improved something in their own life 
(practical knowledge). The negative answer to both these questions allows Plato to confute 
the epistemological value of mimetic poetry. 
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7. 1. 4. Plato’s second argument against mimetic poetry. 
 
Plato’s second argument spans from passages 602c-605c. In this occasion, his 
criticism is based on the assumption that the inferior part of the soul – opposed to the 
reasoning one – accepts at face value what is expressed by mimetic poetry. Plato 
refers here explicitly to the previous discussion in which he stated that the soul is 
divided into different parts. This is the reason he offers to explain why there are 
conflicts and contrary drives in everyone.  
In Book X he recalls the claim: “our soul is full of countless simultaneous 
oppositions” (604e). Then, he wonders about what part of the soul is concerned with 
poetry. He argues that mimetic poetry appeals to the lower part of the soul because, 
“all imitation produces its own work quite removed from the truth” (603b). In that 
respect, he recalls that the element “which relies on calculation and measurement will 
be the best element in the soul” (603a), because it is the best way to get close to the 
truth. In order to clarify his view, he refers to painting again. Painting, in fact, is able 
to produce optical illusions like one-dimensional figures that appear three-
dimensional: ‘bent thing appear bent when seen in water and straight when taken out 
of it, or both concave and convex’ (602c). Plato argues that mimetic poetry, as well as 
painting, appeals to the lower part of the soul because it relies in things that appeal to 
the desiring part, opposed to the reasoning one. Plato says:  
 
Imitation, we say, imitates men acting compulsory or voluntary, thinking that in 
event they have done well or ill, and throughout either feeling pain or rejoicing 
(603c). 
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Plato here refers to mimesis in a different way. The comparison made by Plato 
appears odd. Annas asks, “How can the strength and importunate nature of one’s 
desires have anything to do with one’s being taken in by optical illusions?”226 
However, it is crucial to realize that, in this occasion, imitation does not directly 
concern the knowledge of the things imitated but, rather, Plato focuses on the 
emotions that one feels and the conflict that takes place in the soul when someone 
feels contrasting drives. He emphasizes that poets cause contrasting emotions with 
their poems. From this follows his argument that epic tales rely on the lower, desiring 
part of the soul, which is in conflict with the upper, reasoning one. Plato’s parallelism 
between painting and mimetic poetry relies on the assumption that both appeal to the 
lower part of the soul, which is in contrast to the reasoning one.  
In that respect, I disagree with Annas, who affirms that:  
The argument from painting does not carry over to poetry because the part 
of the soul distinguished are not the same in both cases; conclusions drawn 
from the conflict of reason and another part in the one case have no 
application to the other. […] this does not avoid the problem that reason’s 
role does not come out the same in the two cases. And anyway if the parts 
of the soul appealed to in the two cases are not the same, then Plato has no 
argument at all; He would have no semblance of justification for claiming 
that the worthlessness of painting proves anything about poetry.227 
Conversely, I believe that the point of the analogy between painting and mimetic 
poetry regards the fact that both make a conflict with the different part of the soul. 
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This seems to me evident in the conclusion of Plato’s second attack on mimetic 
poetry: 
Listen and consider. Take the best of us listening to Homer or any other of the 
tragic poets, when he is imitating a hero in grief and spinning out a long 
melancholy lamentation or imitating men singing and disfiguring themselves in 
grief: you know that he gives us pleasure, and we give ourselves up to following 
him; we sympathize and are seriously impressed, and prise as a good poet 
whoever most affects us in this way (605c). 
 
Plato’s worries concern once again the dangers for people’s capacity to exercise one’s 
mind. In passages 603-694, he refers to the strong emotions that one feels in 
conditions of pain or misfortune and he notices that such feelings are stronger when 
one is alone. Conversely, if one is “under observations of his fellows, one fights and 
contends with his grief much better” (604a). This last point could sound moralistic or 
even rhetorical; however, Plato is still concerned with the misleading powers and 
effects of mimetic poetry. In passage 604c-d he asserts: 
 
A man should take thought’, I said, ‘on what has come to pass, and as we regulate 
our play by the fall of the dice, so he should regulate his affairs in the light of 
what has fallen out, as reason ordains will be best. We should not be like children 
who, when they have stumbled, go on holding the injured part and shrieking, but 
should always accustom the soul to turn as quickly as possible to the healing and 
restoring of that which is fallen and diseased making lamentation to disappear 
before medicine (604c-d). 
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Thus, this is the main claim to pursue for Plato: the saving of the capacity of people to 
exercise one’s mind. As well as in Book III for what concerned the forms of poetry, 
Plato’s worries regard the fact that imitative poetry influences and enables people to 
express the word (λογος), namely the thought, the language228.  
 
 
7. 1. 5. Why the Banishment is not a real Banishment. 
 
In this final section of the chapter devoted to the analysis of Book X of the Republic, 
it is now time to recall further evidence that what prima facie seems a banishment is 
not actually a real one. In order to strengthen my argument, I would focus now on an 
extract from Republic Book V, where we find a passage strangely neglected by 
scholars.  
 
Therefore certain festivals and sacrifices will be established by law (a) at which 
we'll bring the brides and grooms together, and we'll direct our poets (b) to 
compose appropriate hymns for the marriages that take place (c) (459e). 
 
It is indeed surprising that Plato explicitly plans certain festivals with dedicated 
rhymes by the poets. It forcibly calls for reassessment of the traditional view 
according to which Plato did want to exile the poets from the ideal community he 
envisages. As a matter of fact, in this emerging picture, two possible readings 
significantly alter the initial perspective of Plato’s attitude toward poetry.  
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Two readings are possible to work out both this apparently enigmatic passage and 
Plato’s overall attitude on poetry.  
One the one hand, a reductive account could see poetry either ceremonially or at best 
as entertainment but, at any rate, as not having aesthetic value. Yet, the 
aforementioned elements are just the surface of the complex issue at stake. In 
connection with all the elements and criticisms we have seen so far, we could 
reasonably infer that festivals, sacrifices and thus at least a good portion of the 
traditional celebrations are part of the city constitution (by law). Plato also refers to 
“our poets” (b). Now, this seems to manifestly imply that some poets are resident 
within the city. Otherwise, there is no way to explain the adjective in question.  
Eventually the most perplexing line comes: 
 
to compose appropriate hymns for the marriages that take place (c). 
 
To this extent, I believe that we can assume that Plato definitely acknowledges poetry 
as art. This is the reason why the rulers of the state ask (and not order) the poets to 
compose appropriate hymns. The adjective under examination now is the most 
intriguing element of the whole passage. For what concerns what Plato meant by the 
adjective ‘appropriate’, I argue that there is indeed room for two different readings. 
One could say that poets’ productions serve merely as a subordinate medium for 
purely recreational but external purpose. Or we could broaden the focus and 
emphasize that we can deduce in any case further, perhaps vital elements from the 
above extracts.  
Indeed, Plato, in the above line, clearly admits to the relevance of poetry, regardless 
of any moral treating or educational concern or purpose. Poets are within the city, 
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(and not just admitted to it as the adjective ‘our’ shows, because of what they do). 
Nothing is demanded to them to do, except to exercise their own art. The very fact 
that no further specification about the contents of poets’ composition rather than the 
purpose of the representations is a proof, I maintain that Plato does respect the poets 
as artists, their freedom of speech and the very art they exercise.  
A fortiori, the importance of this passage relies on the fact that it shows that the 
banishment is not actually a real banishment. What I mean by this is that if it were the 
case, how could we explain the fact that on the one hand Plato explicitly mentions the 
presence of resident poets within the city, but on the other hand he postulates 
restrictions and even a banishment of mimetic poetry? Moreover, it is worth to stress 
that Plato did say anything about what the poets should or should not say. It shows, I 
submit, that when poets exercise their own art with ho educational or political 
purpose, Plato poses no limitations whatsoever to their activity. For all these reasons, 
I believe that the passage from book V adds to the extracts from book II-III and X, at 
least two further elements for corroborating the claim that Plato did not want to 
banish the poets for the ideal state he envisages. First, he shows to take for granted the 
permanent presence to the poets within the city. Secondly Plato says nothing about 
how the poets should (or should not) exercise their own art.  





Plato on Poetry in the Late Dialogues. 
	  
8. 1. 0. The Laws.  
 
Plato’s concern with education stands in the Laws too. Since the very first book, he 
recalls such a central issue of the Republic. What is education then? Plato answers this 
question in the following way.  
 
But I take it that for the purpose of the present discussion we are not going to treat 
this sort of thing as 'education'; what we have in mind is education from childhood in 
virtue, a training which produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen who 
knows how to rule and be ruled as justice demands. (Law, 643e) 
The centrality of the concept of education relies then, above all, in relation to virtue 
first, and secondly with the condition of citizens. A fortiori, justice appears to be the 
pivotal entity in of the state. Since the first book of the Dialogue at stake, it is evident 
that the Laws represent the summa of Plato’s though in many regards. The long 
discussion around drunkenness that starts from 636d to the end of the first book for 
instance resembles the reading or the Symposium offered in the fourth chapter of the 
present study. A fortiori, the broader treatment of the (right) restrictions of the State 
immediately recalls the Republic overall project. But what is more interesting for the 
purpose of the present study is to emphasize that at the very beginning of the second 
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book Plato qualifies the festivals as educational events. Instead of being a break from 
the everyday life, they appear to be an integral part of the life of the State (653d, but 
also 6657d. In the third book, Plato reiterates the principle according to which the 
state shall regulate the forms of music (700b). In the following, long, extracts, we find 
the same worries Plato expressed in the Republic: 
Later, as time went on, composers arose who started to set a fashion of breaking the 
rules and offending good taste. They did have a natural artistic talent, but they were 
ignorant of the correct and legitimate standards laid down by the Muse. Gripped by a 
frenzied and excessive lust for pleasure, they jumbled together laments and hymns, 
mixed paeans and dithyrambs, and even imitated pipe tunes on the lyre. The 
result was a total confusion of styles. Unintentionally, in their idiotic way, they 
misrepresented their art, claiming that in music there are no standards of right and 
wrong at all, but that the most 'correct' criterion is the pleasure of a man who enjoyed 
the performance, whether he is a good man or not. On these principles they based 
their compositions, and they accompanied them with propaganda to the same effect. 
Consequently they gave the ordinary man not only a taste for breaking the laws of 
music but the arrogance to set himself up as a capable judge. (Laws, 700d-701a).  
It is interesting to notice that Plato, although putting forward an argument against new 
poets’ innovations, in the above extract first acknowledges that ‘they did have a 
talent’. Then he criticizes them, given the central role in educating treated at length 
since the first Book of the Laws. The overall impression, reading the Laws, is that 
Plato touches pivotal issues he faced in previous works, but in deeper way and 
explaining at length the reasons for doing so. Laws IV, 706a, is an example of that.  
 
I'm going on the assumption that a law is well enacted only if it constantly aims, like 
an archer, at that unique target which is the only object of legislation to be invariably 
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and uninterruptedly attended by some good result; the law must ignore everything 
else (wealth or anything like that), if it happens not to meet the requirements I have 
stipulated. (Laws IV, 706a).  
In the aforementioned extract The Athenian229 illustrates with a clear allegory the 
telos centrally involved in the process of postulating a certain law and how to purse it, 
regardless of any other concerns230.  
Plato turns on the topic regarding what the poets should (or should not) say at 719b. 
In this occasion however, the Athenian mentions the poets just in order to highlight 
that state of deep inspiration that characterizes the process of production of poetry: 
‘There is an old proverb, legislator, which we poets never tire of telling and which all 
laymen confirm, to the effect that when a poet takes his seat on the tripod of the 
Muse, he cannot control his thoughts. He's like a fountain where the water is allowed 
to gush forth unchecked. His art is the art of representation, and when he 
represents men with contrasting characters he is often obliged to contradict 
himself, and he doesn't know which of the opposing speeches contains the truth. But 
for the legislator, this is impossible: he must not let his law say two d different things 
on the same subject; his rule has to be "one topic, one doctrine.’ (Laws, 719c-d). 
Plato takes for granted the classical view according to which the poets is ‘carried 
away’, as he did in the Ion231. But a further element deserves closer attention in this 
extract, I maintain. It is the distinction between the role and object of the legislator on 
the one hand and the role and the goal of the poets. What emerges clearly from this 
passage is Plato’s acknowledgment of such a central topic for the purpose of the 
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discussion. Although we know such a difference was already at play in the 
Republic232, here in the Laws it is developed in a clearer way. Plato does not deny at 
all the value nor the legitimacy of what the poets does or say while she creates. Plato 
simply distinguishes between what the poets does and what the legislator should do, 
given their different aims and roles. Once again, there is no hint of any kind of 
(negative) evaluation of what the artists do.  
However, a deeper treatment of what the poets should or should not do is present in 
the well-know Seventh Letter. At the beginning of Book Seven, the Athenian utters:  
 
And the third law, I suppose, will be this: poets should appreciate that prayers are 
requests for something from the gods, so they must take great care that they never 
inadvertently request an evil under the impression that it is a benefit. What a 
ludicrous calamity it would be to offer that kind of prayer! (801b-c). 
According to the above passage, Plato’s attitude toward poets expressed in the 
Republic seems to become more severe. A few lines later, the Athenian utters: 
That a poet should compose nothing that conflicts with society's conventional notions 
of justice, goodness and beauty. No one should be allowed to show his work to any 
private person without first submitting it to the appointed assessors and to the 
Guardians of the Laws, and getting their approval. (801c-d) 
Nevertheless, it is worth to highlight that although Plato postulates restrictions even 
severer that in the Republic, his appreciations of poetry as art become more evident. 
Indeed, Plato clearly shows to acknowledge the artistic skills of the poets: 
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on the advice of poets and musicians. (Although we shall exploit the creative talents 
of these people, we shan't-with rare our trust in their tastes and inclinations). Instead, 
we shall interpret the wishes of the lawgiver and arrange to his liking our dancing and 
singing and chorus performances in general.) Music composed in an undisciplined 
style is always infinitely improved by the imposition of form, even if that makes it 
less immediately attractive. But music doesn't have to be disciplined to be pleasant. 
(802b). 
Plato first mentions the ‘creative talent’ proper of the poets. Such talent can produce 
artworks against the rules of the State. But what it is even more interesting to note is 
that Plato shows to be fully aware that ‘music does not have to be disciplined to be 
pleasant’. Plato seems to suggest that one thing is the set or rules of the state. Another, 
completely different (both in essence and in its aim), is the aesthetic value of poetry. 
If the former poetry, the one proper to the state has to follow certain rules for the 
State’s sake, while the poetry that the poets produces when inspired does not follow 
the rules of the state. A fortiori, such poetry does not have to follow these rules in 
order to be pleasant for the listeners.  
The Athenian’s hardest attacks however, is yet to come. In the long passage that I am 
going to quote below, the main character of the dialogues speaks as follows:  
Best foot forward, then. Now, what I say is this. We have a great many poets who 
compose in hexameters and trimeters and all the standard meters; some of these 
authors try to be serious, while others aim at a comic effect. Over and over again it's 
claimed that in order to educate young people properly we have to cram their heads 
full of this stuff; we have to organize recitations of it so that they never stop listening 
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to it and acquire a vast repertoire, getting whole poets off by heart. Another school of 
thought excerpts the outstanding work of all the poets and compiles a treasury of 
complete passages, claiming that if the wide knowledge of a fully informed person is 
to produce a sound and sensible citizen, these extracts must be committed to memory 
and learned by rote. I suppose you're now pressing me to be quite frank and show 
these people where they are right and where they've gone wrong? (810e-811a).  
In full accordance with what Plato has Socrates say in Book Ten of the Republic, in 
the passage above the Athenian objects the value of poems as educative tools. A 
fortiori, the memorization of the poems required by the tradition is an additional 
concern about the efficiency of an education based on the traditional poems (and in a 
traditional way, namely orally.). What I suggest to look at with closer attention 
however, is that although Plato’s attacks to poets become more severe, it emerges 
every page more clearly that what the Athenian is talking about is something quite far 
from what we call poetry. In fact, the Athenian refers to the education of the children 
on the one hand and the entertainment for the mass of the population on the other. We 
have also seen that the severe Athenian acknowledges poets’ creative talents and 
skills. But his positive evaluation does not regard the forms of poetry only: 
Well then, in a nutshell, what sort of estimate will do them  all justice? I imagine 
everybody would agree if I put it rather like this. Each of these authors has produced 
a lot of fine work, and a lot of rubbish too-but if that's so, I maintain that learning so 
much of it puts the young at risk. (811b-c) 
As a matter of fact, the text above refers positively to the content of poets work, not 
just to the way they express their own art. There is not though, I argue, a devaluation 
of poetry. Plato even writes that: 
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Now anyone who means to acquire a discerning judgment will find it impossible to 
understand the serious side of things in isolation from their ridiculous aspect, or 
indeed appreciate anything at all except in the light of its opposite. (816d).  
Even the poetic representations of the ridiculous genre are important and must be 
attended. In what follows, we find a fundamental difference with the features of 
Callipolis outlined in the Republic. The Athenian does envisage a proper occasion for 
the comedy:  
But if we intend to acquire virtue, even on a small scale, we can't be serious and 
comic too, and this is precisely why we must learn to recognize buffoonery, to avoid 
being trapped by our ignorance of it into doing or saying anything ridiculous when 
there's no call for it. Such mimicry must be left to slaves and hired aliens, and no one 
must ever take it at all seriously. No citizen or citizens must be found learning it, and 
the performances must always contain some new twist. With that law, and that 
explanation of it, humorous amusements usually known as 'comedy' may be 
dismissed. (816e-817a).  
It is true that the Athenian relegates the activity of comedy to strangers and slaves. 
But we have to bear in mind that the main character is still concerned with poetry in 
an educational perspective.  This is particularly evident in the lines that follow the 
previous passage: 
But what about our 'serious' poets, as they're called, the tragedians? Suppose some of 
them were to come forward and ask us some such question as this: 'Gentlemen, may 
we enter your state and country, or not? And may we bring our work with us? Or 
what's your policy on this point?' What would be the right reply for us to make to 
these inspired geniuses? This, I think: 'Most honored guests, we're tragedians 
ourselves, and our tragedy is the finest and best we can create. At any rate, our entire 
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state has been constructed so as to be a "representation" of the finest and noblest life-
the very thing we maintain is most genuinely a tragedy. So we are poets like 
yourselves, composing in the same genre, and your competitors as artists and actors 
in the finest drama, which true law alone has the nature powers to "produce" to 
perfection (of that we're quite confident). So don't run away with the idea that we 
shall ever blithely allow you to set up stage in the market-place and bring on your 
actors whose fine voices will carry further than ours. Don't think we'll let you declaim 
to women and children and the general public, and talk about the same practices as 
we do but treat them differently-indeed, more often than not, so as virtually to 
contradict us. We should be absolutely daft, and so would any state as a whole, to let 
you go ahead as we've described before the authorities had decided whether your 
work was fit to be recited and suitable for public performance or not. So, you sons of 
the charming Muses, first of all show your songs to the authorities for comparison 
with ours, and if your doctrines seem the same as or better than our own, we'll let you 
produce your plays; but if not, friends, that we can never do.' (817a-b-c).  
I maintain that the extract that I quoted at full length shows primarily a central 
element. It is not just a matter of a (legitimate) State regulations on education and 
entertainment. The fictional dialogues between the lawgiver and the foreign poets 
show, I believe, that it is a dialogue inter pares. Put in another way, the founders of 
the state have to decide whether the population is going to learn from any poets 
demanding for speaking inspired by the gods and therefore to say the truth. Or rather, 
the rulers of the state must put some restrictions for what concerns both the education 
of the children and the source of entertainment of the adults. It is not a case then that, 
as indicate at the beginning of this chapter, the Athenian qualifies the festival as an 
integral part of the public life of the community.  
However, I am aware that the reader could still resist the idea at the base of the 
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present study. Which is, it is useful to remember, that Plato actually released poetry as 
we know nowadays form the educational and political role that it did have in the 
Ancient Greek society. For this reason, in the next and final chapter, I will advance a 
comparison between Popper’s receipts to television and Plato’s arguments against 
epic poetry. Such a parallelism will clearly show that once we recognizes the status of 
poetry as predominant mass media system, it will become evident that even one of the 
greater accuser (Popper) of the author of the Republic substantially agrees with 
Plato’s worries and restrictions, in so far as they guarantee a full, balanced 
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9. 1. 0. Plato and aesthetic value. 
Textual evidence. 
 
In this section of the study I am going to sum up the main evidence that establishes 
that Plato does see aesthetic value in poetry. More precisely I am going to present in 
one paragraph the main textual proofs that I have analysed in detail in former sections 
of the study.  
First of all, I believe it is necessary to provide an account of aesthetic value, before 
claiming to find it in Plato’s texts. Such a task is a difficult one in contemporary 
aesthetics too. Given the peculiar features of ancient Greek poetry, which as we have 
seen is an unicum vehicle of transmission of very different values, in the case of 
Plato’s aesthetics it seems to be even more complicated to single out aesthetic value. 
However, I advance the claim that in the following extracts artefacts are valued for 
their intrinsic beauty, for their capacity to affect people, and beyond any practical 
purpose.  
Indeed, the main feature shared by the extracts I am going to present lies on the 
presence of a value of different sort, which is in contrast to purely practical ones. I 
name such a value, because of its link with beauty, its capacity to impress people and 
its value free from any practical purpose, Aesthetic value. 
 
9. 2. 0. Aesthetic value in the Ion. 
In the Ion, Plato faces different arts, as painting, sculpture, flute playing, cithara 
singing, and rhapsodizing. It is interesting to note that Plato considers them as 
subjects to master as whole. He dwells in particular on painting and sculpture. I argue 
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that in the following three passages, Socrates’ pupil plainly recognizes aesthetic value 
in both painting and sculpture. We can find such evidence, I argue, in the following 
extracts, from Socrates’ speech: 
 
Soc: Have you ever known anyone who is clever at showing what's well 
painted and what's not in the work of Polygnotus, but who's powerless to do 
that for other painters? Someone who dozes off when the work of other 
painters is displayed, and is lost, and has nothing to contribute but when he 
has to give judgment on Polygnotus or any other painter (so long as it's just 
one). (532e-533a).  
 
Soc: Well. Take sculpture. Have you ever known anyone who is clever at 
explaining which statues are well made in the case of Daedalus. (533a-b).  
 
Soc: And further, it is my opinion, you've never known anyone ever – not in 
flute-playing, not in cithara-playing, not in singing to the cithara, and not in 
rhapsodizing – you've never known a man who is clever at explaining 
Olympus or Thamyrus or Orpheus or Phemius, the rhapsode from Ithaca, 
but who has nothing to contribute about Ion, the rhapsode from Ephesus, 
and cannot tell when he does his work well and when he doesn't-you've 
never known a man like that. (533b-c) 
 
What all of the three extracts have in common, I maintain, is a plain reference to a 
peculiar value. Such a value is common to each art, and it is not related to any 
external purpose or function. In the first case, Plato talks about painted works. Some 
of them are well painted and some of them are not. By the same token, Plato qualifies 
Daedalus’ famous statues as well made. And even in the case of the rhapsodic art 
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Plato acknowledges plain dignity to some works. These passages are astonishingly 
left aside by commentators. Per contra, I would take these passages as evidence of 
the fact that Plato acknowledged that certain kind of (art)works, regardless of any 
possible function or purpose, have full dignity and can be appreciated, because of the 
common value they share. (As he clearly does for Daedalus’ statues in the Ion as well 
as in the Meno). It is indeed clear that neither the statues nor the paintings have any 
other reason to be valued but their selfless appreciation. What makes those artworks 
well done or not, according to Plato, is something of their own. Put in another way, 
they do not serve any other external goal or scope. To this extent, I value Plato’s 
mentioning of ‘give judgment’ (533e) as further evidence of acknowledgment of 
aesthetic value in his thought. What Plato points to in the first case mentioned, is an 
aesthetic evaluation of the paintings, as Socrates states. Although Plato discredits the 
rhapsode, Socrates’ pupil constantly values and appreciates Homer as ‘the best of the 
poets’.  
The difference with the rhapsode’s view is plain. In the former case the expert in 
poetry is the one who knows all its instances. In the latter the expert on poetry is the 
one with specific expertise on the issues treated in the poems, above all. 
Plato, evaluating an artwork, shows to be interested in an artistic, rather than aesthetic 
evaluation only, regardless of any external concern such as moral, for instance.  
That means that here Plato is not interested in anything else but the artwork in itself. 
A good painting (as well as a good sculpture) is so by virtue of certain intrinsic 
features. Intrinsic, I say, to its own kind of art. From such an approach we can find a 
peculiar, independent evaluation, which corresponds to an aesthetic judgment.  
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9. 3. 0. Apology.  
 
In the Apology, Plato has Socrates say: 
 
I soon realized that poets do not compose their poems with knowledge, but by 
some inborn talent and by inspiration, like seers and prophets who also say many 
fine things without any understanding of what they say. The poets seemed to me 
to have had a similar experience. At the same time I saw that, because of their 
poetry, they thought themselves very wise men in other respects, which they were 
not. (22c). 
 
I think we'd better go back to where we turned oft and look for guidance to the 
poets, the ancestral voices of human wisdom. (214a). 
 
Having treated at length the above extracts previously, I would only mention in 
this occasion that Plato, even when harshly criticizes the poets for their lack of 
knowledge of the things they talk about, he does recognises the beauty of their 
words. More precisely, Plato states that the poets say ‘many fine things’. 
Further, it is important to highlight to this extent that Plato’s appreciations of 
poetry do not regard the generic, perhaps formal positive evaluation of the first 
extract. Indeed, even in the Apology, as to say the dialogue where Plato attacks the 
pots very hardly, he does recognizes to them much more than just an formal 
beauty. Plato suggests to ‘look for guidance to the poets, the ancestral voices of 
human wisdom.’ 
 
9. 4. 0. Republic. 
In the Plato’s masterpiece we find not only the vexed banishment, but many aesthetic 
appreciation of poetry too, I maintain.  
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Those, I said, that Hesiod and Homer and the other poets have told us, for surely 
they have composed untrue stories, and have told, and do tell them, to men. But 
what kind do you mean, and what fault do you find in them? A fault, I said, that 
deserves immediate and emphatic condemnation, especially if the untruth have no 
beauty in it (377d). 
 
As stressed before in the study, Plato points in the above extract to a kind of 
beauty that appears to be independent from the truth value as well as the moral 
one. Plato reiterates such a concept in the following extract: 
 
When any man in describing the character of gods and heroes does it badly, like 
an artist whose drawing is absolutely unlike the things he wishes to draw.  
Well, firstly the poet, who told the greatest of falsehoods of the greatest of 
beings, told a falsehood with no beauty in it, when he said that Ouranos did what 
Hesiod said he did, and that Kronos took vengeance on him. And as for the deeds 
of Kronos, and what he suffered at his son’s hands, even if these stories are true, I 
should not think we could so lightly repeat them to the young and foolish. It were 
best to be silent about them, or if they had to be told, it should be done under the 
seal of silence to as few hearers as possible, and after the sacrifice not of the 
mystic pig but some great and almost unprocurable victim, so that very few 
would hear the story. (377d-378a).  
 
It is indeed crucial for the purpose of the argument to stress that Plato, before 
starting his analysis and criticism of the poems, makes clear that in this occasion 
he adopts the standpoint of a ‘founder of a city’. This is important because Plato 
does not approach poetry in this occasion from an aesthetic and artistic point of 
view.  Such an entity also denotes a sharp distinction in Plato’s mind between 
being and artist and being a statesman.  
 
I answered, Adeimantus, you and I at this juncture are not poets, but founders of a 
city. The founders ought to know the canons in accordance with which the poets 
should tell their stories, and which they are not to be allowed to transgress, but 
they need not themselves compose stories. (378e-379a) 
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We shall bid Homer and the other poets not be angry if we strike out these 
passages and all like them, not that they are not poetic (a), or that they are not 
enjoyed by most people (b), but that the more poetic they are, the less must they 
be heard by boys and men who are to be free (c), fearing slavery more than death. 
(387b). 
 
In the above extract, Plato clearly shows to acknowledge the poetic, artistic 
dimension of poetry as well as its power on affecting people. As the end of the 
extract indicates, the matter for Plato relies on the huge influence of mimetic 
poetry on the audience. The final extract from the Republic reiterates this concept, 
and further highlight the pleasure that poetry gives to the listeners. 
 
Listen and consider. Take the best of us listening to Homer or any other of the 
tragic poets, when he is imitating a hero in grief and spinning out a long 
melancholy lamentation or imitating men singing and disfiguring themselves in 
grief: you know that he gives us pleasure, and we give ourselves up to following 
him; we sympathize and are seriously impressed, and prise as a good poet 






























Tenth Chapter.  
 
Plato and Popper: sorting out a misunderstanding. 
	  




In this section of the study, I will be concerned with two main tasks. On the one hand, 
I contend that Popper’s notorious reading of Plato’s political system is fallacious. On 
the other hand, I attempt to prove that Popper’s stance on television is actually 
remarkably close to Plato’s position on poetry. In order to accomplish the first task, I 
will conduct a detailed examination of Popper’s arguments in his well-known The 
Open Society and Its Enemies.233 The second goal on the other hand, will be reached 
by the means of an accurate reading of one of Popper’s very last works, The Power of 
Television.234 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Popper, K., 1945, The Open Society and Its Enemies. Volume One: The Spell of Plato. 
London: Routledge. 
234 Popper, K., 1994, The Power of Television, London: Routledge. Original title: Cattiva 
Maestra Televisione, Karl Popper and John Condry, (1994) Una Patente per tv, Ed. Giancarlo 
Basetti, Milan: Reset, pp. 13-25.  
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First of all, I will analyze Popper’s objections to Plato’s educational system. This will 
reveal Popper’s substantial incomprehension of two vital factors in Plato’s attitude 
toward poetry: the peculiar cultural context of ancient Greece on the one hand and 
Plato’s teleologism on the other. Since such entities have been largely analyzed in the 
first chapter of the study, I will not dwell on them in this section. Once Plato’s 
concerns are revealed to be directed toward the prominent mass medium of that time 
(poetry), we will be ready to move to the second step of the study. It will consist of an 
original comparison between Plato’s arguments on poetry and Popper’s criticisms on 
television. Such a prima facie, astonishing parallelism leads to a remarkable result. 
Indeed, I aim to show the substantial equivalence of Plato and Popper on the huge 
impact, danger and function of the mass media system within their society.  
To sum up, in this final chapter I provide a refutation of one of Plato’s most famous 
and harsh critics. Secondly, I reveal that Plato’s and Popper’s stance on mass media 
essentially correspond. It is my understanding that such a fundamental passage will 
give the ultimate proof of the rightness of my revolutionary reading of the vexata 
quaestio of the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry in Plato. This is the 
reason why the overall outcome of this section is of vital interest for the purpose of 
the whole study.  
 
10. 1. 0. Is Plato’s Callipolis an ‘Open-System Society’? 
 
This section contains a comparison of two paradigmatic statements made by the two 
philosophers at the core of the present chapter. It is indeed crucial for the purpose of 
this section to highlight that since the very beginning Popper’s treatment of the first 
volume devoted to Plato resembles Plato’s opening of Book X of the Republic in a 
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remarkably way. Here is what Popper exclaims at the opening of The Open Society 
and Its Enemies: 
If in this book harsh words are spoken about some of the greatest among the 
intellectuals leaders of mankind, my motive is not, I hope, the wish to belittle 
them. It springs rather from my conviction that, if our civilization has to survive, 
we must break with the habit of deference to great men. Great men may make 
great mistakes; and as the book tries to show, some of the greatest leaders of the 
past supported the perennial attack on freedom and reason.235 
 
And here is what Plato declares in the very first lines of Republic X:  
I'll tell you, even though the love and respect I've had for Homer since I was a 
child make me hesitate to speak, for he seems to have been the first teacher and 
lender of all these fine tragedians. All the same, no one is to be honored or valued 
more than the truth. So, as I say, it must be told (Plat. Rep. 595c). 
If Popper’s statement regards ‘the great men’ of the past generically, Plato is even 
more precise in naming the masters of his time: Homer and the other tragedians. Yet, 
what equates the two scholars is the common task they want to pursue. Namely, both 
of them seek for the truth above anything else, greatest authority included. To this 
extent, it is interesting to note that Popper himself admits that “Plato believed that the 
law of historical destiny, the law of decay, can be broken by the moral will of man, 
supported by the power of human reason.”236 Now, it is hard to see how such (liberal) 
attitude could possibly overlap with the totalitarian one Popper attributes to Plato.  
Indeed, what Popper fails to see in the political system outlined in Plato’s Republic, is 
that the teleologism is a guide for defining the overall structure and particular roles 
within the society itself.237 Instead of taking into account such a fundamental principle 
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for defining Plato’s stance on poetry (but not only on poetry, I would say), Popper 
points to a mixture of historicism and social engineering in Plato’s philosophy. It is 
inconsistent to say that one of the main peculiarities of Callipolis is that it “does not 
change”238, but to say, a few lines later, that “Plato’s belief that it is possible for us to 
break the iron law of destiny and to avoid decay by arresting all changes, show that 
his historicist tendencies has definite limitations”239. When Popper says that Callipolis 
‘does not change’, he seems to refer to the restricted social mobility within Callipolis. 
But Callipolis does change. Social mobility within Callipolis is a clear 
counterexample to Popper’s claim about the supposed fixity of Plato’s ideal 
community. It is true that the Proper Work Argument240 decreases the social mobility 
within the society. But although such a principle is a limitation, it is also worth 
remembering that the social mobility within Callipolis is aimed to prevent the city-
state itself, rather than a particular class of origin or simply the dominant one. Such a 
goal is accomplished by a rigid, meritocratic system of selection of the citizens and 
related class.  
The ‘Noble Lie’ is a clear example of Plato’s priorities and goals. The concept arises 
from Plato saying we have to lie to the guardians. He tells that there are three types of 
people, gold, silver and bronze. He acknowledges it a lie but considers it necessary for 
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the Guardians to live the life of deprivation they do. These concepts underlying the 
Noble Lie show at least two major factors. First of all, Plato is willing to break even 
moral rules to make the Republic strong in its internal structure. Secondly, social 
mobility is guaranteed by the state regulations, because of its utility for the state’s 
maintenance.  
Now, to guarantee the life and health of a city-state must be one of its first, fully 
legitimate purposes for the state itself. Secondly, a restricted social mobility, in so far 
as it is governed according to a clear and meritocratic regulation is more than 
legitimate, it is useful for the states itself as well as for the citizens. This is true for 
modern and contemporaries states too, especially democracies. In this regard, R. 
Robinson comments:  
Dr. Popper is mistaken in believing (pp. 139, 497) that Republic 547a (the 
“mystic number”) takes back the earlier position that, if a gold or silver 
child is born to bronze parents, he is to be transferred to the governing 
class. This passage forbids the mixing of the metals. Since the child was a 
different metal from his parents, a mixing of the metals would occur if the 
child remained with them. The prohibition of the mixing of metals, 
together with the doctrine that silver children are occasionally born of 
bronze parents, does not prohibit but on the contrary commands the 
promotion of such a child. Similarly, Dr. Popper is mistaken in thinking 
that Republic 434 b-d forbids a man to do work for which his metal is 
unsuited.241 
By the same token, Popper objects to the educational system of the ideal community 
of the Republic: “Plato’s educational aim is exactly the same. It is purely political aim 
of stabilizing the state by blending a fierce and a gentle element in the character of the 
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rulers.”242 Unfortunately, Popper completely ignores Plato’s teleologism in education, 
especially in the second and third book of the Republic. Since previous chapters have 
thoroughly addressed the concept of teleologism, the following will be an analysis of 
Popper’s work, alone. I endorse G. P. Grant’s point on this:  
[…] I would holds that Popper’s misinterpretation arises from taking what 
is secondary in Plato and making it primary. Popper thinks that Plato’s 
chief interest is in political means. I would say his chief interest is in 
question of ends, and his chief point about is that man’s end cannot be 
found in political life.243  
Teleologism and the question of ends beside, there is another central issue involved in 
what I, among others, consider as Popper’s misunderstanding of Plato.  This issue 
concerns fifth-century Athens’ peculiar cultural scenario and it is strictly related with 
poetry by virtue of its status of main vehicle of addressing education, politics and 
ethics, among other values. Grant recalls:  
The central factor in Plato’s historical situation (indeed the one Popper 
misses entirely) was, however, that Greeks polytheism had lost all claims 
to intellectual respectability, largely because of fifth-century science and 
philosophy. This polytheism had in general provided the principles of 
private and public action for the Greeks. But the science which had 
destroyed these mythological grounds for actions was unable to replace 
them.244 
Although Grant has a point in saying that in Socrates’ age the cultural was in flux, I 
do not think that philosophy was in such a strong position to undermine the authority 
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of the classic epic heritage or, at least, that that was true for the majority of the 
Athenian population. However, I endorse his emphasis on the preeminent role of 
Greek polytheism as a central authority (and such a major authority, it is worth 
remembering, was promoted by the means of teaching and recitation of poetry both in 
private and in public).  
At any rate, what is more interesting is that what was not true in the reality of Plato’s 
time was true in the mind of the father of Callipolis. What I mean by this is that 
Plato’s education program was aimed to guarantee the full development of a person, 
regardless of the traditional, moral authorities such as Greek polytheism. Of course, 
we have to bear in mind, as Grant reckons: “In so far as Plato was a fifth-century 
Athenian, we cannot expect him to have entirely transcended the limitations of that 
position, anymore than expect Jesus Christ not have been a Palestine peasant.”245 
What I want to stress is that, within the boundaries of the time and culture Plato was 
living in, Callipolis’ educational reforms actually provide a better intellectual growth 
of the individual, in comparison with traditional schooling of fifth century BC Athens. 
Grant ends his analysis of Plato and his Callipolis emphasizing that: “He saw that 
without such knowledge existence must be anguish and impotence. All this is surely 
true today. Only after finding such knowledge do men have the light to go out and, 
piecemeal, change the world.”246 
Proceeding with the reading of the Open Society and Its Enemies, we see that the 
author connects Plato’s severe restriction on education with Sparta’s political 
principles of literacy education.247 But Popper gives neither textual nor historical 
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evidence for the above speculation. A few lines later, his harsh critique clearly shows 
its anachronistic limit. Basing his criticism on an incompatible comparison between 
µουσική in the Athens of Socrates and music of his own time: “Plato even forgets that 
it is the function of music to make the young more gentle, for he demands such form 
of music as will make them braver, i.e. fiercer.”248 
Both historians and classicists have showed the deep gulf between our conception of 
music and Hellenistic µουσική. The comparison I drew in the first chapter between 
beauty for Plato and for his contemporaries resembles to some degree the above 
anachronistic parallelism. That is to say, the same word points to very different, and 
broader, matter. Greek µουσική covers a much wider range of heterogeneous entities 
when compared to modern music. Moreover, Greek µουσική is undoubtedly much 
closer to the overall concept of ‘education’ rather than an (fine) art as music. Indeed, 
the term µουσική παιδεία (mousikē paideia) indicates recitation, playing instruments, 
singing poetry and dance. Yet, that is just a part of the overall µουσική παιδεία. 
It seems to me that Popper here is referring to a modern conception of music, which 
Popper is inappropriately combining with the ancient mousike. And even if he is not 
referring to 410c ff. (see especially 411a), where Socrates says that mousike and 
gymnastike are both directed to the soul, the one promoting gentleness and the other 
toughness, I argue that Popper’s criticism to Plato’s μουσική	   παιδεία,	   does not 
acknowledge the complex (and deep different) historical status of education of Plato’s 
age.  
Such a fundamental misunderstanding of µουσική leads Popper to believe that: “The 
description of a modern writer, who characterizes contemporary totalitarian education 
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as ‘an intensified and continual form of mobilization’, fits Plato’s whole system of 
education very well indeed.”  
R. Robinson emphasizes Popper’s anachronism, not only about µουσική but in 
general, and after a very accurate examination of Popper’s sources and translations, 
remarks: “The general startling effect, therefore, of Dr. Popper’s translations is not 
due to his inaccurance but to his having adopted a fresh and independent approach to 
Plato.”249 
To this extent, such a flaw affects Popper’s view on the educational system of the 
ideal community outlined in the Republic. The very distinct historical and cultural 
context is actually the real ground upon which the debate between the Plato and 
Popper takes place. Indeed, even when Popper sometimes attributes to Plato plainly 
mistaken views, that is mainly due to his lack of historical acknowledgements. That is 
particularly true in the case of poetry, the major mass media system of Socrates’ age. 
It is also the reason why, once Popper’s criticism has been put in a correct cultural 
perspective, they lose their relevance. That is due to the fact that, in a nutshell, what 
Plato meant by poetry rather than music is something radically different to what 
Popper refers to, by the same term. Conversely, as shown in the last section of this 
chapter analyzing Popper’s concerns on television, when the aforementioned 
criticisms are applied to the main mass media of Plato’s time, they substantially 
overlap.  
Since the following issue has been broadly debated among scholars, it is also 
interesting to note the reasons why Popper defines Callipolis as a totalitarian state: 
“There must be a censorship of all intellectual activities of the ruling class, and a 
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continual propaganda aiming at molding and unifying their minds. All innovation in 
education, legislation, and religion must be prevented or suppressed.”250 
It takes, in effect, a giant associative leap to assert that Callipolis’ set of rules and 
restrictions imply the terrifying scenario sketched above.  
On the same line of reasoning, Robinson affirms:  
I still do not know what he (or anybody else) means by “totalitarian”. The 
best guess I can make is that he means the whole political character of 
Hitler’s Germany; but, if so, I see no sense in the statement that Plato’s 
political program “can be fairly described as totalitarian” (p. 87).251 
Although Popper’s objections to Plato’s educational system are different from 
Popper’s arguments against Plato’s political system, they share an important feature. 
Namely, both of the attacks show how Popper ignores the historical and 
terminological frame from and within which Plato envisages his ideal community. I 
grant that, for Popper, Plato’s stance on education and state’s structure prima facie 
could seem authoritarian. Though, in order to determine whether Plato regressed or 
progressed, with regard to education and politics in comparison with his own time, we 
cannot dismiss what education was like, because that is the only point of comparison 
we have for answering that question. This is also the reason why the historical and 
cultural context inevitably plays a vital role in relation to Plato’s writings on poetry. 
On the one hand, because of education was based on the systematic teaching of epic 
poems. And on the other hand, because in the IV Century BC, people did not actually 
read poetry, but attended numerous and heterogeneous performances of it at festivals, 
religious ceremonies and several public occasions. If we miss the absolute relevance 
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of the historical and cultural context, then we miss any point of reference, and 
consequently we no longer have a defined ground upon which to answer the 
objections that the enigmatic features of Callipolis give rise to. Ignoring that, leads 
the reader to hypothesize complete opposite views. M. Lane emphasizes this incorrect 
reading, saying that if “Popper taught in mid-century that the Republic is openly and 
avowedly a totalitarian text, a dangerous text which has been sanitized as Utopian 
ideal by generation of exegetes.”252 Conversely, we find an opposite reading like the 
following: “Leo Strauss taught some years later that the Republic is secretively and 
ironically an anti-totalitarian text, a text which warns against the danger of being 
sanitized by exegetes as a Utopian Ideal.”253 
Concerning Strauss’ reading of the Republic, I am sympathetic with Lane’s view:  
Strauss instead concentrates on the willingness of philosophers born 
without power to rule, and his claim, spelled out in The City and Man, is 
that the rule of the philosophers is stymied by a vicious circle. “The 
philosophers cannot be persuaded, they can only be compelled to rule the 
cities”254  
Given the lack of a correct contextualization, it is clear that both Popper’s and 
Strauss’ interpretations of the Republic misinterpret Plato’s writing. Regarding the 
latter, I cannot see the reasons for why Plato would have presented a theory in such a 
paradoxical form. I do not see either the alleged circle pointed out by Strauss. On the 
contrary, the rigid corsus honorum, for all intents and purposes, a qualification for 
ruling, is designed in order to select the best citizens and to guarantee them the best 
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education. Such a higher education, it is worthwhile to remember, is a long-running 
scheme with no trace of indoctrination whatsoever. On the contrary, the strong logical 
and theoretical training the rulers have to pass implies a liberal and autonomous way 
of thinking. Robinson is even clearer about this point: “Plato says that the rulers must 
learn philosophy because ruling can be a science and philosophy is the way to 
science. Dr. Popper should have examined this rational and explicit argument instead 
of making an untestable imputation.”255 
We might agree or disagree with Plato’s political ideal but it should not be over a 
matter of utopia or, worse, propaganda. Rather, Plato faces the question of the 
necessary education of the rulers. Still at the centre of the contemporary political 
debate is the question: should our politicians (the rulers) be simply chosen by the 
population or should their education and skills be a necessary and sufficient condition 
for letting them govern? Such an issue has become even more important in the recent 
debate about the legitimacy of technocrat governments. According to Robinson’s 
view (which I advocate):  
Plato's best and most serious argument for his political proposals, namely 
that government is a science and science should be left to experts. Plato 
urges, and Plato sincerely believed, that it is as absurd to govern by 
popular vote as it would be to conduct medicine or navigation by popular 
vote. That is the point of the simile of the Ship in Republic 488. The error 
of democracy, according to Plato, is that it denies the possibility of science 
in government.256 
A strictly connected issue with (the right) governance is of course Justice. The 
next section in fact, emphasises how different was Justice for the average Greek in 
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comparison with our own conception, and How different justice was for Plato, in 
comparison with his own contemporaries.  
 
 
10. 1. 1. The case of Justice. 
A central issue regards Justice. It is strictly related to Republic’s alleged 
authoritarianism and in fact Popper charges Plato with moralism saying that: “The 
Republic is probably the most elaborate monograph on justice ever written.”257 
According to The Open Society and Its Enemies, “Behind Plato’s definition of Justice 
stands, fundamentally, his demand for a totalitarian class rule, and his decision to 
bring it about.”258  
First of all, I would not be so sure that Plato had a defined concept of Justice. That is a 
hotly debated topic among commentators.  However, I see neither a definition nor a 
concept of Justice ascribed to Plato. Rather, I consider the Republic as aporetic 
seeking for a definition of Justice. Second of all, the structure of Callipolis itself, as 
emphasized in previous sections of this chapter, clearly indicates that there is no hint 
of privilege or conservation for the ruling class. The fact that only the best citizens 
and not their pupils or sons will be the future rulers is a clear evidence for that.259 
Eventually, I will add a more salient point in relation to Popper’s view on Justice in 
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the Republic. On the one hand, that point will reveal a further historical flow in 
Popper’s reading. On the other hand, it will shed light on the non-totalitarian attitude 
of Plato’s stance. Popper affirms: “As a matter of fact, the Greek way of using the 
word ‘Justice’ was indeed surprisingly similar to our own individualistic and 
equalitarian usage.”260 But the matter regarding the Greek idea of Justice is a complex 
one. Traditionally, the mainstream interpretation identifies Trasymachus as the 
character illustrating the traditional Athenian common view on the matter. 
But beside that, I would strongly contrast Popper’s claim according to which Greek 
Justice, the anthropomorphic deity Δίκη (Dike), was to any degree similar to our own 
idea of Justice. The following long passage by Guthrie explains the gulf between the 
Greek δίκη and the way we think of justice:  
In Homer the will of a great man is his law. He does not so much things 
because they are right. Rather, since he is in a irresponsible autocrat, they 
are right because he does the. This can be illustrated very simple by the 
change in meaning undergone by the commonest of Greek words, dike. We 
translate it “justice”, and something akin to that meaning it acquires very 
early. But whether or not its etymology connects it, as is probable, with the 
meaning “direction” or “way”, the earliest sense of which we have record 
is that of “customary behavior” of any particular class. […] This first 
example shows how far removed it was in the mind of the writer from any 
sense of “justice”. […] Justice, then, for the Greeks consisted first of all in 
doing what custom alone had established as being suitable for a particular 
station in life, whether that of serf (demos), king or even god. The gods, 
however, being the highest class, are also the most free. […] The kings 
dictate to his people, and gods to men. Hence dike for us is what the gods 
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will. It is right because they will, and not vice versa.’261 
Guthrie emphasizes at least two vitals factors. First of all, he explains how radically 
different the concept and usage of δίκη is from our own justice. And secondly, he 
sheds light on the nature of δίκη, which is strictly related with the classist structure of 
the Hellenistic society. Moreover, the fact that what was ordinary or customary often 
overlapped tout court with δίκη is a further indication of the challenge undertaken by 
Plato, in this regard too. Indeed, even if we do not agree with Plato, for the reasons 
outlined above, I believe we are now in a position to grant to the father of Callipolis a 
genuine seeking for justice. Plato is not satisfied with the traditional conception of 
justice based on a hierarchic, uncritical customary usage, so he advances a theoretical 
search for a philosophical account of such a pivotal entity for the structure of the 
hypothetical state (and its underlying philosophy) that he envisages.  
 
10. 1. 2. Plato’s ‘Open System’ versus ‘Bad Mistress Poetry’.  
 
A brief introduction is required in order to fully understand the reason why the next, 
apparently discordant text, (in relation to the ones so far treated in this study) is now 
at stake. Indeed, in what follows, I am going to analyse a concise but fundamental 
script where Popper’s arguments against television essentially overlap with Plato’s 
stance on poetry. As we will see, even Popper himself talks about “censorship” of 
who speaks on television.   
According to G. Bosetti, the recipient of the telephone transcript upon which Popper’s 
The Power of Television262 is based, the text focuses on “the subject of television and 
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the harm it causes to children through violence of which it is full.”263 It is also worth 
recalling for the purpose of this section that the text at stake, which is one of Popper’s 
very last ones, was of vital interest for the author himself. The author felt both the 
importance and the urgency of such a text. According to Bosetti, “Popper said to me 
explicitly that we must to postpone things any longer because he felt that he did not 
have much time left.”264 
It is also worth recalling two additional, central factors. The subject at the centre of 
this essay, namely, television and its dangerous effect, is not an interview but rather a 
“slow and precise dictation”.265 As a matter of fact, the author tackled the issue in 
other occasions,266 but the one at stake here can be regarded as Popper’s summa on 
the matter. “He wanted to hit the target at all costs”267 because  
He feared above all the abbreviated, cut, truncated representations that 
television had made of it – German television in particular: “They can cut 
and censor me”, he protested, “and they are scandalized if I speak of 
“censorship” television.”268  
 
As a matter of fact, Popper himself used the word ‘censorship’ in order to express his 
attitude toward television. Television had become the dominant mass media during 
Popper’s life and, especially at the time he focused on it and its possible dangerous 
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effects, numerous doubts had been raised about the power of television and its 
possible limitations.  
Popper’s The Power of Television starts by discussing J. Condry’s Thief of Time, 
Unfaithful Servant: Television and the American Child.269 Condry’s analysis is based 
upon two key elements: “the immense power of television and the great amount of 
time spent by children watching television.”270 The conjunct topic of education and 
television is thus the ground upon which both the aforementioned authors build their 
own criticism. Indeed, one of Condry’s main claims is that “television cannot teach 
children what they need to know as they grow into adolescence and adulthood.”271 
It is remarkable to note that Condry’s starting point corresponds to Plato’s opening of 
treatment of guardians’ education in the second book of the Republic -- after a brief 
overview on the decadent status of American children he wonders whether television 
is responsible for that and to what degree: 
It is important to begin with a broad overview of children’ needs. How do 
children become useful member of the society? How is their immaturity 
used to prepare them for adulthood? How do they spend their time? Time 
is a useful measure because unlike wealth and opportunity, it is the same 
commodity for all.272 
Put briefly, Condry calculates an average period of 40 hours per week of exposure to 
television by American children. Condry emphasizes a further key element regarding 
the different approach to television by adults and children. While adults watch 
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television because for an entertainment purpose, “most children, while they find 
television entertaining, watch it because they seek to understand the world.”273 
Indeed, it is not just a matter of panem et circenses, as Juvenal put it.  
Condry’s statement about television’s purpose is a fundamental hallmark, which is a 
vital feature of his criticism. The purpose of media was a concern for Plato too, as we 
saw in the analysis of his criticism in the Republic. More precisely, the matter relies 
on the fact that today, as in ancient times, children “have greater difficulty in 
separating fact from fictions”,274 unlike adults, who are normally aware of the 
fictional frame of what they read, listen or watch. This factor was at stake, perhaps 
even on a larger scale, in the case of ancient Greek poetry, because of the absence of 
proper textbooks for schooling as well as a formalized structure of education. As a 
matter of historical fact, the same epic poems that the average Athenians used for 
schooling, happened to be the very same the material to recite in private occasions. 
And further, the very same epic material worked as content for theatrical events, 
religious ceremonies and festivals in general too.  
In order to establish the magnitude of the effects of television on American children 
Condry uses the categories of exposure and content. Both categories are fully at play 
in the case of Greek poetry, as we will see soon. 
Condry’s central point is that television does not inform children about the world. It is 
not designed for such a purpose and when it inevitably does inform children about the 
world, it is inadequate. Television, in Condry’s view, is designed to sell things as 
opposed to inform children. Besides the fact that, in the case of ancient Greek poetry, 
advertising was not the goal, the point of the analogy relies on the consideration that 
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the object of Plato’s criticism of poetry is remarkably similar to Condry’s analysis of 
television.  
A fortiori, two fundamental factors invigorate the resemblance. First, the exposure in 
Plato’s Athens was, as we have already seen, never-ending or, at any rate, it was a 
much more pervasive exposure in line with the average exposure to television pointed 
out by Condry. Secondly, given the lack of any kind of proper textbooks, the same 
contents of such an overexposure overlapped with typical tales used in education. A 
further element is at stake in the comparison between Plato and Condry. Indeed, 
Condry emphasises an addition major feature for television. This feature is that 
“television drama has no reason to be concerned with reality, if distorting reality gains 
attention, distortion will occur. Winning audience attention is the primary concern of 
television; even that part said to be “educational”.”275 
A tale must be interesting to tell or better said: a story must be interesting in order to 
catch audience’s attention. The eponymous rhapsode in the Ion explicitly admits that 
a key part of its job is to get people listening to him with engagement (Plat. Ion 535c-
e). We also know that, historically, audiences were much more emotionally involved 
in the myths, especially when represented in theatrical stages.276 Otherwise, the 
rhapsode was not successful, and the tragic or comedy author had no chance to win 
any contest. We do know that the contests corresponded in a major way in the 
evaluation of epic authors. It was not simply a matter of winning a contest. The 
authors who won the festival contests in particular obtained great honours and an 
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extraordinary fame. In a competitive society like Socrates’ Athens, that was the main 
goal of any poetic writer277.  
Reality and its depiction was one of the very first worries of Plato’s criticism in 
Republic, Book II. Plato wondered whether the bloodiest acts told by the epic poets 
really happened or not. Besides the truth or falsehood of such narrative works, Plato’s 
second concern in this regard relied on whether it was appropriate to tell to the 
children such stories. The telling of stories was an educational worry for Plato as it is 
for Coundry. The latter clarifies the strong link between television and education in 
relation to children: 
‘All of these examples suggest that television cannot be a useful source of 
information for children. Indeed, it may be a dangerous source of 
information. It offers ideas that are false, unreal; it has no coherent value 
system, other than consumerism; it provides little useful information about 
the self. All of this makes television a terrible instrument for socialization. 
Since it was never meant to be a tool for the socialization of the young, 
children who use it in this manner face the possibility of growing up 
absurd.’278 
Plato’s concern, was even more justified because the main characters of the 
aforementioned bloody tales happened to be the main divinities, as to say the most 
important authorities in the moral domain. As Plato emphasized in his criticism, at the 
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liturgist-impresarios) and within the plays (between the leading characters or themes or 
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sea.’277 Cartledge, P. ‘Deep Plays’ Theatre as process in Greek Civic Life. In Easterling, P. E., 
The Cambridge Companion to Greek Tragedy, 1997, Cambridge, Uk, p 14.  
278 Ibid., p. 270.  
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top of the value structure sat the cruellest agents. Condry endorses the same kind of 
worry. It is not a case then that his conclusion focuses on the values, as well as the 
information given to children by the privileged source of learning:  
All of these examples suggest that television cannot be a useful source of 
information for children. Indeed, it may be a dangerous source of 
information. It offers ideas that are false, unreal; it has no coherent value 
system, other than consumerism; it provides little useful information about 
the self. All of this makes television a terrible instrument for socialization. 
Since it was never meant to be a tool for the socialization of the young, 
children who use it in this manner face the possibility of growing up 
absurd.279 
We can share Condry’s evaluation on television and its use as an educative tool. Yet, I 
argue that we can extend his criticism to ancient Greek poetry in this regard too. It is 
possible to base upon the common ground provided by their both being the primary 
mass media of their times. More specifically, the key features outlined above 
highlight how not just the role within the society (mass media), but also the essential 
features of both television and epic poetry substantially overlap. Moreover, the 
comparison corroborates Plato’s concern for additional reason, as Condry points out: 
“Who teaches values? The schools? The churches? The family? Television certainly 
does. But are the values of television the only ones we would have our children 
adopt?’280  
If for Condry that was a rhetorical question, for Plato this was simply the factual 
reality of his time. Therefore, he had to radically change the situation in order to 
improve children’s education. As we will see soon, in more detail, Plato’s renovations 
are surprisingly similar to Popper’s proposals for television.  
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Popper substantially advocates Condry’s detailed examination of television over-
exposition and its effects. But, if the latter is more focused on the analysis of the 
issue, then the former puts forward some original suggestions in order to radically 
change (and improve) the status of television. 
Popper starts his own criticism in a similar way to the way Plato ends his last 
criticism of poetry at the closure of Book X of the Republic. Indeed, Popper writes:  
I would say that television is of course a terrible force for the bad (a), but 
that it could be potentially a force for the good (b). It could be, but it is 
very unlikely to become so. […] It can only be done by giving them an 
arresting environment, and a good environment; and by giving them good 
examples (b1).281 
In the last book of the Republic, Plato, after having criticized poetry and banished it, 
nevertheless leaves the door open to a possible return of “beneficial” poetry into the 
city. It is curious to observe that the resemblance between the two passages at issue 
regards first the harsh criticism (a) and secondly the possible rehabilitation (b) of the 
primary mass media under investigation. Indeed, Plato writes:  
Nonetheless, if the poetry that aims at pleasure and imitation has any 
argument to bring forward that proves it ought to have a place in a well-
governed city, weat least would be glad to admit it (b), for we are well 
aware of the charm it exercises. But, be that as it may, to betray what one 
believes to be the truth is impious (607b-c-d).  
It is also significant to highlight that Popper points to the importance of good models 
to be presented in television. That is exactly one of the main points of the new canons 
for poetry that Plato indicates in Book III of the Republic. 
Popper articulates the features of the censorship he envisages:  
Many people think that nothing can be done, first of all because censorship 
is not acceptable, especially not in a democracy. Second, censorship would 
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not be effective: it would come too late. In television is impossible to have 
everything censored in advance. One could perhaps give the responsible 
producer a bad mark if he uses too much violence, but one cannot really 
have censorship in advance.282  
It is now important to face the specific features upon which Popper builds on his own 
censorship in order to provide a better educative source for children by the means of 
an accurate curtailment.	   
Popper first suggests an inner control. Such a corporative self-check ought to be 
complementary to the general law and should be done by the same professionals 
involved making television programs. In addition, Popper even forecasts a licence for 
anyone who is generically connected283 with television. Such a license presents the 
following restrictions:  
• “This license can be withdrawn for life, if he acts against certain principles;”284 
• “The license can be withdrawn from him by a kind of court;”285 
• “He is constantly under supervision, and he constantly has to fear that if he does 
something bad he may lose his license;”286 
• A training course is compulsory in order to get the licence;287 
• An examination must be passed in order to get the licence.288 
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284 Ibid, p. 421. 
285 Ibid.  
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Popper’s final remarks explain the reason behind the strong censorship that he 
proposes. His final remarks illustrate the perspective from which he analyses it, which 
is also the perspective of the recipient of television, the audience’s perspective, 
regardless of age. Referring to who does television, he writes:  
That is what he is doing – whether he likes or not – if he is involved in 
television. He works as an educator because television is presented very 
largely both to children and young people but also to adults. So he is 
involved in adult education: that, too, he has to learn. 
If Popper’s main point, emerging in the above passage, emphasizes the vital point that 
whatever an individual does when working in television unavoidably does education. 
However, at the very end of the quotation, he also singles out a further element 
involved in the audience’s perception of television, which is, once again, a factor 
pointed out by Plato in the tenth book of the Republic.  
Popper’s statement on perception is as follows:  
(Y)et they do not know that their work has a subconscious influence on 
both children and adults. Of course it depends very largely on the 
intelligence level of children and adults. They will also learn that all these 
things they see on television are unreal. But that is not completely true: 
many things they see on television are real. They see on television not only 
fiction but also reality, and the mixture of reality and fiction which they 
see on television is most confusing to children and also confusing to the 
less intelligent adults.289 
Thus, the dangerous mix of reality and fiction is strictly connected with education in 
Popper’s view – the reason relies on the following consideration. Television provides 
the most heterogeneous material, from true representations of reality to the most 
absurd fantasy. What is most relevant in connection with education from this 
realisation is in regard to fiction. Usually the more fiction resembles reality, the more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 Ibid, p. 423.  
	   265	  
it is appreciated. Unless the audience has acquired theoretical skills for distinguishing 
what is true and what is false, the dangerous mix of reality and fiction could become 
an explosive mixture since the ability to distinguish between the two derives from 
previous knowledge.  
Popper provides examples of how the mixture of undisclosed factual and fictional 
stories are dangerous. Notwithstanding the author’s previous experience with difficult 
children, he highlights that almost always such children came from violent families. 
Popper remarks: “My point is that television now produces violence where perhaps 
there would otherwise be no violence.”290 Popper argues then that exposing children 
to a conspicuous amount of violent fiction stories (that present themselves as real) has 
the same deleterious effects on children of violent families. If not the goal (selling), 
Plato’s criticism of poetry is remarkably similar to Condry’s analysis of television. 
Now of course, the issue of censorship remains a vexing one. In the fifth century BC 
as well as in our own time, it is hard to work out a possible justification for censure of 
the freedom of speech.  
However, I maintain that there is room for discharging both Plato and Popper from 
being illiberal or even totalitarian. For what concerns the context in which the former 
lived, S. Halliwell points out: “[…] but a basic discrimination between satire of 
individuals and of the state remains indispensable.”291 As a matter of historical fact, it 
seems undoubted that “there was an old (“Solonian”) general law of slander at 
Athens.” 292  But the case of slander is intrinsically distinguished (and easy 
distinguishable) form a general censorship. If the former essentially concerns the case 
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of one citizen against another citizen, then the latter regards the case of a (strict) 
general law, and it is eventually the State versus one or more citizens.  
Although Halliwell focuses on the genre of comedy solely, we can understand some 
relevant points useful to address the question of freedom of expression of poets, and 
whether Plato was aware of such a principle or not, or whether his contemporaries 
were or not. To this extent, I shall argue that it is vital to emphasize that, in the 
Republic, Plato did not call for any type of law or decree regarding slander in 
comedies. We do know however that he did it in the Law (XI 934d-6b) but as 
Halliwell points out, even in that occasion: 
Plato is not all tied to the cultural practices of his own city, but in this 
instance he appears to have been curiously influenced by them. He 
assumes, unsurprisingly, that comic performances will occur in the context 
of religious festival (936a2) he is therefore recognizing at the same time as 
his spokesman hypothetically curtails, distinctively license which, as the 
entire section makes plain, is defined by its exemption from the 
requirements of customary social relations.293 
I shall argue that it is of particular significance that Plato never mentions any 
restrictions whatsoever of freedom of the poets regarding festival or religious 
ceremonies. For what concerns their very own domain, Plato does not say a single 
word of what or how artists, in general, and poets, in particular, should operate. He 
leaves them an absolute legislative liberty. Plato, at least in the society he envisages in 
the Republic, does not even consider the case of slander, unlike the liberal Solonian 
Athens does. I would also argue that the complete absence of any reference to these 
occasions strengthens my thesis that Plato did not ever censure poetry qua poetry by 
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the means of his banishment. Rather, he wanted to legitimate the art of poets as an 
independent tool of expression, regardless of any political, pedagogical or informative 
purpose.	  	  
Yet, it is understandable that the modern reader would find odd the idea of censorship 
– particularly when that censorship is aimed (quite contradictorily) at guaranteeing 
freedom. Popper, too, feels this worry and he justifies his censorship with the 
following compelling argument, (which I endorse):   
Democracy consists in the control of political power. That is the main 
point of democracy. There should be nobody uncontrolled in a democracy. 
Now television has a colossal political power potential; a potential that is 
almost all-important. It is as if it were God himself who speaks here, if this 
power is misused. The power is too great for democracy: no democracy 
can stand up if this power is misused. 
Urgency (if the similarity between Popper and Plato holds) seems to be what Plato 
felt, too, and that urgency gave rise to his censorship. 
If Popper makes a point regarding the unlimited power of (those who speak on) 
television, the comparison illustrated so far, then it sheds light on Plato’s banishment 
of the poets. In Book X of the Republic, he expressively refers to the drifter poets that 
from city to city demand to declare religious, epic poems in the agoras they come to 
(a). 
It seems, then, that if a man, who through clever training can become 
anything and imitate anything, should arrive in our city, wanting to give a 
performance of his poems, we should bow down before him as someone 
holy, wonderful, and pleasing, but we should tell him that there is no one 
like him in our city and that it isn't lawful for there to be (a). We should 
pour myrrh on his head, crown him with wreaths, and send him away to 
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another city. But, for our own good, we ourselves should employ a more 
austere and less pleasure-giving poet and storyteller, one who would 
imitate the speech of a decent person and who would tell his stories in 
accordance with the patterns we laid down when we first undertook the 
education of our soldiers (b).’ (Plat. Rep. 397a-398b).  
Further, as the second part of the extract shows, Plato admits a kind of poetic 
performance, in so far as it is functional to the guardians’ education (b). That it is to 
say that Plato’s banishment of the poets is not unconditional banishment but it is 
clearly aimed to the educational realm of poetic performances.  
If we accept Popper’s argument, then the question still lingers: why are only the poets 
so actively controlled and censored in Plato’s ideal community? I would offer an 
answer to such a thorny problem, in order to fully release Plato from any charge of 
illiberality.  
As a matter of fact, Plato censors and banishes the poets solely and not any other 
artists like painters, for instance (as Aristotle notoriously does in Politics 1336). In 
that occasion, Aristotle shows to be plainly sympathetic with Plato’s curtailments in 
education. Moreover, he even includes visual obscenity to the state literacy censures, 
(which is something that Plato never does). Essentially, if Plato really had a 
totalitarian attitude, he would have banished any of his philosophical opponents from 
participating in his ideal city. However, not just in the Republic but in each of his 
other dialogues no hint of such a totalitarian inclination exists toward the other 
philosophical schools, alongside the other (categories of) thinkers that compete 
against him, like sophists, rhetoricians and eristicists. We also know that, in his 
writing, Plato did want to distinguish himself (and philosophy in general) from the 
other opponents. The way he approached his opponents was by the means of rational 
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investigation, dialectic discourse and his willing to face any kind of interlocutor in 
open discussions. Of course, it was a hard task to complete in Socrates’ time. Also, as 
Nehamas observes (referring to Isocrates’ Helen):  
These texts indicate that in the eyes of the generation or two following him 
no less that in the mind of his contemporaries (as the Clouds 
demonstrates), Socrates remained closely connected with those who, at 
least in Plato’s dialogues, are portrayed as his most bitter and dangerous 
opponents. And, at least for Isocrates, Plato himself was on the sophistic 
and eristic side of the distinction between philosophy and its early 
rivals.294 
Although the majority of people still regarded such radically different thinkers as part 
of a similar mind-set, Plato never sought to eliminate from the debate the 
aforementioned scholars. Even if he did spend his whole life, as had his master 
Socrates not to mention his pupil Aristotle, distinguishing philosophy as the real way 
for seeking the truth, from other supposed sophoi who, conversely, claimed to already 
know the truth and being able to teach it, perhaps upon payment. Despite his constant 
work toward the establishment of his branch of philosophy, Plato did not banish the 
other thinkers from his ideal city.  
The reason, I suggest, relies on the completely different ground upon which the 
quarrel against them was to be fought. As Popper suggests in the context of modern 
mass media, when the mass media speaks, it is as if God himself speaks to the 
audience. That was very much true in the case of epic poetry too. Because of the 
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peculiar features already emphasized, the exhibition of epic poets was not just an 
artistic performance whatsoever. What the poets wrote was the word of the gods. This 
is exactly the reason why Plato banished such poets from Callipolis. He could not 
have had the possibility to contest poets’ tales because ultimately they were based on 
the authority of Greek polytheism. Both Socrates and Plato, who were very much 
willing to take part in a conversation with anyone searching for the truth, could not do 
that with the most authoritative source of truth, values, and general education. 
Because if the logos was the common ground for philosophers and sophists (among 
others), its analytic and dialectic analysis was useless to both rhapsodes and poets 
because they used to justify their conviction upon the religious authority they 
demanded to be means of expression295. The philosopher’s dialectics then was 
powerless when applied to the poets.  
Further, without a proper regulation, as Popper emphasises it is the main mass media 
power that censors everybody else, having neither the authority nor any plain 
regulation in order to censor anybody:  
But television censors everybody else. […] They have censored me; they 
can censor everybody. They have a completely unlimited power of 
censorship. […] But they censor me, so why should not I be involved in 
censoring them? […] My thesis is that from a democratic point of view at 
present the broadcasters are censoring everybody without their having any 
means of protesting against it.296 
Thus, the complete arbitrariness of the mass media system is the main, common flaw 
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sought both by Plato and Popper. In conclusion I argue that the great value of their 
thesis lies on the fact that both of them elaborated on an original solution in order to 
guarantee a well-balanced development of children. Secondly, the two scholars 
accomplished another great result too. They designed, by the means of the prima facie 
illiberal censorship, an “Open-System Society”, against what Popper defined as a 
“Bad Mistress” in the title of his work devoted to it. Such a “Bad Mistress” took the 
shape of poetry in fifth century BC Athens and television in our own time. Yet, these 
mistresses truly exercised the minds of some great thinkers. The job of those thinkers, 
both in antiquity as today, is to analytically criticize problem first and secondly to 





































An Anamorphic interpretation for a philosophical dilemma. 
 
In sum, I believe that it is eventually possible to set aside earlier objections regarding 
Plato’s alleged aversion to the poets. Yet, I also believe that the overall picture of 
Plato’s attitude toward art and poetry could be further clarified by an original 
comparison I draw in this final section of the study. 
For this reason, I would now advance my own general theory by the means of an 
explicative allegory. I am confident that, especially in the light of the former analysis 
and comments, we are now in a safe position to recover a consistent, overall picture of 
the matter at stake. I am confident that Holbein’s Ambassadors would help the reader 
to establish what Plato’s notorious attitude toward poetry prima facie looks, and what 
such stance actually shows when approached from the right perspective.  
To sum up my interpretation of Plato’s aesthetics in general and his banishment of the 
poets in particular, I would draw an original comparison in order to provide an 
incisive allegory of my interpretation of Plato’s stance on poetry. Indeed, I submit that 
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the most famous example of anamorphic painting effectively illustrates how Plato’s 
stance on poetry must be approached in order to be fully understood and sorted out.  
Because I believe that Plato’s attitude toward poetry actually works as an anamorphic 
picture. And The Ambassadors, as to say the anamorphic picture I have chosen as 
term of comparison, clearly explains the right approach we shall adopt toward Plato’ 
aesthetics, I submit.  
‘Anamorphic images are not just images that transform to reveal hidden secrets or 
change from one expected view to another. They do both these things, but they do it 
in particular visual ways according to specific rules or guidelines based on distance 
point and catoptric perspective practices.’ 297 
Anamorphosis in art then refers to a particular technique whose peculiarity relies in 
revealing a peculiar trait of a certain image. Such a trait, message, different painting, 
can be actually grasped by a particular, (usually lateral and anyway not frontal), 
perspective only. In what follows I argue that exactly the same happens in the case of 
Plato’s philosophy and his problematic attitude toward poetry.  
What I mean by this is that in so far as we look at Plato’s arguments on poetry 
regardless of his cultural contest298, we can only grasp a prima facie inconsistent (a) 
and disturbing (b) overall picture. As to say, the Plato’s critique and banishment looks 
different of what they actually are. Plato’s arguments seem narrow-minded or even 
illiberal, and the reader cannot makes sense of them. Mainly, that is due to the fact 
that what we nowadays term poetry is something intrinsically quite different from 
what Greeks refers to by the same word. And this is the reason why, if we apply 
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teleologism.  
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Plato’s criticisms to contemporary literature, they appear incoherent (a) with Plato’s 
numerous positive evaluations of poetry, as well as paternalistic (b) in their 
restrictions or even illiberal: Plato’s banishment of the poets i. e. (bI).  
Conversely, the reason why I would define my ground-breaking interpretation as 
anamorphic relies on the fact that I show that approaching Plato’s extracts on poetry 
from Plato’s own historical and cultural perspective, they reveal to be very different. 
More precisely, if we look at Plato’s critique bearing in mind that poetry was the main 
mass media of classic Greece rather than a pure fine art, the same alleged despotic 
arguments eventually unveil themselves. Plato’s criticisms finally do make sense, 
because they apply to the ancient equivalent of modern broadcasting, as the analogy 
with Popper’s criticism and banishment of television shows.  
It happens exactly the same in the painting I recall in this section, I urge.  
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Because of its peculiar anamorphic frame, in so far as we look at the above painting 
from the frontal perspective (only), we actually deal with the following problematic 
issues: 
a) We see in front of us an inconsistent (a) object with respect to the rest of the 
painting.  
b) Such an incomprehensible object at the centre of the figure actually does look like 
a scratch (b).  
A disturbing, inconsistent element in connection with the picture it belongs to. 
More precisely, I insist that the skull anamorphically painted actually looks like a 
visible annoying, distorted element, unsounding with the rest of the painted objects of 
the picture.  
Further, it is curious to note that the allegorical figure the two Ambassadors bear 
represent ‘[…] the symbolic tokens of property, accomplishment, and discovery, as if 
they in their own persons were the bearers of the advanced knowledge and civilization 
of their own time.’299 
Once again, I argue, as in Plato’s philosophy overall picture, in front of us stands the 
most important items. But the overall picture, or, better say, all the elements of the 
picture, can be grasped only by adopting a particular perspective, hidden at a first 
sight.  
Now the reader might ask why one might should do that. Or put in another way, one 
could wonder whether the parallelism I have just sketched is justified or not.  
I would answer in reply that such a move, as to say a change of perspective for 
approaching Plato’s vexed attitude on art, is fully justified by the following elements.  
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1. First of all, as I have argued at length previously, the predominant cultural context 
was significantly distinct, and if we do not bear it firmly in mind; what we get is a 
distorted overview, not just of a particular (skull), but also of Plato’s philosophy 
in general, I urge.  
2. Secondly, since ‘anamorphic representation occasionally defines a specific 
viewing point.’300, through Anamorphosis I submit that we see the philosopher’s 
specific viewpoint. As in the case of the Ambassadors, where the skull is actually 
visible form the point of view that the painter used to look at the paining. More 
precisely, the only point from which it is possible to see the skull clearly 
corresponds to the lateral door the painter used in order to enter his study. 
 
It happens the same in the case of Plato, I argue. Once we adopt the philosopher’s 
perspective, we clearly see how poetry was like and Plato’s concerns became visible.  
Therefore, I submit that, as in the anamorphic painting cited, what surfaces from a 
deep interpretation of Plato’s criticisms and consequent banishment of the poets in the 
Republic, is a radically different overall picture form the pima facie impression of it.  
That is the only way, I maintain, we have to adopt in order to gain a real 
understanding of Plato’s condemn of mimetic poetry and his reasons for his censure 
of poetry and poets’ exile. As in an anamorphic picture, if we do not adopt the right 
perspective, we get confused and we loose the sight of what a prima facie inconsistent 
picture really means.  
Otherwise, mainstream interpreters such as Annas and Naddaff, holding that Plato’s 
criticism of poetry is teleological and based on its educational function, loose the 
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sight of the many appreciations of poetry I have emphasized, getting at an 
inconsistent picture of Plato’s aesthetics.  
My reading then, differs because according to the mainstream interpreters, Plato does 
not recognise any other value in poetry, while I hold that he does recognise another 
aesthetic value in it and so sees it as having value as a fine art. In order to corroborate 
this claim, I have laid stress on the fact that since the early dialogues till the late ones, 
Plato shows to appreciate poetry, in so far as it is the object of a disinterested 
appreciation or experience. The matter is when poets use poetry for political and 
pedagogical purposes. 
Further, the way I have proposed presents a fundamental advantage in comparison 
with the interpretations and comments faced throughout this work. This study is 
indeed the only one capable of recovering an overall, consistent explanation of why 
Plato on the one hand often praises Homer and other poets, and on the other hand he 
harshly criticize them from extra-aesthetic points of view.  
One might ask why it is necessary to build a consistent view in order to grasp Plato’s 
message in respect to art in general and poetry in particular. Indeed, I realize that a 
coherent account is not per se a guarantee of rightness. Because of one might object 
that an overall consistent account of Plato’s philosophy in relation specifically with 
poetry is simply not possible to accomplish. But what I want to stress here is that my 
account of Plato on poetry combines both the rational and historical reconstruction. 
Which is, in my view, the right way of proceeding in order to find out what a thinkers 
of the past really meant. But S. Makin emphasizes the importance of the two entities 
mentioned above: ‘But it would be wrong to oppose historical and rational 
reconstruction, as if one was showing what a philosopher said, the other what he 
meant. Historical and rational reconstruction combine to show clearly what P said. 
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Simply presenting the words P used does not show us what P said. For until we 
understand the words that P used we gain nothing by knowing that P used them. To 
understand what P said I have to relate P’s words and concepts to my own words and 
concepts.’301 
On the other hand, one might argue that Plato simply changed his mind, as he 
certainly did during the course of his life. That certainly happened, as D. Frede, points 
out: ‘it is unconceivable that Plato, who thought, discussed, and wrote philosophy for 
some fifty years, never changed his mind’302. But, at least in the case of poetry, that 
would imply that in a certain period he did evaluated positively poetry and 
subsequently he did not.  
But the textual analysis conducted since the very early dialogues till the very last one 
highlights a consistent set of claims about poetry and poets. It is then possible to say 
that Plato, did not changed his mind about poetry. On the contrary, and in a nutshell, 
Plato emphasizes (and shows by the means of dialectics) that poets lack the 
knowledge they believe to possess thanks to the gods influence. But on the other 
hand, Plato shows sincere appreciation for the most famous authors of the past as well 
as his own time, when they are not taken to be teaching for the children or source of 
knowledge for the adults.  
Or one might even argue that Plato was inconsistent in his attitude toward poetry. And 
the fact that in this study I have put forward a theory that reconciles a struggle 
account of Plato is not by itself a guarantee that my theory is (the) right (one).  
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To this extent, a related question would be how can we be sure in attributing a certain 
view to an author?  
S. Makin answers this question too, emphasizing the necessary correspondence 
between the historical and the rational frame.  
‘This will not be objectionable as an account of P's views. It will only appear 
objectionable if historical and rational reconstruction are confused. But nor will this 
be a purely rational reconstruction, with no historical component. For, as seen above, 
rational and historical reconstruction typically go hand in hand, and I seek consistency 
with the historical evidence concerning P’s grounds for C, so far as is possible given 
my knowledge of what P said concerning C.’303 
Such a coincidence, as indicated since the very beginning of the study, is the obliged 
path by which our investigation has analyzed Plato’s texts. A fortiori, throughout this 
study I have argued that both the historical and the theoretical outlooks are necessary 
keys in order to make sense of Plato’s attitude toward poetry.  
But further, Plato himself reinforces the thesis that it is necessary to look for the 
overall consistent meaning in order to work out what an author really meant. Indeed, 
in the Protagoras Plato has Socrates emphasize with particular clarity the above 
conviction. Although we have already treated in details in the second chapter, it is 
useful to recall that in the Protagoras, the eponymous sophist recalls a single passage 
by Simonides in order to (pure instrumentally) corroborate his own claim. Plato rebuts 
that in order to figure out what a certain author really did want to say, we have to seek 
for a general, consistent message, instead of looking to a single extract.  
Although other interpretations go to different directions, I endorse C. Rowe’s reading 
of the passage of the in question. 
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‘Socrates’ exposition of the Simonides poem in the Protagoras is normally taken as a 
spoof of some kind. But it seems unlikely that Plato would take up six Stephanus 
pages with a mere jeu d’esprit. I suggest, rather, that he/Socrates is starting from the 
position adopted by the other interlocutors, that the poet is wise and therefore must be 
telling the truth – with this difference, that he makes the poem express the truths that 
it would be telling if in fact the poet was wise, which Socrates thinks, and we know he 
thinks, he was not. So it is a kind of spoof, but one with a serious point, and one that 
gives Socrates an opportunity to expound his own ideas at some length.’304 
Indeed, Plato cogently postulates that we have to seek for the general, consistent 
account in order to be sure to attribute the correct, original view to a certain author. 
Plato himself the, invites us to follow this approach in order to find out the truth. 
Which is, I insist, that his prima facie censorship and even banishment could be read 
as a release for Art. Because, it is worth to reiterate it, Plato does not banish poetry 
because he is attacking it as a “fine” Art.  On the contrary, he is releasing poetry from 
its educational context and baptizing it into the realm of Fine Art. The art that we do 
know and we do appreciate per se. Put in another way, poetry as art, because of its 
freedom from all the external purposes and functions that Plato emphasized as flaws 
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